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BEYOND THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL: A SYNTHESIS OF THE 
POLITICAL THEORIES OF HANNAH ARENDT AND MICHEL 
FOUCAULT 
 
SUMMARY 
This thesis argues for a move beyond the division of contemporary western experiences 
into separate social and political spheres.  This includes a comparative study of the theories 
of Hannah Arendt and Michel Foucault alongside historical and contemporary examples in 
support of the relevance of their theories and that of this thesis.  
The synthesis between Arendt and Foucault made here corrects the respective weaknesses 
in each theory by using the strengths of the other. Furthermore, this synthesis informs a 
move beyond the social and political referred to above. The critique of sovereignty, the 
defence of plurality and the critique of instrumental reason are shown here as the most 
important parallels between the two thinkers and the central ways that people in 
contemporary western society are disempowered. This thesis argues for a reconsideration of 
these issues in order to redress this disempowerment.  
The thesis also looks at the major divergence between the two thinkers which is shown to 
rest on their respective treatment of the social and political. This argument rejects the 
Arendtian argument for the separation of the social and political to favour Foucauldian 
resistance located on and within the everyday experiences of western individuals. This 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
opposition to the claims of Arendt regarding the social. However, this retains the political 
strengths of her vision.  
The synthesis of the strengths of both theorists alongside the ultimate rejection of the 
Arendtian separation of the social and political that this Foucauldian resistance exemplifies 
is concluded as constituting a move beyond the social and political to have more relevance, 
meaning and ultimate empowerment for individuals because it more accurately reflects the 
realities of their everyday lives.  
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The Unknown Citizen. 
(To JS/07/M378 This Marble Monument is Erected by the State) 
 
He was found by the Bureau of Statistics to be 
One against whom there was no official complaint. 
And all the reports on his conduct agree 
That, in the modern sense of an old-‐fashioned word, he was a saint 
????????????????? ?????????????????????????? 
He worked in a factory and never got fired, 
????????? ????????????????????????????????? 
For his Union reported that he paid his dues, 
(Our report on his Union shows it was sound) 
And our Social Psychology workers found 
That he was popular with his mates and liked a drink. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????? 
And his health card shows he was once in hospital but left it cured 
??he had everything necessary to the Modern Man, 
A phonograph, a radio, a car and a Frigidaire. 
Our researchers into Public Opinion are content 
That he held the proper view for the time of year; 
When there was peace, he was for peace; when there was war, he went 
He was married and added five children to the population, 
?? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Was he free? Was he happy? The question is absurd: 
Had anything been wrong, we should certainly have heard.                        
 
W . H . Auden (1960) 
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Do not go gentle in that good night. 
Rage, rage against the dying of the light 
 
Dylan Thomas (1952) 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1999 I criticized Michel Foucault (1926-1984) for not recognizing in his College de 
France lectures that his call for political philosophy to ????????????????????????????????121) 
had already been achieved by Hannah Arendt (1906-1975).1 Over the course of researching 
the above article it became apparent that there were both parallels and divergences between 
the two theorists to an extent that an article could not adequately explore. At that time, the 
comparison between these two theorists was a relatively under explored area within social 
and political thought2. The exception to this was in feminist literature3 where the 
compatibility and contrast between the two had some provenance. It was still however 
restricted in terms of the potential that it offered. There was then a nagging intuition that 
there was something very original in taking a much deeper and more extended exploration 
of the work of these two theorists in comparison and contrast to one another, particularly by 
taking the wider approach of looking at comparisons between them in general, rather than 
the sociologically specific and by definition limited site of feminist politics.  
Other reasons contributed to the desire to develop a thesis length argument around these 
two thinkers. There is also something very timely in the parallel observations that both 
make regarding the empowerment of individuals in the contemporary western world which 
in this thesis is used to apply mainly, but not exclusively, to Western Europe and North 
America. In actual fact, the points in this thesis would apply to any part of the world where 
the experiences of peo?????????????????????????????????????????? ????????. The concept of 
state used in this thesis is applied both in the ????????? ??? ???????????????????? ?an 
exclusive rule over a given territory???????????????? ?????????? 78) and as the set of shared 
practices and organisations that order everyday life. The thesis also grew out of the desire 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
should not be sidelined by the traditional cannon of politics, a notion of which Arendt can 
be considered to be representative, but that the social was immanent to and therefore 
inseparable from politics as is shown in the work of Michel Foucault. It is the ultimate aim 
                                                                                                                    
1See Claire Edwards, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, Studies in Social and 
Political Thought, Issue 1, (1999 2nd ed.), 3-20. 
2 With the exception of Grumley (1998) and Dana Villa (1999). Both are however brief engagements with the 
subject. 
3McNay (1991, 1992), Bell (1996), Honig (1995), Benhabib (1996), Pitkin (1998). 
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of this thesis not only to point out the need to transcend this distinction given the 
disempowering experiences of the contemporary western world but also to suggest the way 
that this might be done. This thesis therefore is the conse???????????????????????????????
parallels to each other, important divergence from each other and the contemporary 
relevance that a synthesis of their strengths offers. 
Despite the argument here originating from an appraisal of Arendt that led to a critique of 
Foucault, this thesis concludes with an ultimate critique of Arendt via an appraisal of 
Foucault. The structure of the thesis and the reasons for this will be explained in due 
course. Firstly, however, it is necessary to explain something about the ideological 
background of these thinkers, the way that this is employed in this thesis and the changing 
context of the secondary literature against which this thesis will be written. 
Bellamy points to the political and social naivety of most recent liberal theorising of all 
persuasions (1992: 217) and in doing so he unintentionally pinpoints the problem in 
modern liberalism that both Arendt and Foucault malign and which it is important to 
clarify. Liberalism is not a straightforward ideology. For example, consideration must be 
given to the historical span of liberal ideas which range from for example ???????????????
(1588-1679) seventeenth century advocacy for a necessary political authority in the body of 
the sovereign (1651) to ?????????????????- ) twentieth century Theory of Justice (1971). 
Furthermore, there are also the different forms of liberalism that originate from different 
places4. To further complicate the issue, different strands of liberalism can appear to argue 
very different things depending upon whether they primarily involve an argument 
concerned with the ?social??that is the everyday lives of individuals, ?political???????? that 
are the degree to which those individuals are empowered in their everyday lives, or the 
?economic? sphere which pertains to material wealth.  
?????????????????????????-???????????????????????????????????????wing crude boundaries 
allows those arguments of Mill (1806-1832) concerning sexual ???????????????????????????
(1864-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????rguments of Hobbes for sovereign 
authority (1651), Rousseau (1712-??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????-
                                                                                                                    
4 For an informative consideration of liberalism on this basis see Bellamy (1992). 
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1920) consideration of the state in Politics as a Vocation (1974) could be considered 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????rgument by Hayek (1899-1992) of the 
importance of the free market in opposition to planned economies would constitute a much 
more economic liberalism.   
Explain???????????????????????????????????????????????????? in this respect is made all the 
more complex by the fact that at times both theorists present some liberal moments of their 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
importance of private possessions (in Bellamy 1992: ????????????????????????????????
recognition of the importance of the plurality of people (1964: 7) and the effectiveness of 
people acting together via an equal share of power (1964: 30,40). She would likewise agree 
????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????state politics and violence 
(1918: ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Rousseau 1968: 49) ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????from 
compulsion by others (1964: 76). Both Arendt and Foucault find simultaneous liberal 
mom???????????????????????????????????? (1632-1704) respect for toleration and difference 
of opinion and emphasis on the value of pluralism (Bellamy 1992: 166),  ???????????????-
1832) argument for the accountability of the governors to the governed (in Held 1989: 118) 
???? ????????????????????????-paternalism and anti-conformity (in Bellamy 1992: 24-6). 
Both ??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????n of 
??????????????? ???????????78) and the increasing and damaging rationalization and 
bureaucratization of western life (Bellamy 1992: 166). 
Despite these moments of convergence with liberalism there are clear moments where 
Arendt and Foucault critique other liberal principles thus standing in significant distinction 
to them. Both overtly reject the ????????????????????? description of individuals as hostile 
and in need of sovereign authority. They also re????????????????????????????? unanimity of a 
general will (1968: 61) and ???????????????????????? ?????????????????????????g who can 
?????????????????????????: ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????-1952) trust in the rationality of the historical process (in Bellamy 1992: 
142). Likewise, it can also be inferred that they would reject arguments such as that of 
12 
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Locke (1690) that security can be fo???????????? ???????????????????271-2) and the 
possession of private wealth (1996: 272-3). 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????therefore is a highly complex one. 
When the specific elements of liberalism that they reject are distilled and examined as they 
are in this thesis, theirs is a critique better described as being directed against liberalism 
since 1945, a notable point in the history of liberalism broadly supported by Bellamy 
(1992: 217). This is a particular type of liberalism that Foucault refers to as ????-?????????
(2004: 130) and which this thesis defines, in line with Foucault, as a form of ideology 
concerned with the free market, increasing privatisation at the same time as welfare 
reduction, and governance of the individual informed by principles of efficiency and 
competitiveness leading to self-interest (Kiely 2005: 63, 151, 224, 293). Held describes the 
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????d with questions of sovereignty 
??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
specifically economic security (2004: ???????????????????????????? 132). These are 
additions to which the claims of Arendt would lend some support. Both theorists have as 
central concerns the points at which government informed by liberal principles become 
self-contradictory.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
issues to those made by Foucault. This interpretation is supported by the examples that both 
use to illustrate their arguments.  This thesis therefore considers that Arendt????????????????
liberalism can be described as a criticism against neo-liberalism despite this being a term 
that she does not use. To this end, w???????????????????????????????????here in chapters 
pertaining to Arendt, it is used with this neo-liberal interpretation of it in mind.   
Since 1999 the secondary body of literature that compares Arendt and Foucault has grown. 
This is both a curse and a blessing. It is a curse because the initial basis of originality upon 
which this thesis was first grounded has perhaps been undermined somewhat. However, it 
remains the case that the majority of comparative secondary literature are articles; there are 
only two other book length studies that consider Arendt and Foucault comparatively5. The 
                                                                                                                    
5 This is to the best of my knowledge. See Kang (2005) and Kingston (2009). 
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blessing that arises from the increasing comparative body of work on Arendt and Foucault 
is that it has created a new basis of originality. 
This new originality is achieved in three main ways. Firstly, this thesis is able to bring 
together in one place most of the existing comparative secondary literature on Arendt and 
Foucault. This goes beyond the limit of all other comparative pieces to make this thesis 
distinct. The second point of originality derives from the points of parallel and divergence 
between the two that are considered. These are not limited to sovereignty (Agamben 1998, 
Martel 2010), revolution (Grumley 1998), violence (Duarte 2007), the social (Pitkin 1998) 
or critical thinking (Kang 2005).  
The argument here finds some kinship in the readings of Foucault and Arendt made by 
Kang (2005) and in terms of its ultimate conclusion the claims of Grumley (1998) and 
Kingston (2009) have some resonance. Further originality is provided on the basis that this 
argument pushes beyond the traditional dichotomy of individual versus collective (Braun, 
2007, Kingston, 2009, Marquez, 2010) by overtly recognizing that although the collective 
aspect of social action is not unimportant (Grumley 1998, Braun 2007) it is not something 
to be limited by either (Gordon 2001, Kingston 2009, Marquez 2010).  
The readings of Foucault and Arendt made here are original because of their distinction to a 
neutral reading of both theorists (Grumley 1998, Kang 2005). This thesis emphasizes a 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
analysis and resolution for disempowerment in twenty-first century everyday life than the 
arguments of Arendt, whilst having the advantage of retaining the important empowering 
spirit of Arendt. However, there is also originality through the attention that is given to 
certain under-?????????????????????????????????????????????? in the comparative secondary 
literature?????????????????????????????????????????????which this thesis considers some 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
aspects of Foucault that this thesis brings out is his critique of instrumental rationality.  
The secondary literature on Arendt and Foucault as separate thinkers is limitless. For 
practical reasons this thesis largely focuses on the comparative secondary literature, 
although often because of what has been accurately de??????????????????????????????????????
14 
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(Kang 2009: 8, 96) there are times where consideration is given to non-comparative 
secondary literature because certain claims therein warrant a response on this basis. 
Likewise, this thesis rejects any labels upon Arendt and Foucault that attempt to 
unnecessarily categorize them into the traditional canon (Klausen and Martel 2008). This is 
considered restrictive and not in the spirit of either theorist.  
The first six chapters of this thesis look at the main parallels between Foucault and Arendt. 
These are selected because it is felt that they are the converging aspects of their theories 
that have the most relevance for those societies identified earlier. Chapters Seven and Eight 
looks at the ultimate divergence between the two, namely their differing approaches to the 
social and political. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
theories to the contemporary western world all chapters of this thesis use contemporary 
socio-political examples and data in support of the claims both of Arendt and Foucault and 
also of the thesis itself.  
??????????????????????????????in this thesis is used to refer to the collection of plural people 
within a state whose everyday lives are subject to the governance of the centralised 
authority of that state. This definition is supported by Foucault who recognises the 
importance of ??????????????????????????????: 231) of ???????????????????????????????? 31). 
In addition to Arendt, other social and political thought treats the experiences of everyday 
life as an issue that can be separated from those of empowerment and uses the short hands 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (for example Schmitt 2007, 
Pitkin 1998, Schecter 2000). Although this thesis shows that both Arendt and Foucault use 
these concepts in highly idiosyncratic ways, it also shows that Arendt can be considered to 
be representative of this separation. As the ultimate contention of this thesis is that the 
misleading separation of these two concepts is transcended, the times when the terms 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? is due to their value as short hands, not 
because they exist as genuinely distinct spheres. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????eignty in three ways. It offers a 
consideration that goes further than other secondary work which alludes to but does not 
fully explore this issue (Connolly 1997) or that ignores it completely (Martel 2010). It 
distinguishes Arendt from advocates of sovereignty such as Hobbes and Schmitt and is 
15 
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therefore the chapter which demonstrates ?????????strength ??????????????????????? of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-citizen and sets this 
problem up as a weakness that Fouca?????????? redresses. 
Chapter Two explains Fou?????????????????????????????????? a parallel concern to that of 
Arendt. It shows that like Arendt, Foucault is distinct from Hobbes and Schmitt. This 
chapter also shows how this thesis is distinct from other comparative writers of Foucault 
and Arendt such as Marquez who sees their treatment of isolation as different (2010: 27-8). 
In addition to outlining this parallel, this chapter suggests that the reversal of the prevalence 
of the Foucauldian shepherd flock might contribute to the reinvention of the Arendtian city-
citizen thus demonstrating ????????????????????ique of sovereignty has a strength that Arendt 
lacks.  
Plurality is always used in this thesis in the directly Arendtian sense of the human condition 
that more than one person exists; every person exists at the same time as other people 
(Arendt 1998: 4, 1993: 73, 1976: 455). Chapter T????? ????????????????????????????????????
of plurality in the face of what she sees as mass western society. This chapter explains that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? and emphasizes the 
importance of this today. This chapter further explains isolation as a ?political? issue and 
loneliness as a ?social? one. The importance of this chapter is that it highlights the 
importance of plurality in two ways: the ontological situation of people and the plurality of 
perspective that this has immanent to it. 
Chapter Four explains that Foucault also defends plurality through valuing distinction. It 
emphasizes the importance of his argument for a much more dynamic operation of power 
and the importance of rejecting models of warfare that lead to fear of the other. This 
chapter explores the importance for creating a new relational fabric between people. 
Chapters Three and Four also exemplify the relevance to contemporary societies of this 
parallel between Foucault and Arendt that is a strength in the work of both.  
Chapter F?????????????????????????????????????????????l rationality which is defined here as 
means-end rationality which is shown to be rejected by Arendt because such forms of 
thinking stifle the ability to make judgements. ?????????????????????????????????
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distinctions to theorists such as Weber and Schmitt through her discussion of bureaucracy 
and politics. Furthermore, these two aspects of her thought exemplify its contemporary 
relevance. 
Chapter Six reads a critique of instrumental rationality i????????????????????????????social 
normalization. The Nietzschean influence on Foucault is examined here. The chapter also 
argues that there is a critique of instrumental rationality inherent in his analysis of 
pastoralisation. As with the previous chapter, it is shown how the Nietzschean and 
pastoralising aspects ???????????????????link through their contemporary relevance to 
violence and bureaucracy which are again used to show his clearest parallel with Arendt. 
This chapter also marks the point at which their divergences begin.  
Chapter Seven examines the divergence between Arendt and Foucault. This chapter looks 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ceases to count as politics at all. Because the social and political are connected so strongly 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????e chapter also examines but 
ultimately rejects her argument for the separation of the social and the political on the basis 
that the experiences of everyday life for many people make this impossible. Despite this 
rejection of Arendt, this chapter offers a much more sympathetic account of her idea of the 
social than is offered by other secondary commentators (Pitkin 1998, Reinhardt 1998, 
Medearis 2004, Kingston 2009, Marquez 2010).  
The final chapter of the thesis also looks at the social and political together through the 
arguments of Foucault and abandons these short hands in favour of issues of empowerment 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of Arendt that is captured in his 
notion of bio-politics is shown to be the ultimate distinction of his work from hers and this 
chapter states this as the ultimate strength that he offers in relation to her major weakness. 
The chapter suggests an approach to contemporary issues of empowerment in everyday life 
drawing upon ????????????????????????n ethics. It is claimed here that politics as an ethics 
shows the way to challenge the dominations of bio-politics and the way to transcend the 
separation of the social and political by taking on governance in its singular sphere of 
operation.  
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There would have been several different ways to approach a comparative study of these two 
thinkers, indeed the subject matter is not exhausted yet. There might have been more 
consideration of the intellectual history informing these two thinkers such as that of Kant, 
Heidegger, Jaspers, Blanchot and Rousset, a more detailed examination of Nietzsche and 
????????????????????? respective critiques of Marx and Humanism. However, given the 
aim of this thesis to demonstrate the relevance of a synthesis of Arendt and Foucault?s work 
to the contemporary world it was not possible to both look forward and backward with 
respect to their theories. For this reason the decision was made to focus on the present, 
between past and future one might say. Despite the ultimate rejection of Arendt contained 
in this thesis, it also demonstrates that it is nonetheless the case that the best of her vision is 
????????????? ???????????????????????????? 
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1.0 THE LOSS OF THE CITY-‐????????? ???????? ???????? ??
SOVEREIGNTY 
1.1: Introduction 
The estimations of the number of states in the contemporary world have ranged from 178 
(Nye 1993: 6) to 190 (McGrew in Held 2004: 132) to a more recent figure of 167 
(Democracy Index 2010). National states are governed in different ways. For example, 
Saudi Arabia is government by absolute monarchy, whereas North Korea is governed by 
dictatorship. In both states popular mandate does not form the basis of governmental 
legitimacy. Other forms of government established without popular mandate include 
theocracies such as Iran and Vatican City or a junta government such as in Niger. In the 
case of Somalia there is the claim (Bromley 2009: p404) that there is no de facto exclusive 
centralised government at all.  
Sovereign states and state systems are described by Arnason a???????????????????????? 212). 
112 claim to govern legitimately through popular mandate (Democracy Index 2010). This 
popular mandate, more often than not, is expressed through a process of free and fair 
elections of political representatives and politics is carried out day to day in the form of 
those political representatives forming government, rather than direct political participation 
by the population themselves6. Generally speaking, this means to govern according to 
principles commensurate with liberal democracy (Ibid). The specific internal arrangement 
of government of this type varies. For example, Germany and the USA use a federal system 
of government whereas the UK and Canada follow a parliamentary system. Some liberal 
democracies have a separation of the executive, legislative and judicial powers such as the 
USA and Italy whereas some have a fusion of powers such as the UK, Eire, India and New 
Zealand. France and the USA elect both their head of state and their government, whereas 
the UK and Australia have a non-elected head of state.  Other liberal democracies such as 
Belgium use a complex political system based on the communities within.  Some states 
include a monarch in their political system such as Belgium and Japan, whereas republics 
such the USA and France do not.  
                                                                                                                    
6 The two partial exceptions to this in the contemporary context are Switzerland and the USA which both 
involve some elements of direct political participation beyond voting for representatives. 
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Bellamy (1992: ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? Despite the numerous international 
variations of liberal democracy, all share common aspects that permit them to be conceived 
of by the term liberal democratic. For example, all have a territorially exclusive centralised 
government which draws its legitimacy from the individuals governed therein. 
Contemporary global state politics is therefore divided between states that follow a liberal 
democratic model for government and those that do not.  
In Hannah Arendt??????????????????????? political ideology that informs government matters 
less than the form and institutions that government takes, such as a centralised and distant 
government as exists in sovereign politics. In ????????????????????????????? of sovereignty 
applies across the ideological political spectrum. This chapter draws on this non-partisan 
strength and also seeks to emulate it in the examples provided herein. ?????????????????????
sovereignty uses Thomas Hobbes? (1588-1679) concepts frequently7 and although there are 
numerous other thinkers (Bodin 1596, Spinoza 1670, Filmer 1680 and Schmitt 1922) who 
advocate the importance of sovereignty to politics, it is to Hobbes as a representative of this 
argument that Arendt directs her critique. In order to understand the uniqueness of this 
critique, it is necessary to understand some of the political values behind sovereignty that 
Arendt uses Hobbes?????????????????????. Later some of the ways that Arendt can be 
distinguished from other, more recent theorists of sovereignty such as Carl Schmitt (1888 ? 
1985) will also be identified. 
Hobbes believed humans to be essentially anti-social creatures. As a result, states of war 
can potentially arise and these states of war can arise in two ways. The first way arises from 
????????????????????????????????????acquisition from another which may well require 
aggression to succeed. The second may arise from the attempts of individuals to protect 
themselves from this within the ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
toward Conte?????????????????? ??????????? 1651: 161). This ????????????????????????
human beings is one of conflict ?????????????????n. The potential acts of violence 
immanent to the state of nature are ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                                                                                    
7 As does Foucault as the next chapter will show. Other secondary theorists who do the same include Gratton 
(2006; 448), Marquez (2010, 16) and Martel (2010, 156). 
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
situation of a war of all against all (Ibid).  
In his body of political work Hobbes outlines the solution to this apparently inescapable 
situation. Hobbes argued that to guarantee each indivi???????????????????????banish the fear 
between individuals in the state of nature, submission of individual wills to a sovereign 
ruler should take place. This sovereign might be one man or representative body of men.  
Every individual would agree to obey decisions about their well being taken by the 
sovereign, and in turn the sovereign takes responsibility for the security of the people and 
thus individuals live free of the fear of conflict arising from the state of nature which 
simmers under the surface of all human interactions????????????????? responsibilities are 
discharged via civil institutions and law.  As a result individuals need no longer worry 
about participating in political life, as the undercurrent of conflict that the unchecked state 
of nature threatens to explode,  set off by such triggers as precarious security, tenuously 
possessed private property and arbitrary negative freedoms, is held safely in abeyance by 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
power on a sovereign, and their political responsibility(ies) of obedience to a sovereign.  
In this contract there is no longer a demand for the general population to participate in 
public life nor is there seemingly any need. Such political organisation appears to offer 
security and freedom. Individual wills are understood as one unitary will, the differences 
between the social bodies thereby represented are irrelevant because, politically speaking, 
they becom??????????? an indivisible union exists: sovereignty as the bedrock of freedom. 
This facilitates other ideas about how politics should be organized such as many can be 
represented as one, the sovereign protects and ensures individual liberty(ies) and security is 
a tenuous and fragile state that continually requires a fine balance of parental nurturing and 
alert watchfulness by a sovereign to ensure security continues. However, before moving on 
to consider Ar???????????????????????????????? it is necessary to give a brief preliminary 
explanation as to how the not??????????????????????????????????????? his political model 
upon finds equivalence in the contemporary western world. This is so that subsequent 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s 
sovereignty can be better understood.  
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1.11: ??????????????????s?????????????????xiety, Uncertainty and Mistrust 
Although not arising from the Hobbesian thought experiment of a human state of nature 
constituted by a war of all against all, vers?????????????? can be identified in contemporary 
social and political thought and the Hobbesian notion of fear added to, updated and 
understood through the concepts of insecurity, anxiety, uncertainty and mistrust. 
Dodsworth argues that in contemporary political life ???????????????????????????????????????
that new government powers are legitimised (2011: 10). She goes on to ????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
form of political insecurity can be added to by job insecurity (Dawson 2004, Layard 2003c: 
6, Skellington 2010: 17) and insecurities around marriage, the family and social roles (Beck 
1989: 87-88). Ecological insecurity and the crisis in the scientific expert are two further 
insecurities identifiable today (Ibid).  Forms of insecurity are so numerous and prolific 
today that contemporary society is defined by Beck ?????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (1989: 95). ???????????????
description of contemporary western societies is one mired ?????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ??????????? ????????????????????????????????? 102). This 
claim is supported by the growth in the formal study of health ?????? that is epidemiology 
(Carter and Jordan 2009: 83).  
Besides insecurity, Layard (2003) points to other aspects of modern western life that 
exemplify different ?????????????????????????????????????????????????within the UK and 
Europe (2003c: 6) is something that Layard argues is attributable to the liberal doctrine of 
?????-?????????????????????????????????????????a for produ???????????????????????????
Fribbance (2009: ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
economic and social position amongst their societal peers. The Downey report cites a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? and 
government ministers (Bell 2000: 169) and the work of Glaeser et al (2000) and Putnam 
(2003) demonstrate increasing self-reports of declining trust between people in the UK and 
USA (in Wilkinson and Pickett 2009: 54).  Declining trust between people may well be 
linked to the uncertainty that many people experience from increasing urbanisation from 
which they experience a sense of loss of place (Hinchliffe 2009: 213). In turn, the 
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uncertainty connected to loss of place may partially explain the fear and insecurities that 
surround both indigenous and immigrant populations in situations of migration (Raghuram 
2009: 160-170). Such fears are exemplified by the  No Borders movement?? (Hayter 2000) 
condemnation of ?????????? ??????????5 campaign to limit immigrants into the UK as a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 170).  
In the above ways ???????finds a place in contemporary society. In fact, the list of examples 
could go on and subsequent chapters of this thesis add to it. What is important at this point 
is to demonstrate how these notions of fear, ???????????????????????????????????????????
years ago, finds contemporary expression in the experiences of insecurity, anxiety, 
uncertainty and mistrust. As this thesis will go on to show, these can be argued to inform 
contemporary versions of sovereignty. 
Hannah Arendt fiercely criticizes sovereign models of politics????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????ced for people to be free 
(1993: 164-165). For Arendt, the sovereign model bequeathed by writers such as Hobbes is 
the antithesis to freedom. This claim is explained in the following chapter using three main 
criticisms of sovereignty made by Arendt. These are sovereignty as Leviathan, the 
Westphalian state as sovereign and the sovereign individual. The chapter is structured in 
these three ways to highlight the particular relevance and therefore the distinction that 
???????????????????????or the ways in which politics operates today in many of the 
political systems outlined earlier.  
1.2: Sovereignty as Leviathan 
The initial premise of the war of all against all that writers such as Hobbes founded a vision 
of a political system upon, is for Arendt the very beginnings of all that is wrong about a 
political system as embodied in a Leviathan (1976: 139).  This is because the sovereign 
holds all power(s). Sovereignty is the least egalitaria???????????????????????????????[?] an 
authoritarian form of government with its hierarchical structure [?] it incorporates 
inequality and distinction a???????????????????????????????? (Arendt 1976: 99).  ?On 
Revolution? (Arendt 1965) outlines the problems with the Hobbesian version of a contract 
between individuals and a sovereign, a covenant that ???????????????????????????????????
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aboriginal act on the side ???????? ????????????: 170). The requirement of this contract is 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The end result of this transference of power is that the individual has consented to obey and 
consequently to be governed, so rather than a gaining of more power, the individual loses 
what little power s/he had.  
In distinction to ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????overeign does 
not remove the dangers of isolation that the individual is argued to face in the state of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????[?] it is precisely their isolation 
which is s???????????????????????????????: 171). Thus the isolation of each individual is 
perpetuated by this kind of system, guaranteeing, in a circular, symbiotic relationship, the 
requirement for a sovereign and theref?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sovereign systems of politics perpetuate the very situations believed by many to be 
prevented.  
The isolation of each individual from their peers is an indication of the anti-political nature 
of this statist organisation of power. The very important political faculty of the capacity for 
spontaneous action within each individual is stifled (Arendt 1998: 188). The suppression of 
the individual?s capacity to act and the possibility that the system may fail to suppress this 
capacity to act locks both governor and governed into a relationship based upon fear, 
resulting in a tyranny (1976: 461). A political system based upon sovereignty requires 
further tyrannical measures via the implementation of violence to maintain order to suggest 
that the sovereign model provides security.  For Arendt, this means that sovereignty is an 
illusion, wholly at odds with the very freedoms that the sovereignty supposedly provides 
(1993: 164). For these reasons, Arendt reaches her conclusion that far from being the 
guardian of freedom(s) for individuals, sovereignty is, in fact, antithetical to it.   
A further problem that Arendt sees in terms of the sovereign political model centres upon 
how a single will as embodied in the ruler can be equated to the multitude of wills existent 
in the society below and this is a common problem from the strongest and most inflexible 
form of centralized authority such as dictatorships to those claimed as liberal democracies. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? one and the same as society, it 
is really a submission to wil??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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endures in this system (1965: 164-5). The absolute most that the individual can hope for in 
this system is that his/her will is represented by the sovereign, but as Arendt notes,  this 
does not equate with a direct action from the individual informed by their opinion (1965: 
268). In the contemporary European ?????????????????????????????????????? regarding 
political disenfranchisement is supported by an independent survey carried out by the 
International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (2004) that demonstrates a 
political apathy that characterises a decline in voting participation. All Western European 
countries except Denmark show a decline in voting participation in parliamentary elections. 
This is particularly the case in countries that have never had compulsory voting but is also 
true in some countries that have abolished it, for example, Austria. Peston (2005: 318) and 
Stephens (2004: 189) identify a rise in voter apathy in the U.K citing a 59 percent turnout 
(Peston 2005: 318) in the 2001 elections which saw only 40 percent of those under the age 
of 25 turn out to vote (Ibid). This marked the lowest voter turnout since the introduction of 
universal suffrage (Stephens 2005: 236). Heffernan (2011: 9) claims that this rose to 61% 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-?????????????
(Ibid). In terms of presidential elections in western European countries, the DEA survey 
shows a decline in voting and a lower voter turnout than for the parliamentary elections 8.  
The attempts to equate a sovereign will as the will of the people is another way such 
governmental models suppress ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
organize the infinite plurality and differentiation of human beings as if all humanity were 
???????????????????? (Canovan 1974: 24) and is described by Are??????????????????????????
(1976: 467).  Indeed, this is one of the biggest dangers of the sovereign model for Arendt 
and is the reason a whole separate chapter of this thesis considers it. Arendt distinguishes 
herself from thinkers such as Rousseau (1983: 61) by pointing out that the idea of a 
???????????????that can be represented by a sovereign neglects the plurality of individual 
wills. This creates the ideal political conditions for totalitarianism to flourish???A perfect 
?????????????????????????is for Aren??????????????? ??????????????????? ???????????? 
Immanent to liberal democratic political systems, within which ??????????m became 
absorbed with the ???????????????????????????????1989: 107), is the belief that submitting 
                                                                                                                    
8 International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (2004). 
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individual political power to a sovereign is democratic. The process for choosing a 
sovereign is either done by deus ex machina, as in the case of previous centuries or by 
popular vote, as in the case of contemporary liberal governments. Either way, this becomes 
accepted as legitimate, either because of divine law or because of the will of the majority. 
For Arendt, not only do sovereign political models ensure the continued isolation of each 
individual whilst at the same time homogenise the people below into the body of the 
sovereign, but the system in which liberal democracies come by sovereign governments is 
undemocratic because  
Even if there is communication between representative and voter, between the nation and parliament 
[??] this communication is never between equals but between those who aspire to govern and those 
who consent to be governed. It is indeed in the very nature of the party system to replace the formula 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sprung from the people (1965: 276-7).  
Arendt is unequivocal about the elite representatives that many political systems give rise 
to, arguing that the very system of representatives is un-political (1965: 277). She 
distinguishes herself from thinkers such as Weber (1974: 77) and Schmitt (2005: 6) by 
claiming that it ?????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? This process 
removes the individual from the political process and hands it ove??????????????? This 
diminishes the need for people to communicate with each other and further contributes to 
their isolation from one another.  
In ?On Revolution? Arendt draws upon the relatively youthful political system of America 
to exemplify her argument9. Arendt praised both Adams and Madison, two of the Founding 
Fathers of the American republic, who both argued for a balance and dispersal of power 
which minimizes the isolation outlined above that representation can lead to???????????
celebration of this type of government is a consistent theme throughout her body of work. 
In ?On Violence?, she re-iterates this praise of the American political system: 
The United states of America is among the few countries where a proper separation of freedom and 
sovereignty is at least theoretically possible insofar as the very foundations of the American republic 
would not be threatened by it [?] as Justice James Wilson remarked in 1793 ? ?????????????????????of 
the United States the term sovereignty is totally unknown (1970: 5-6) 
                                                                                                                    
9 Blakely and Saward (2009: 366) more recently make a similar claim. 
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For Arendt the alternative to fully sovereign centred political systems is clear. There needs 
to be a non-hierarchical arrangement of political power and this is an idea which is taken up 
further in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
In three ways then, Arendt sees problems with the politics of centralized models of 
governance. The first is the fact that statist politics perpetuates and guarantees the isolation 
of each individual. Rather than protecting the citizen from the hazardous state of nature, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
more plural public space amongst their peers. There are elements of ????????? here in that 
rather than facilitating freedom citizens? freedom is limited. Secondly, politics based 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????can be and is 
represented in the sovereign. This is nonsense for Arendt as the notion of a society 
becoming one requires a re?????????????????????????????? and suppresses the diversity of 
wills present in the plurality of people. The third way in which this system is fallible is 
through the idea that it is in fact democratic. As evidence shows, government by 
representation removes political motivation from electorates, creating professional 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? political inequality of the 
representative system is a further way in which the political isolation of citizens is 
guaranteed.  
Thus, it can be seen how the sovereign statist arrangement of power within a given territory 
comes under attack from Arendt and can be linked to contemporary political models. 
However, this is not the only way in which Arendt finds fault in the investment of power in 
a single, unitary sovereign. Arendt observes that during the nineteenth century the nation 
stepped into the shoes of the prince (1965: 268). The importance of this is that it is not only 
within borders that problems arise via sovereign models of politics, but also between 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sovereignty, the national state as sovereign actor on the global stage. This manifestation of 
sovereignty has its history in the seventeenth century, yet ???????????????????? and the 
examples offered by politics today is just as pertinent to the politics of the twentieth century 
and forms another key way that Arendt has a unique relevance to contemporary politics. 
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1.3:  The Westphalian State 
The Weberian definition of sovereignty is exemplified in international politics today by the 
1648 Treaty of Westphalia (Nye 1993: 2). This treaty sees the state as a political actor free 
from interference from outside its own territory (Kegley and Wittkopf 1993: 119-120) and 
is another way that sovereignty comes under attack from Arendt. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????what megalomania is 
for an ind????????????????????????? 124) one finds an articulation of a consistent theme 
throughout Arendtian political theory. This asserts that the global organization of powers 
based around the Westphalian concept of sovereign nation-states holds dangers akin to 
those which are claimed to be present within a sovereign territory. For Arendt, the modern 
faith in such an organization of states since the Treaty of Westphalia was foreshadowed in 
the spirit of the French Revolution (1976: 2???????????????????????????????? ????????
?????????????????????10 which characterized this revolution led to issues in terms of the 
creation of relatively modern nation-states. Arendt exemplifies this in ?The Origins of 
Totalitarianism?, making much of the peace treaties after WWI. She points out mistakes 
inherent in their caveats which relate to the creation of nation-states in Southern and 
Eastern Europe. In discussing the inadequacies of these peace treaties, Arendt gives us the 
insight that in her view the Westphalian nation-state system is fundamentally flawed. This 
is because state centred ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
politics, both in countries with settled national traditions and worse still, areas which lack 
[?] the conditions for the rise of nation-states; homogeneity of the people and rootedness 
??????????????????? 270). This is a sentiment also echoed by more recent theorists such as 
Modelski (1972), Scholte (1997) and Giddens (1999) albeit for different reasons to Arendt.  
????????????????????, one of the reasons for the fundamental impracticality of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-states in parts of 
Europe after 1918. This involved a yet further denial of the plurality of the human condition 
because not only did the solution embodied in the peace treaties arbitrarily gather people 
                                                                                                                    
10 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????of nation, state and nationalism see Arendt and Nationalism by R. 
Beiner (in Dana Villa 2002). 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????f the diversity and inequality of 
peoples contained within the territorial border (1976: 270) nor the inequalities outside of it. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????The dissolution 
of these two states in the early nineties (see Kegley and Wittkopf 1993: 459) also proves 
the more contemporary relevance ?????????????????????????????????numerous others such as 
Georgians in the former USSR, Hungarians in Romania and even Scots and Welsh in the 
United Kingdom. In support of A???????????????????????????????????? show a common 
pattern identified by Fuller (1991-????????????-nationalism [?] that includes separatist sub-
natio??????????????????????? ????????????? 460). 
Arendt points out that ????????????????????????????????????????equal national sovereignty 
with the West??????????????????? 270). This perpetuated the two hundred and fifty year old 
idea of an equal dispersal of power across the globe, territory by territory, immanent to 
which is the understanding that each territory is ?????????????????????????????????????????
example of East Europe after the First World War therefore, can be used to explain her 
objections to all modern territories because 
Modern power conditions [...] make national sovereignty a mockery except for giant states [and] 
??????????????????????????????????????ation-state system from outside. (1976: 269-70) 
???????????????????????? point here has been proven many times over on the world stage. 
The work of Troyer identifies the recent and ongoing situations in Iraq and Afghanistan as 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????03: 264). 
Likewise, Schwarz and Jüterstonke (2005) point out the discrepancy between international 
norms and practices due to the ambiguity of sovereignty. In these ????????????????????
claims find a contemporary resonance. 
 
In Arendtian theory there are other reasons why an arrangement of global power based on 
sovereign territories constitutes flawed political models??????????????????????re is only one 
resolution to disputes in a world whose political units are defined by the autonomous right 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????? ???? [....] that conflicts of an international character can ultimately be 
settled only by war, there is no ??????????????????????????229). ??????????????????????lyptic 
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?????????????????: 3) that characterizes the global organization of political power, 
particularly in relation to global superpowers Arendt astutely observes the futility of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????? to govern autonomously. She rightly claims 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????: 3). At the time that 
Arendt wrote this the superpowers in question were the USA and the USSR. Although the 
USS????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in terms of the greater proliferation of WMD???????????????????????more relevant11. The 
former BBC war correspondent and Independent MP, Martin Bell supports this claim by 
stating ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and an ????????????? ???? ??????????????????????????????? 123).  
 
???????????????????f this aspect of sovereignty therefore highlights a certain paradox in the 
modern organization of global politics that has perpetuated into the twenty-first century. 
The organization of landmass into sovereign nation-states creates a global situation akin to 
the one within territories that Hobbes was anxious for us to avoid. Nye (1993: 6) describes 
the characterization of the global order as anarchic and Kegley and Wittkopf  (1993: 575) 
state the absence of a higher authority to the nation state .  To put this differently, the 
concerns and solutions for potential states of war in the domestic political context do not 
appear to be applicable or necessary concerns or solutions in the global one. 
 In order to ensure that the individual sovereignty of nation-states is respected, deterrence 
via means of violence is the best guarantee of peace. On a global scale therefore in terms of 
our current organisation of power there exists the potential for conflict. Given the relevance 
of her claims to the contemporary situation, Arendt prophetically notes ????????????????????
hidden throughout the history of national sovereignty was that sovereignties of 
neighbouring countries could come into deadly conflict not only in the extreme case of war, 
?????????????????????278). The examples of the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988) and the Bosnia-
Croatia conflict (1992-1995) point to the ????????????????????????????????????????? as does 
the 22% increase in the worldwide sale of arms since 2005 (Skellington 2010: 17).   
 
                                                                                                                    
11 This concern is recognised by Ikenberry (2002), Troyer (2003), Houen (2006) and Martel (2010).  
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The paradox is therefore, that through the organization of contemporary global politics the 
people of the world are still bequeathed the very situation that the statist sovereign model of 
domestic politics supposedly averts but on a larger scale. The potential for ??????????????
against all??still exists most ostensibly on a global scale. Global not just in reference to the 
???????????????????????????????????? the potential for greater destruction than Hobbes could 
have ever envisaged because the growth of technology and its awesome destructive 
capacity (Arendt 1983: 83) has to be allowed for12. Arendt cautions that it should not be 
forgotten that such technological growth, for all of the advantages that this affords us, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
That is, no situation of war can ever in reality end any other way than annihilation for all 
concerned parties. This situation finds its zenith in a global order pivoted around a political 
??????????????????????????????????????????????erritorial boundaries. In her recognition of this 
paradox, Arendt is distinct from political theorists such as Schmitt who claim that war is 
not the aim, purpose or content of politics (2007: 34). Furthermore, in this recognition 
??????????????????????????eignty has further value to contemporary politics and to this 
thesis. 
Arendt herself identifies another paradox inherent in the notion of state as a sovereign 
actor. In the work ?The Origins of Totalitarianism? she documents the history of 
imperialism. Imp???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
financial wealth across the world and the resulting imposition of the will of one sovereign, 
upon a land and a people far outside the territorial limit which would demarcate its claim to 
its own rights to exclusive rule (Arendt 1976: xvii). As in the previous section, we are 
directed again to the tenuous basis of any legitimate claim of sovereign rule. Arendt points 
out how the nation-state is least suited to successfully fulfil such expansionist aspirations, 
???????????? [?] consent at its base cannot be stretched indefinit??????????? 126-7). 
Moreover, a nation-?????????????????????????????valid beyond its own people [?] and 
boundaries (Ibid). 
                                                                                                                    
12 A point made in much more recently by Nye (1993:7) 
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The paradox of this expansionism beyond ?????????????????????????????????????????-fold 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
nation leads: 
[?] either to the full awakening of the conquered peoples national consciousness and consequent 
rebellion against the conqueror, or to tyranny. And though tyranny, because it needs no consent, may 
successfully rule over foreign peoples, it can stay in power only if it destroys first of all the national 
institutions of its own people. (Arendt 1976: 128) 
It can ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
here. As recently as 2010 it has been described by Andrew Murray of the Stop the War 
???????????????????????????????in Jones 2010). Even the British deputy Prime Minister Nick 
??????????????????????????????????????(Ibid)13, a description used more recently in the UK by 
Liberal Democrat MP Michael Moore14. 
   
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
taken to mean the very concepts that justify the legitimacy of governments at home, namely 
democracy, freedom, security and legitimacy from below leading to a peaceful existence 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for new invest?????????????????????????? 132) the paradox of expansionism within the 
Westphalian system leads to the potential end of the conquering sovereign. This might 
firstly happen via war as a result of rebellion in the conquered nation and the concomitant 
loss of peace. Arend???????????????????????????? by a former Gulf War commander who 
conceded that ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 115), an idea 
furthered upon by a former Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff who points 
out t???????????????????????????????????????????pproach to war-?????????????????????? 116). 
This is because any rebellion would need to be fought by the sovereign, or more accurately, 
the people over whom the sovereign governs, thus rendering obsolete the peaceful 
existence that the sovereign is supposed to provide. The second paradoxical outcome 
relates to the tyranny that will need to be employed to quash dissent in a conquered nation. 
For the conquering sovereign this again results in hypocrisy toward the very principles that 
                                                                                                                    
13 Other w?????????????????????????????????????????ork here are Troyer (2003), Martel (2010) and Arato and 
Cohen (2009: 323).  
14Michael Moore, Question Time, BBC1, 10th March 2011 
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ensure the sovereign?s existence at home. This can then only result in those principles being 
undermined.  The previous example of Iraq also demonstrates both of these paradoxes. 
 
??????????????? about the weaknesses of sovereign systems are therefore far from untimely. 
Today global superpower(s) exist who stand financially and technologically more superior 
to other states in the system, and who can, and sometimes do, ignore the Westphalian 
principles of sovereign governance as their forebears did15. Prophetically, on states of this 
type, Arendt writes: 
[?] the very notion of one sovereign force ruling the whole earth, holding the monopoly of the 
means of violence, unchecked and uncontrolled by other sovereign powers, is not only a forbidding 
nightmare of tyranny, it would be the end of all political life as we know it. (1983: 81) 
Again here, Arendt points out the potential of the imbalance of power between sovereign 
states and the consequences that are involved in this. It is therefore no great surprise to find 
that Arendt considers the Westphalian system of sovereign nation-states outdated16.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the foundations of the nation ???????????????15), it????????????????????????????????6), and 
????????line of the nation-??????????????4, 9). More recent international theorists echo this 
sentiment such as McGrew who has nicknamed the international political system 
???????????????????????????? 164). 
In line with Arendt???????????????, international politics might therefore be described as 
???????????????????????. The Westphalian notion of sovereignty invites the concession, 
alongside the one made by Arendt (1970: 5), that there are not many alternative options. 
This s????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
[sovereign] ??????? (1970: 36) positing that there is only one conceivable way out of ?the 
insanity of this position? (1965: 4)?????????????????????????????????????????????] purpose, 
that fact alone proves that we must have a ???????????????????????????????: 229-30). One 
more recent alternative is that proposed in the arguments of theorists such as Rosecrance 
(1986) who argues that this new concept might be found peacefully through economic 
                                                                                                                    
15 For example, Duarte (2008: 2) points out the unilateral decision making of the hegemonic USA. Other 
writers who see this as a form of imperialism are Ikenberry (2002: 270), Arato and Cohen (2009: 323) and 
Martel (2010: 154).  
16 A view supported in a more modern context by Connolly (1997: 15) and Arato and Cohen (2009: 323). 
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relations. Others might be found through the social sphere, via the increasing number of 
international NGOs (see Held 1999: 151, 2004: 138-9) and/or the existence of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? 26). It still remains the case however 
??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? 4) and that the optimism of 
Rosecrance and others is belied by the twenty-first century examples given so far. 
The world today is a global order organized around rights to exclusive government over a 
territory and where peace is only achieved in certain regions at certain times due to the fear 
of the scale of war that has the potential to erupt. In the international arena, what has arisen 
is a global version of Hobb????????????????ure. Rather than peace being achieved through 
any genuine cooperation, it is based upon undercurrents of insecurity and fear backed up by 
weapons of world destroying capabilities. ???????????????????????????? paradox so early on 
in post-war international relations is central to the value and relevance of her critique of 
sovereignty today. 
WMDs as solutions to disputes constitute ?finality? in every sense of the word, the end of 
all parties and so is in fact is no real solution at all, making a mockery of the system itself. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????only 
???????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Furthermore, there are important social and economic issues which concern geographical 
locations but which now have too many international dimensions to be effectively dealt 
with by the state (Beck 1989: 94, Giddens 1999). Examples which illustrate the problem of 
this notion of state sovereignty are terrorism (Lowenheim 2007), the Tragedy of the 
[environmental] Commons (in Pryke 2009: 115) and the international drugs trade (Booth 
1996). Albert (2001 in Held 2004: 99) points out that ????????????????????? largest 
economies are corporations. This suggests, in line with Arendt, that new concepts for 
international issues are needed. This new concept may be found in a direction based more 
in international socio-economic issues and less in the politically flawed notion of ?states as 
containers????????r 1995 in Held 2004: 133). The political value of the socio-economic 
field is revisited in the ultimate conclusion of this thesis. 
The flawed concept of sovereignty thus far discussed also applies, Arendt argues, to the 
lives of those individuals who live under any political systems that promote the 
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maximization of individual liberty as a key function of government. In this way her critique 
is directed toward those versions of sovereignty that claim to guarantee a freedom 
measured in terms of individual sovereignty.  The final aspect therefore of Arendt?? unique 
tripartite critique of sovereignty is through its application to individuals. It is also here that 
the purpose ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
citizen can be identified.  
1.4: The (Non) Sovereign Individual 
For Hannah Arendt, the idea and celebration that is bound up in the notion that by being 
sovereign individuals we are free, is a cause for concern. Her political theory is concerned 
less with undermining the kind of liberties that classical liberalism emphasised, such as the 
Hobbesian freedom from attack or the Benthamite ???????????????????????????? ?????????????
narrow focus of ??????????that characterizes neo-liberal rhetoric and the methods 
advocated to achieve such freedom. For Arendt, such ills hit an apogee in the modern age. 
?????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
unhampered pursuit of more pr????????????????????????????????8: 110). 
Here then Arendt identifies that peculiar to neo-liberal rhetoric is sovereignty understood as 
freedom to accumulate wealth. This Arendtian definition is upheld in the modern political 
rhetoric of the UK, where politicians marry economic insecurity and the threat from 
terrorism (Clegg, 2011) or argue that ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
bulwark between the power of the state and the fre??????????????????????????????? 2001). 
Arendt attacks the contention that such accumulation of wealth creates secure and free 
individuals contra the state of nature. As an aside to the main debate, in ?The Human 
Condition? Arendt states: 
I fail to see on what grounds in present-day society liberal economists (who today call themselves 
conservatives) can justify their optimism that the private appropriation of wealth will suffice to guard 
individual liberties ? that is, will fulfil the same role as private property. In a jobholding society, 
these liberties are safe only as long as they are guaranteed by the state, and even now they are 
constantly threatened , not by the state, but by society, which distributes the jobs and determines the 
share of individual appropriation. (1998: 67-8)17 
                                                                                                                    
17 It should be understood that Arendt distinguishes private property from the accumulation of wealth. The 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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Arendt recognizes that certain elements of political discourse not only condone, but 
actively encourage the accumulation and appropriation of wealth. This is reminiscent of the 
earlier observation about sovereignty that identify it as anchored to issues of individual 
security and this applies no less today. Besides conservatives, other politicians also speak in 
terms of ???????omotion of both our s??????????????????????????????? 2011). The 
appropriation of wealth is encouraged in contemporary liberal thought because it appears to 
represent the guarantee of individual autonomy. However for Arendt ????????????????
always takes the form of negative freedoms, which are a limited form of freedom and not a 
????????????????????????????. Negative liberties masquerade as individual sovereignty and 
this harbours dangers ??????????????????[...] freedom can only come to those whose needs 
have been fulfilled, it is equally true that it will escape those who are bent on living for 
????????????????????: 139). 
There is then an identifiably anti-capitalist sub-?????????????????????18 as well as her 
explicit critique of sovereignty. As a result of the encouragement of the appropriation of 
private property the statist system carries within its practices the justification for its 
continued existence. What ?????????????????????8: ????????????????????????????????????
from each other in a struggle for more ????????????8: 69). This is necessary because the 
system itself cultivates a culture which successfully manufactures in individuals all the 
alleged guile and stealth characteristic of individuals in the state of nature, thus giving the 
illusion that the state of nature is a realistic possibility, something also recognised by 
Layard which he dates as particularly identifiable since the late seventies (2003c: 15). 
Ostensibly a long way from the cut throat world of capitalist endeavour Arendt observes 
that even the family man is indoctrinated with the same ideals and her assertion that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
concentration on the welfare of his family [?] that we hardly noticed how the devoted paterfamilias 
worried about nothing so much as his security. (1976: 152)  
is borne out by the contemporary political sentiments given above. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Ancient Greek political system, complete with city-citizens, whereas the latter is the use of wealth to 
accumulate more wealth, as in the spirit of capitalism. This is expanded upon elsewhere in this thesis.  
18 For reasons of brevity and relevance it regrettably cannot be elaborated upon in this thesis. See Kang (2005: 
214-215) for a brief discussion of the anti-capitalism of Arendt. 
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Thus the core tenet of those doctrines that esteem personal security also dictate privacy as 
an ideal for maximizing security, something the Osborn quote demonstrates particularly 
well. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
view because of the disconnection from public life that the retreat into the private sphere 
fosters. As the examples of contemporary political rhetoric given here demonstrate, the 
serious political consequences that Arendt identifies have to be considered in contemporary 
politics no less and possibly a great deal more than at the time that she wrote about them.  
The consequence of basing security upon individual sovereignty and sovereignty upon the 
accumulation of wealth and privacy as a measure of freedom undermines collective human 
experience. In order for individuals in the societies described so far to safeguard their 
property and security, a necessary level of suspicion about other individuals is promoted. 
This pushes many individuals into a more politically isolated life than necessary. This is the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????ed to really enjoy political freedoms.  
The modern world, with its growing world alienation, has led to a situation where man [?] 
encounters only himself ??this] has left behind it a society of men who, without a common world 
which would at once relate and separate them, either live in desperate lonely separation or are 
pressed together in a mass [?] human beings who are still related to one another but have lost the 
world once common to all of them. (Arendt 1983: 89-90) 
The loss of the common world through sovereign politics continuously legitimizes 
sovereignty as a political system because alternative political relationships between 
individuals remain limited. The individual is left politically impotent, being both politically 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????overeign. For Arendt this embodies all 
the pre-requisites for a tyranny (1976: 454). The consequences of a political life centred 
upon the individual thinking his/her own thoughts are tyrannical because Arendt sees a 
tyranny as: 
[?] a form of government in which the ruler [??] had monopolized for himself the right of action, 
banished the citizens from the public realm into the privacy of their households and demanded of 
them that they mind their own private business. (1965: 130) 
Aren????????????????????????????? does not have to be an identifiable tyrant as the focus of 
power. Sovereign models of politics and their accompanying discourse thus far exemplified 
have tyrannical dimensions as they perpetuate the understanding that individuals should 
keep their own house in order without concern with or for others. This belief is no less 
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pertinent today than at any other time.  Arendt herself claimed it as ?characteristic of both 
the nine??????????????????????????????? (1965: 140) and the examples offered herein suggest 
its relevance to the twenty first century. 
?????????observations and the supporting examples of her claims pose the question of what 
freedom as a citizen means in countries that are governed according to a sovereign model 
when many of the individuals therein are politically isolated beings in a mass society? 
Citizenship is subsumed by individuality which in turn is subsumed by political axioms 
embedded in insecurity, anxiety and self-regard. This discussion now turns to another 
political disadvantage that the equation of freedom with individual sovereignty provides 
which is the elimination of spontaneity. This is because, as Arendt noted, aspirations to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? of individuality 
[??] regardless of how un-political and ??????????????? ??????????in Baehr, 2000: 136).  
Arendt claims that the reason that spontaneity is often minimized in sovereign politics is 
the inherent unpredictability that spontaneity embodies. Total domination can not allow for 
any event that is not predictable as such an event may well carry within it potentials for 
change?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of life, for any activity that is no?????????????????????????????? 339). There are several 
contemporary examples of this fear of unpredictability which interestingly span the 
ideological spectrum of current governments and therefore ????????????????????????non-
partisan criticisms of sovereignty. The 2010-2011 Jasmine Revolutions in Tunisia (Walt 
2011) and Egypt appeared to show mass popular uprising against non-elected governments 
which resulted in the removal of that government. These events seemed to spark a domino 
effect of similar events across the Arab world, a phenomenon termed the Arab Spring 
(Hardy 2011)19. The G20 protests in London in 2009, where one man died because of 
police action (Miekle et al 2009), and  student protests in London in 2010 and 2011 saw 
police treatment of protestors, who included children (Foot 2011) and a wheelchair user 
(Casciani 2011),  raise a level of public alarm and legal action against them (Morris 2011). 
                                                                                                                    
19 Within the Arab Spring, the examples of Libya and Syria suggest the fear that dictatorships have regarding 
spontaneous initiative and non-predictability (Hardy 2011). In Libya, a civil war between the Gadaffi political 
regime and critics of it raged for five months before Gadaffi and his closest allies fled (Ibid). In Syria, it is 
alleged over two thousand civilians have been killed by the government (Hardy 2011, Sinjab 2011). 
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These latter examples suggest the possibility that even in less autocratic sovereign systems 
this concern is no less present.  
Arendt responds to the mistrust of spontaneity demonstrated by many governments by 
pointing out that all of the arguments against spontaneity simultaneously justify the need 
for an appeal to sovereignty. One example is the argument by Schmitt that sovereignty is 
the answer to unpredictability (2005: 6) through the power the sovereign has as the  
decisive entity (2007: 43-44) in ???????????????????????????????? 13) and what is the 
???????????????05: 5). More recent theorists reiterate this by pointing to the inevitability of 
sovereignty (Reinhardt 1997: 146). In distinction to such claims, Arendt argues that such 
attempts to thwart spontaneity and unpredictability is to deny something essential about 
humanity: 
[...] it is indeed as spurious to deny human freedom to act because the actor never remains the master 
of his acts as it is to maintain that human sovereignty is possible because of the incontestable fact of 
human freedom. The question which then arises is whether our notion that freedom and non-
sovereignty are mutually exclusive is not defeated by reality, or to put it another way whether the 
capacity for human action does not harbour within itself certain potentialities which enable it to 
survive the disabilities of non-sovereignty. (1998: 236)   
For Arendt, spontaneous action and unpredictability go hand in hand with non-sovereignty. 
The unpredictability of human action is of value to political change. In each individual 
there exists the potential to spontaneously set in motion small changes that mark the 
beginnings of bigger changes once many people are involved; the example of the Arab 
Spring demonstrates this. Exhorting the alleged value of individual sovereignty measured 
in terms of the limitless accumulation of wealth and the perception of security that arises 
from political isolation is actually contra-humanity. In order to have the preconditions in 
place so that a different kind of political freedom can be suggested, it should be accepted 
that absolute sovereignty as individuals is not only impossible20 because of the plurality of 
people but also undesirable. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reduction in individual autonomy that this view implies, although she possibly alludes to it 
in the quote above ????????????????? (Ibid). Indeed, she seems willing to accept this loss of 
autonomy when she states that this is the price for freedom 
                                                                                                                    
20 Recognised by Kateb (in Villa 2002: 142) 
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????me thing) is 
the price human beings pay for freedom, and the impossibility of remaining unique masters of what 
they do, is the price they pay for plurality and reality. (1998: 244)  
This weakness does not appear to account for the level of autonomy or individual 
sovereignty required for spontaneity. Even the most spontaneous of actions requires a 
certain amount of individual sovereignty to step outside of the confines of previous habits 
of thought or behaviour. To be more precise about Arendt therefore, the problem regarding 
individual sovereignty seems to arise when politics becomes overly focused on the ideal of 
individual sovereignty to the exclusion and detriment of the potential for politics that exists 
for individuals in the plural. Furthermore, the potential loss of ?????????????????????
argument can be viewed as one ??????????????????????????????????????????? hierarchy of 
power present in sovereign political systems but one that is made in the more level situation 
of the plurality of human existence. I?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
offer no greater level of autonomy than other political arrangements and some query the 
notion of individual autonomy in modern society (Bellamy 1992: 250-1) anyway, the 
possible loss of autonomy implied by ?????????????????????????therefore be considered as 
one experienced in more equitable circumstances. A further solution to this weakness in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  
The idea of individual sovereignty as a measurement of freedom is flawed. Despite this, 
many political systems promote this belief and this achieves a three fold effect that favours 
the sovereign or government over those who are governed. In the Arendtian view, the 
alleged sovereignty of individuals needs reconsideration. The suspicion that free market 
economic fields cultivate between individuals seeking security appears to give credence to 
the reality of the state of nature. This idea is compounded by many individuals? retreat into 
a private domain.  Where attention is focused inwardly onto ?????????????????domestic 
sphere, negative freedoms are maximized and so is the perception of individual 
sovereignty.  Conversely, the perceived threat of others appears minimized because this 
inward focus only involves concern with others in terms of the threats that they may pose. 
In this way the state of nature appears to be held in abeyance as the sovereign appears as 
both the protector and guarantor of security and freedom and so this system seemingly 
works.  
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Moments of political isolation should be belied by the plurality of the human condition but 
they are not, as evidence in this chapter has suggested. Governmental domination over 
plural political moments attempts to draw legitimacy from the assumption that non-
sovereign subversive political action contains within it a spontaneity and consequence that 
cannot be predicted and so therefore must constitute a threat. In encouraging mistrust, 
insecurity and fearful anxiety around the spontaneity and unpredictability that is possible in 
plural politics, the chances of political change are eschewed, particularly changes to the 
political system which might mean a challenge to or reduction of power for the sovereign. 
??????????????s political theory clearly indicates how the association of freedom 
conceived of solely in terms of sovereignty leads to associations which keep us trapped in 
an illusion21. For as long as individual sovereignty is held as the exclusive measure of 
freedom, as it is in neo-liberal rhetoric, the potential for experiencing other potentially 
???????????????? freedom is stifled.  
1.5: Conclusion  
Politics based upon realist models of sovereignty compounds the isolation of people from 
the political potential inherent in plurality. This isolation arguably feeds into a culture of 
anxiety, insecurity, uncertainty and mistrust from individuals towards others. In turn this 
feeds into the appearance of a sovereign as a necessity to political life, a necessity for 
safeguarding security thereby minimizing anxieties around security. This results in the 
suppression of alternative approaches to freedom rather than their creation and marks out a 
situation in which the city-citizen in the sense of a fully interested, motivated and 
empowered political actor has been forced into decline. ??????????????????????????????????
in identifying the symbiosis between the end of sovereignty and the need for it.   
In addition to attacking sovereignty on the above basis, Arendt simultaneously attacks it 
because it is unrepresentative as it is impossible that a multitude of wills can be represented 
in the single will of the sovereign and also because people are removed from engagement in 
politics because they become non-equals in the hierarchy created by representation, as 
                                                                                                                    
21  ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
presence of freedom and non-??????????????????????  
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some of the examples here have shown. This limits people as city-citizens. For both Arendt 
and the contemporary political experience of some, sovereignty is not only isolating and 
iniquitous, but also dominating, restrictive, disingenuous and artificial to the human 
condition.  
 ????????????????also has relevance in the contemporary international context through her 
implicit critique of globalization. She makes the prescient observation that the Westphalian 
state system contains problems that sovereign models of politics are alleged to avoid.  
Sovereign governments also magnify problems of un-representation. Furthermore, the 
absence of equality between nation-states in the global arena means that in reality it is only 
the powerful states who can fully exercise sovereignty. Ultimately, in this global system 
there is no alternative resolution to international disputes except war. 
Finally, Arendt views sovereignty as weak in its application to the individual. The flawed 
idea that both positive and negative freedoms are enjoyed in equal measure because of the 
sovereign actually only results in negative freedoms which by definition are limited forms 
of freedom. This can be identified implicitly and explicitly in contemporary political 
rhetoric.  The notion of individual sovereignty in this model of politics therefore is more 
accurately described as the promotion of individual privacy.   
What is unique about Arendt are the different yet simultaneous ways which she criticizes 
state sovereignty. The trinity of her critique is still applicable to numerous contemporary 
forms of political experience. What is also unique about her argument is that the ideological 
or party political biases that underpin these political models do not matter. Indeed the 
examples that Arendt drew upon in h????????????????????????????????????????????22.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
What matters is that those political systems that are based on a model of centralized, 
exclusive state governance share those common aspects and flaws outlined here. This is 
important because these issues can be seen to contribute to unnecessary limitations upon 
the political experiences of people living within them.   
                                                                                                                    
22  See Arendt (1976). ????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ????????????????
modern sovereigns are totalitarian with democratic, monarchical, fascist and communist sovereigns made 
?????????????????????? ??? 2008: 66).  
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Despite this strength however, this chapter has also pointed out some weaknesses in her 
argument. Firstly, she never makes explicit how the political changes that she recommends 
might occur. It is therefore difficult to see from within her argument how her call for a 
renaissance of the city-citizen can come about. It seems to be a rather vague hope that 
republican sentiment can just be re-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
unequivocal rejection of violence,23  class revolution would equally not be a possibility in 
bringing about the recreation of the city-citizen. Other weaknesses relate to her claims 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the face of the plurality of the human condition also undermines the concept of individual 
autonomy.  The suggestion is made here that the loss of individual autonomy that might be 
made for the gain of a politics based in plurality would be preferable because of the 
environment of greater comparable equity to the loss of autonomy that is experienced by 
individuals who surrender it to a sovereign, which by definition is iniquitous. 
This thesis asserts however that the weaknesses in Arendt identified in this chapter can also 
be addressed through the unique approach of another body of work. In a different, yet 
parallel way, it can be shown how the decline of the city-citizen, so central in the work of 
Arendt, can be compared to the rise of the shepherd-flock, so prevalent in the political 
writings of Michel Foucault and how aspects of his work can correct these Arendtian 
weaknesses. It is to this claim that this thesis now turns.  
                                                                                                                    
23 This is explained in Chapter Five. 
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2.0 THE RISE OF THE SHEPHERD-‐????????????????? CRITIQUE 
OF SOVEREIGNTY 
2.1: Introduction 
The chapter that follows explores the first important point of parallel between Arendt and 
Foucault by looking at the work of Foucault with particular focus on the critique of 
sovereignty embodied in his work on the rise of the shepherd flock. In exploring this aspect 
of Foucault several themes and claims seen previously will be illuminated. This begins 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????which considers 
the arguments of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469?1527) and shows that sovereignty has become 
the dominant rather than the necessary or only arrangement of power. Fouca???????????????
with Arendt also finds clear expression in his analysis and eventual rejection of Hobbes24 
and his distinction from Schmitt. This reiteration of Arendt???????????? is furthered later in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ition of the symbiosis between 
the end and the beginnings of sovereignty. However, as the chapter moves towards its close 
a point of divergence will be made apparent between the two theorists in that rather than 
phrasing the critique of sovereignty as a crisis of a decline of the city-citizen as Arendt 
does, Foucault shows it as the crisis of the rise of the shepherd flock. Although this 
momentarily moves away from the comparative observations between the two theorists, the 
chapter will argue that this dive??????????????????????particular claims about the rise of the 
shepherd flock suggests an answer to the frequently cited critiques of Arendt that question 
how the loss of the city citizen that she so laments could be reversed in a modern day 
context25.  
2.2 Sovereignty as Leviathan 
?In short, we have to abandon the model of Leviathan??????????? 2003: 34) 
In the College de France lectures, Foucault refers to the political arguments of Machiavelli, 
as expounded in The Prince26????? ??????????????????????????????, the main political 
                                                                                                                    
24 See Edwards (1999). 
25 See Agamben (1998: 188), Schecter (2010: 224), Martel (2010: 160). 
26 ??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
him to erroneously conclude the constitution of governmentality around this time. They argue that rather than 
governmentality, it was actually sovereignty that was constituted in the period 1580-1660 (2008: 52).  
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
explains that the fundamental questions for sixteenth century politics consisted of ????????
govern oneself, how to be governed, how to govern others, by whom the people will accept 
being governed, how to ???????????????????????????????a: 87). These questions can apply 
to any individual who has the role of a leader, the head of a household, a teacher, a 
governor as well as the prince himself. What distinguishes the prince, and the juridical 
justification of his sovereignty that Machiavelli exhorts, from all of these other types is that 
the Prince remains external to his principality (Foucault 1991a: 90). Foucault states that 
between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries the nature of the political changes. There is 
a move by other political writers to distance themselves from the advice to the prince that 
characterises Machiavelli, objections that should not to be seen solely in terms of an 
outright re??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
themselves from a certain conception [?] which, once shorn of all its theological 
foundations [?] took the sole interest of the Prince as its object and principle of rationalit?? 
(Foucault 1991a: 89)27  
The new style of political treatise beginning in the sixteenth century seeks less to justify the 
external, unique supra-??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
governmentality) that gives the appearance of a seamless connection of the sovereign to the 
people. In his genealogy of political theory, particularly in the form of advice to the 
sovereign as represented by Machiavelli, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
instead focuses on territory and those individuals who inhabit it (1991a: 93) through issues 
such as the government of personal conduct, of souls and lives and of children and 
pedagogy (1991a: 87).  This is important because within this expansion of the focus of 
sovereignty it becomes directed toward land and people.  
This new focus manifests in advice to the sovereign to cultivate the seamless connection 
between sovereign an????????????????????????????????continuity in both an upwards and 
                                                                                                                    
27?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
object and principle ??? ??????????????????????????? the ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
over the two hundred years between the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries that this changes into something else 
that then becomes governmentality.  
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??????????????????????????a: 91).  Upward???????????????????????????????????????
government of the sovereign over the self. This is exemplified by the highest self-morality, 
a good work ethic and government of money. At this point, explains Foucault, these things 
??????????????????????????????????s capacity for self-government and therefore fitness to 
govern others. This is term??????????????????????????????a: 90). The devolution of these 
maxims to others in the state allows for a downwards continuity. Heads of families can run 
????????????????????individual??????????????????????????????a: 92) not only for the good 
government of the family, but also for the good government of the state, and therefore 
???????????????????a: 95). This is s????????????????????????????????90). Foucault 
identifies a key event that represents these changes in governmental thinking.  La Mothe Le 
??????? advice in the seventeenth century to the Dauphin who later became Louis XIV of 
France, reveals ?????????????????????????????a: 91) form of government that can be ?applied 
to ???????????????????????Ibid). At this point politics is conceived no longer ??????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????28 of a 
plurality of forms of government which are immanent to the state rather than the 
transcendent  sovereign of which Machiavelli writes (Ibid). 
The point at which this form of government takes on the more familiar apparel of modern 
political science is via a notion of economy, particularly economy over the individual self 
an???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????becomes established 
via the good government of each person over their own self and family. Through this 
cultivation of the pastoral, of endowing the individual with duties that they themselves had 
to fulfil, economic and social citizens are created. This pastoralisation is the most important 
aspect of the art of governmentality, rendering the individual monitor of his/her own life. 
Since every individual does this, so does the whole population. Foucault calls this a 
government omnes et singulatum, government over all and each.  
                                                                                                                    
28 Foucault recognises then a clear hiatus between the establishment of the sovereign, as claimed by Singer 
and Weir, and the seminal art of governmentality. The a????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Machiavelli not withstanding, the subsequent epistemological differences between sovereignty and 
governance that Singer and Weir claim on this basis (2008: 62) needs to be sustained within the bio-political 
context of modern western life. 
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Thus, for Foucault, good management of the family becomes not only the object of the art 
of governmentality, but also its instrument. Foucault writes that slowly political economy 
moves away from issues relating to the family and takes on a ?????????????????????????a: 
101). Rather than making the Machiavellian problem of sovereignty disappear it becomes 
even more important (Ibid). This is because sovereignty does not cease to have a role once 
the (good) government of the self is established but paradoxically becomes more necessary 
and ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(Ibid). Thus, the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????overeignty is far from being 
eliminated by the emergence of a new art of government, even by one which has passed the 
threshold of political science; on the contrary, the problem of sovereignty is made more 
??????????????????????). 
????????????????????????onsidered as an excavation of the tentacles of power that allows 
sovereignty to both operate and perpetuate. Foucault traces the history of governmentality 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
understood. In ?Society Must Be Defended?, Foucault articulates this recognition explicitly, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????t has essentially 
centred upon royal power ever since the Middle Ages. The juridical edifice of our societies 
was elaborated at the demand of royal power, as well as for its benefit, and in order to serve 
as its instrument or its justification. In the West right is the right ???????????????????????? 
25).  
Thus we are brought back round to the opening statemen??????????????????????????????
genealogy, as expounded in the College de France lectures, clearly excavates certain 
problems inherent to sovereign political models as identified in Chapter One. This 
contemporary model of politics which will be shown later in this chapter as relying heavily 
on pastoralising methods of governance ??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
evolved from origins that sought to perpetuate the privilege and inequality of the sovereign 
as governor over people. For Foucault, this leads to two undesirable aspects of such a 
politic??? ?????????????????????????????????????????? sovereignty that parallels with Arendt is 
????????????????????????????? status as the purported arbitrator of human hostilities, such as 
embodied in the work ????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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There is, of course, one name that we immediately encounter: it is that of Hobbes, who does at first 
glance appear to be the man who said that war is both the basis of power relations and the principle 
that explains them. (2003: 89) 
 As the following section will show Arendt and Foucault do not see exactly the same 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????theless the arguments of both see 
the claim of sovereignty as a necessary and effective arrangement of power as a fallacy. 
In his ??????????????????????????????What are the rules of right that power implements to 
produce discourses of truth??, by which he meant established practices that draw from and 
upon a validity that comes from being pe??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Foucault makes some key observations about sovereignty and illustrates the misleading 
premise that underpins sovereign ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Middle Ages centred upon royal power?????????, centres on the problem of sovereignty, 
that is, how the legitimacy of the sovereign can be maintained and its practices legitimized. 
???????????therefore essentially about domination. Sovereignty is ultimately the way(s) that 
domination ??????????????????? ????????????? 26). The masking of domination by 
sovereignty is done in two ways. Firstly, there is the question of the legitimate rights of the 
sovereign and secondly, there are issues that surround the legal obligations to obey. In this 
way, Foucault illuminates the central position of the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth 
century ??????????????????????????????????????????????? sovereignty seen today in many 
contemporary states (2003: 26) such as those exemplified in Chapter One.  
Foucault explains that advocates of sovereignty, such as Hobbes, presuppose the individual 
??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 43). Sovereignty is needed to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????? 44) in that it is concerned with individuals, and is exercised on and through 
individuals. However, for Foucault, the understanding of sovereignty as the unification of 
sub?????????????????? ???????????????s of power relations. It misleads the analysis of the 
?????????????????????????multitude, demanding ???????????????????????????????????????????
??????????? ???????????????????????????????????? 28).  
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These are misdirected questions because the parts (the subjects) are more pertinent than the 
whole. Foucault argues that sovereignty should not be understood as, ?a Leviathan needed 
to sit above people ????????????????????????????????????????????? 28).  What is needed is to 
examine and excavate the multiple power relations that exist between ordinary people who 
function below the sovereign. These are the real power relations that should be of interest to 
us, if we are to truly understand how power works. In recognition of this he argues 
To grasp the material agency of subjugation [...] would [?] be to do precisely the opposite of what 
Hobbes was trying to do in Leviathan....rather than raise this problem of the central soul [?] we 
should be trying to study the multiple peripheral bodies, the bodies that are constituted as subjects by 
power-effects. (2003: 29)   
What should really be done in an effective analysis of power is to understand how the 
???????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
support one another, relate to one another and how they converge and reinforce one another 
in some cases, or negate and strive to a??????????????????????????????????????? 45).  
Foucault ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ereignty 
which are really less to do with sovereignty and more to do with domination throughout 
society that feels such power effects. Foucault is both explicit and specific in what these 
practices actually are. He distinguishes several levels of social domination, a single 
individual over the masses, for example the sovereign in a central position or of one group 
over another of which contemporary examples would include non-smokers over smokers in 
the field of health in relation to longevity or around body size and shape such as is marked 
???????????????????????? (Sherman 2008), or the control of teenage sexuality (Williams 
2011) or the creation of debt by increasing credit.  For Foucault, it is practices such as these 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? [...] the 
multiple subjugations that take place and function within the social bod????????? 27) are the 
dominations that an analysis of power must consider.  
This rejection of understanding, examining and reducing politics to ????????????????????????
??? inverts traditional ways of thinking about politics such as that of Hobbes and marks out 
?????????????????????????????????????????????. In arguing for the examination of the power 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ????
immediate ways that individuals encounter sovereignty because although many 
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contemporary societies live with sovereign models of government, this form of government 
is always mediated through sociological, legal and economic policy that renders individuals 
?ill?? ???????, ???????????????? ??????????????? Just as importantly, it also recognizes that this 
form of power involves subject to subject dominations which arise through social 
judgements and subsequent negative labelling ???????????????????????????????????????????? 
???????(Hayward and Yar 2006, Tyler 2008). Because Foucault locates his argument in the 
multifarious sites or targets of this type of government rather than one specific and named 
site of subjection, he avoids limiting his argument to areas of governmental oppression that 
have traditionally occupied political thought such as class or nationalism. This makes 
???????????????????? ???? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and yet the specificity to be applied in terms of the multifarious social forms that subjection 
currently takes and also could take in the future. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????? 46) It i??????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? 44) and like Arendt has 
strength because of the absence of partisanship. Conceiving of power in sovereign terms 
leads to a fundamentally flawed perception of the state, namely that it is somehow natural 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the state to disappear, the poli????????????????????????????????????? 45). This leads to the 
subsequent erroneous analysis of power and its practices. Foucault raises the point, contra 
Hobbes and Schmitt, that there are no pre-existing individual subjects in a state of conflict, 
who require arbitration by a sovereign. The real power tentacles of sovereignty work by 
inventing a subject, and then invents a much greater need for both positive and negative 
?????????????????????????????????????????????requirement for pastoral care in the fields of 
health, sexuality, wealth and other aspects of life creates an illusion of sovereignty as the 
only possible political solution. In this recognition, Foucault makes the significant point 
that politics is exercised through social life. To put this more simply, in this recognition 
Foucault sees that rather than there being a genuine need for sovereign power to create 
political harmony, sovereignty invents the need for itself.  With an assertion that 
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completely opposes claims such as that of Schmitt but which parallel with Arendt, Foucault 
tells us that we therefore need to  
[...] abandon the model of Leviathan, that model of an artificial man who is at once an automaton, a 
fabricated man, but also a unitary man who contains all real individuals whose body is made up of 
citizens but whose soul is sovereignty. (2003: 34)  
 
In order to do that, we need to adopt a different perspective when analysing power and step 
outside the confines of juridical sovereignty that sovereign politics imprisons us within. 
Ultimately, this thesis will suggest one way that this might be done. 
In the claim ???????????? ???? ????????????????????and thus the traditional guise of modern 
day political forms of social control, Foucault concurs with Arendt. Despite this parallel 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
historical content of his genealogical method. This gives his arguments a greater 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
therefore offers a much more accurate socio-historical perspective than that of Arendt. 
Also, his argument is more applicable to politics today due to his recognition of the 
importance of society as the site ??????????????????? operation of political power. However, 
despite these empirical differences, the parallel between them regarding the futility of the 
system and the need for the rejection of sovereignty still stands and is important for social 
and political thought because it explores the alternative to a very widespread model of 
politics which seems to ???????????????????????????????or how politics should be exercised, 
as the data in Chapter One of this thesis suggest.  
This parallel between Foucault and Arendt points out that immanent to sovereign political 
models is a distance between sovereign and society and also a distance amongst and 
between individuals within society. In forms of sovereignty that involve elected 
government, these disconnections are not present any less due to the impracticality and 
inequity inherent to the structure of representation. This has considerable negative impact 
on the communication potential from electorate to government and accountability from 
representative to electorate. Despite this political distance, there is no such distance when it 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ersely, the ubiquitous, 
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immediate and infinite political interventions in everyday lives mean that no equivalent 
political distance exists when it comes to the government of every individual. 
???????????observation of the disconnection immanent to sovereign politics parallels further 
????????????????????????? the isolation of individuals. As we have seen, for Arendt this is 
perpetuated by sovereignty rather than prevented by it. Foucault makes a comparable 
observation in his critique of sovereignty, namely that one of the main consequences of the 
dominating social subjugations that uphold sovereignty is isolation. 
 2.3: The Inversion of C lausewitz and the (isolated) Individual at W ar 
Foucault extends this claim by exhorting us to think about how domination is a relationship 
of force and how force can be reduced to a relationship of war? (2003: 46-7). He arrives at 
these questions via the historical study of the ownership of war from the sixteenth century 
(2003: 49) to the present day. Foucault claims that war changed its locus from being owned 
privately to becoming owned by a central body (the state) around this time. Once war 
became owned by a central power, Foucault explains that it only took place on the edge of 
states, waged only by state armies. The result of this shift is that the social body is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????At the point that war shifts its owner 
and moves to the outer limits of states, a new political discourse enters understanding. 
Foucault identifies this as per????????????????historico-??????????????????????????????? 
(2003:49) but which at the same time was still a discourse on war and was considered to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? 49). Foucault exemplifies this claim in the 
eugenicists of the nineteenth century (Ibid) and observes that the end of war does not 
equate to the beginning of political power (2003: 50).  He identifies that war is still 
connected to states, albeit in a different format. He points to the paradox that the end of war 
does not mark the beginnings of political power (Ibid) just as the inseparable law and 
sovereignty (1991a: 95) does not end war. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??????(2003: 48).  In doing so he asserts, in distinction to political theorists of 
sovereignty such as Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau that rather than sovereignty keeping the 
wars between individuals at bay, war and sovereignty are inextricably and symbiotically 
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linked.  War and sovereignty are locked together. Although the manner of their relationship 
has changed historically, the relationship endures. The mechanisms by which this 
relationship is maintained foreshadows further connections that can be made between both 
Foucault and Arendt that form the content of the rest of this chapter.  
In excavating the emergence of an analysis of the state, its institutions and its power 
mechanisms, Foucault identifies that it occurs in binary terms (2003: 88). The social body, 
argues Foucault, is understood as consisting of two groups, which are completely distinct 
from one another and also in conflict (Ibid). Foucault identifies them at this time, using the 
example of English historico-political discourse, as supra-race and sub-race29. However, 
what is important to Foucault in this analysis, is not the identity of the groups themselves, 
[which has been a point of misunderstanding of his point here (2003:88)] so much as the 
fact that the state draws its existence from the binary opposition of two groups. Foucault 
states that  
[?] the conflictual relationship that exists between the two groups that constitute the social body and 
shapes the state is in fact one of war, permanent warfare. The state is nothing more than the way that 
the war between the two groups in question continues to be waged in apparently peaceful forms. 
(2003: 88) 
These claims regarding the opposition of groups in society and the resultant continuance of 
war, offer an original discussion and re-evaluation about how the individual within society 
is ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
does not actually begin with war (2003: 92) but that rather than the war within society 
being brutish and involving bloodshed via weapons or fists, what is actually present in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????l and courage (Ibid) that 
takes place between equals (2003: 90). If this were not so then peace would ensue from 
sufficient difference as the strong would vanquish the weak, or the weak would surrender in 
the face of the evident superiority of the strong (Ibid). This equality, or more precisely 
insufficient difference, gives the potential for war, or the belief in the potential for war to 
continue ad infinitum. What Foucault identifies as embodied in the claims of Hobbes, is an 
unending series of presentations that spring from a culture of fear about the apparent 
                                                                                                                    
29 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
highlights sa???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????? (2003: 92). Foucault shows how in the real 
terms of Hobbes Leviathan, we are not actually at war, but rather, in a state of war (Ibid). 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????-enemy distinction as the sole determinant of politics (Schmitt 
2007: 34, 35) whereby enemy is defined by difference (Schmitt 2007: 27) and viewed and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
however, in terms of the intractability of the friend-enemy distinction for all politics. 
Schmitt argued that a world without the friend-enemy distinction would be a world without 
politics (2007: ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
binary distinction is not inevitable, necessary or accurate for politics, as a later chapter will 
show. However, such binary distinctions that mimic warfare as exemplified by modern 
proponents of sovereignty like Schmitt are useful for understanding how sovereign politics 
really works.  
Foucault explains the significance of an archaeology that stretches back over the history of 
the ownership of war, the birth of a discourse on society steeped in binary terms and the 
presentations of war that masquerade as serious war-like intent throughout society. In his 
lecture to the College de France on the 21st January 1976, he both posed a key question to 
the auditorium, and at the same time gave the answer: 
Why do we have to re-discover war? Well, because this ancient war is a permanent war. We really 
do have to become experts on battles, because the war has not ended, because preparations are still 
being made for the decisive battles, and because we have to win the decisive battle. In other words, 
the enemies who face us still pose a threat to us. (2003: 51) 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
achieved through one of the pivotal notions of sovereignty, namely rights. Foucault is 
explicit on this point, identifying that: 
The subject who speaks in this discourse [binary opposites, enemies who are a threat to us], who 
????????????????????????????????????????????????[??] the position of a universal, totalizing, or neutral 
subject [....] that person is inevitably on one side or another: he is involved in the battle [?] Of 
course he speaks the discourse of right, asserts a right and demands a right [?] These are singular, 
and they are strongly marked by a relationship of property, conquest, victory, or nature [??] It is true 
that this discourse about the general war [?] that tries to interpret the war beneath peace, is indeed 
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an attempt to describe the battle as a whole [??] But that does not make it a totalizing or neutral 
discourse, it is always a perspectival discourse. (2003: 52 my emphasis)  
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????in comparison to theorists such as 
Hobbes and Schmitt can be perceived in this identification of the opposition (mostly 
binary) of social groups as a cornerstone of discourse present in political systems involving 
sovereignty. Contemporary examples of this in the UK include Lord Freud who justified 
cuts in social housing benefit ?????????????????[?] the government has a duty to the taxpayer 
to bring (social housing) ??????????? because ??????????????-working families?????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (in Kula 2011). In this example of 
political rhetoric the divisions are created between ????????? taxpaying and hard-???????? 
and ?non-working, non-taxpaying, non-ordinary? families. Other exampl??????????????????
and non-????????????????????????????????????????? (2011)???????????????(2010) 
identification of women, the young and disabled people as representatives of benefit 
recipient(s), ???????????????????????????????????-ness and  ??????????????????????????????? 
(2011) or the cost incurred by those individuals who are not united in values30 (Neville-
Jones in Gardham 2011). The full implications of these techniques of political domination 
are elaborated later in the thesis. 
It is thus possible to identify ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
basis of sovereignty both requires the isolation of each individual from his/er peers whilst 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
exactly how this is done. In using the ???????????????????? conceived from and sustained by 
the popula???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
subtly and invisibly yet effectively set individuals against one another, not only on the basis 
of individual to individual social judgements, but also on the basis of the groups within 
which individuals identify themselves or are indentified by others. This perpetuates their 
isolation by undermining the connections that they would otherwise make. Foucault 
identifies the methods of this in the techniques of domination whi??????????????????????
                                                                                                                    
30 Such desire for uniformity ???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????Bell 2000: 121). 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 46) particularly those 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-??????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????f affairs where all the subjects without 
exception obey the laws, accomplish the tasks expected of them, practice the trade to which 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
either earthly or not (Foucault 1991: 95). In this recognition Foucault explicitly identifies 
the shepherd-flock consequence of the conception of power as necessitating management 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
escape Arendt either. I??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????ruth 
[about behaviourism and its laws] is that the more people there are, the more likely they are 
to behave and the less likely to tolerate non-???????????????8: 43). ????????? ?????? is that 
?non-behaviour?? exemplified in this chapter as non-taxpaying, non-white, non-British or 
non-value sharing, creates divisions between people and in Foucauldian terms generates 
and perpetuates binary opposites between them.  
This parallel between Arendt and Foucault highlights the possibility for a whole swathe of 
connections that can be made between what is in Foucauldian terms, the domination of 
individuals via subjugating practices and in Arendtian terms the political isolation of 
individuals. The ways in which this parallel is illuminating for social and political thought 
identifies that through being perceived as non-working or single-mother or young or 
disabled or non-white or non-Christian or non-British or any combination of them, 
???????????????????groups can be identified by political discourse, targeted by social policy 
and artificially marked out as negatively different or ??????? within the social body. This 
leaves that sub-group vulnerable not only to political oppression from the sovereign, but 
also to social oppression from other groups and individuals. These social divisions benefit 
the sovereign because a divided society, as Foucault pointed out, is one that is easier to 
govern. Contrived divisions diminish the cohesiveness of all those who are governed, thus 
compounding the isolation of groups and individuals, supported by the previously cited 
research of Putnam (2000) and Glaes et al (2003) (see Layard, 2003c).  Arendt herself 
recognized the significance of this when she stated that ????????all modern people who 
move mistrustfully [?] ????????????????????? 
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This parallel also illuminates the social and political importance of the question ???????????
??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Leviathan it means for all to confer individual powers on the sovereign so that each 
individual need not concern him/herself with any other. This might take the form of 
concern meaning interest???????????????? ????????????????????? meaning care. In juridical 
terms t??????????????????????????????? respecting the established order means respecting each 
???????????????????????????????????????and (negative) freedom. In short, what Arendt herself, 
if she were able to talk in Foucauldian terms, might identify as system of rights which 
inevitably, and destructively for other forms of ???????????????????????????????????????.  
 
Foucault can be interpreted like Arendt as using liberal concepts to form the basis of an 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ourse that is born of them, are 
the mechanisms of brutal and secretive domination that masquerade as sovereignty and thus 
enables it to perpetuate (2003: 27). Once again in distinction to proponents of sovereignty, 
h????????????????????????????????????????around the problem of sovereignty ? which is 
central to the theory of right ? and the obedience of individuals who submit to it, and to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Ibid)  
For Foucault techniques of domination are the sine qua non of sovereignty because they 
form ????????????????????????????????????????????. Foucault shows how the presentation and 
perception of threats between groups and individuals allows the conception and gestation of 
fear and mistrust amongst individuals. This provides the basis for sovereignty and the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ow, and by 
those who are afraid?????????96). Like Arendt, Foucault identifies a trinity. In his case it is 
the trinity of will-fear-sovereignty which applies whether there is ?a covenant, a battle, or 
relation????????????????????????????????(2003: 96).  
The important parallel between Arendt and Foucault is their recognition of the negative 
dual role that social division and isolation plays in modern politics.  Arendt rightly shows 
us an individual who remains politically isolated the whole of their lives, far removed from 
the city-citizen who would experience an alternative and possible more genuine political 
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freedom. The perpetuation of their isolation is achieved through insecurity and mistrust. 
???????????????????????? the way that this insecurity, anxiety and mistrust is cultivated and 
sustained, so much so that in contemporary society they become part of the fabric of 
political discourse. ???????????? reading of the treatment of isolation in the work of Arendt 
and Foucault differs from that of Marquez (2010: 27-8) who views the treatment of 
isolation in each theorist as different approaches. Given the bio-politics that characterises 
western life today the argument here is that it is a mistake to see it as such.  
 
It is much more accurate to claim that Foucault gives this Arendtian observation a more 
contemporary dimension. The techniques of government, once used to ensure the 
legitimacy of a royal sovereign, enters public consciousness. In claiming and seeking to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s, 
sovereignty is invested in as a political system without enough questions being asked of it. 
This continues because, despite the apparent peace that is achieved there is an undercurrent 
that an ever-??????????????????????? comes from both outside and within the governed 
population31. This leads us to inte??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????that obeys the laws. The institutions of sovereignty that bind all 
individuals in western societies demands that everyone must behave ??????????????????? 
which really means to accept the rights, responsibilities and rules set out by the sovereign 
and reinforce them through the judgment of others, for example respecting the property of 
others by paying tax yourself?????????????????????????????????????????????? and not 
deviating from the values of the sovereign and the ???????al character??of the territory over 
which the sovereign governs. The perception of ?????????????????????????????????????????
cultivates the mistrust and insecurity that diminishes the cohesion of the social body and 
augments the potential for isolation within it. This is what Foucault meant when he advised 
that ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????of society, continuously 
and permanently, and it is this battlefront that that puts us all on one side or the other. There 
??????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????  
                                                                                                                    
31 This cont????????????????????????????????: 79) that the common enemy that ????????????????????????????????
?nowhere to be found?? 
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The entity that appears to save society from its ever present war is the sovereign and the 
system which appears to prevent the acting out of the war- beneath-the-surface-of-peace is 
the system of rights that the sovereign guarantees to all who submit to its power. In this 
contract an illusion of individual sovereignty is manifested32. Foucault, in a parallel 
recognition to that of Arendt, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????222). 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to grant every individual, pseudosovereignty can be understood as pseudo-freedom. 
Because of the culture of mistrust and insecurity that th??????????????????????fosters, self-
governing citizens are created. The art of government is that of a shepherd. In dominating 
us to govern ourselves into taxpayers or ?British? people or value sharers as the examples 
here have shown, a docile and obedient flock is manufactured. In this moment the 
shepherd-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. 
 Arendt and Foucault parallel in the recognition of sovereignty as a political arrangement 
that involves a double betrayal towards those the arrangement is supposed to protect. Each 
of them identifies one crucial self-preservation exercise that sovereign political models 
achieve by sleight of hand. Firstly, proponents of sovereignty such as Hobbes and Schmitt 
perpetuate the understanding that it is only sovereignty which is the solution to an alleged 
state of nature, and on this basis complicit behaviour is ensured that allows it a relatively 
unchallenged existence, whilst at the same time, continually renewing and reinforcing the 
assumption(s) that adversaries surround us. Secondly, in doing so, it nurtures the 
circumspection of our societal neighbours that keeps individuals just far enough away from 
each other that they become and remain??????????????????????????????????????????????? 
embodied in negative freedoms which in turn, prevents the kind of connections within 
collective existence that would give us alternative experiences of freedom. 
This undeniable relationship led both Arendt and Foucault to parallel in identifying the 
beginning and the end of sovereig??????????????????? ??????????????????? ????????????????
the consequences of a system not based on the principles of sovereignty it quickly becomes 
                                                                                                                    
32?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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the case that the end of sovereignty is inconceivable33 because the end of sovereignty 
requires the beginnings of sovereignty (Foucault 1991: 95).   
2.4: Conclusion 
 The importance of the contribution that Foucault makes to a critique of sovereignty is to 
recognize that the attempts to legitimate the position of the sovereign happen in a 
downwards as well as an upwards direction; that is historically such attempts at securing 
legitimacy has stretched from both ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
mandate through to the techniques targeted at and practiced on the social body which is the 
????????????????????????????????????????. Furthermore, his research shows his claims in this 
regard to be historically demonstrable in the instance of upwards continuity and 
sociologically so in the instance of downwards legitimation. In both directions the quest is 
to legitimate the inequity immanent to sovereign political systems and this is something 
that Foucault argues against. In this moment, his first parallel with Arendt can be seen. This 
parallel has value for social and political thought today in that it re-poses important 
questions about the inevitability and necessity of the arrangement of contemporary politics 
seen in many of the countries of the world. The parallel drawn here between Foucault and 
Arendt questions the actual political value of such an arrangement of power beyond its 
claims to prevent the worst excesses of the supposed state of nature. This parallel questions 
how politically effective large models of representation are and also highlights the doubts 
surrounding how democratic they can be when they create the career politician, an entity 
who from all positions on the ideological continuum has historically been shown to 
frequently abuse and disrespect the privilege of being elected. It also questions the purpose, 
validity and effectiveness of homogenizing the diversity of those who are governed in the 
reflection of the singular entity of the sovereign or centralized state. This parallel identifies 
that this political homogenization necessitates the manufacture of artificial social divisions 
amongst those who are governed to ensure a diminished cohesion of individuals to continue 
the inequity that the system depends upon. 
                                                                                                                    
33 Arato and Cohen (2009: 323) argue for a transformation not abandonment of sovereignty on the basis of its 
global relevance, something th???????????????????????????????(2009: 318).  
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Instead of the psychologisation of fear or enmity that is represented in the political 
arguments of advocates of sovereign systems such as Hobbes and Schmitt, Foucault 
politicises fear, mistrust and insecurity through his recognition of a historico-political 
discourse in which war forms the permanent backdrop that perpetuates the presentation of 
the need for a sovereign.  In the next chapter, it will be shown how Arendt parallels this 
politicization of fear. However, in the Foucauldian account seen so far politics becomes 
exercised in the social realm through the invention and reinforcement of a symbiosis 
between sovereign as shepherd and those below who require saving from the hostilities of 
the ungoverned flock.   
At the point at which the need for and position of the sovereign is legitimated in a 
downwards direction, Foucault identifies the rise of the shepherd-flock. It is through the 
common person and their behaviours and judgement that the notion of good self-
government finds its way into the social realm. Extending out from the individual self 
towards groups this good government includes government of households and families. The 
analysis of the sovereign as the head of this power arrangement leads to an erroneous and 
misleading analysis of western poli????????????? ????????????????????????? criticisms of 
sovereignty extend into criticism of analyses of it such as those of Hobbes and Schmitt, and 
make its clearest expression in the claim for the need to study the subjugations within and 
throughout the social body instead of the sovereign as the political focus. As this thesis will 
eventually show, the value of this distinct way of re-thinking the model of political power 
that exists in some societies, offers not only answers to some of the weaknesses of Arendt, 
but also the possibilities for moving beyond the unhelpful division between the social and 
the political. 
Foucault calls for the abandonment of sovereign political systems and in doing so parallels 
with Arendt once again. Like Foucault, Arendt also politicises fear, insecurity and mistrust 
in her work. This thesis asserts however that there is ?????????????????????????????????????
how to re-invent the city-citizen that can be found by looking at the arguments that 
Foucault makes. This turn towards Foucault has merit in two ways. Firstly, due to the 
genealogical method that excavates a sociological basis for his political critique, Foucault 
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has the advantage over Arendt in that he bases his arguments on a much more precise 
socio-historical sensitivity. 
  The second point of merit for this thesis turning toward Foucault for an answer to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-flock to suggest the 
way in which it might be possible to begin a type of renaissance of the Arendtian city-
citizen. This idea is based upon the decline of the city-citizen being coeval to the rise of the 
shepherd flock. This thesis argues that it is possible that this principle can be understood in 
reverse. Using a see-saw analogy, the rise of the city-citizen might well be the consequence 
of a focus on bringing about the decline of the shepherd-flock34. This, in turn, has a two-
fold advantage. Firstly, the decline of the shepherd-flock is not as abstract an idea as 
attempting the stand alone rejuvenation of republican sentiments amongst people. 
Secondly, attempting to send the shepherd-flock into decline does not require anything like 
the scope of co-ordinated action required by social revolution, nor any of the violence of it. 
In this way the positive contribution to political thought of the integrity of both Arendt and 
???????????????-violence stance is kept intact.  
What must be considered now therefore are the possibilities for how the decline of the 
shepherd flock might commence. Interestingly, there is another parallel in the work of both 
Arendt and Foucault that suggests the way that the decline of the shepherd-flock can be 
achieved, and this is their defence of the importance of the plurality of people. This defence 
will show that both theorists undermine ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????(2007: 45). In addition to the advantage suggested above, 
the celebration of plurality has the further advantage of de-politicising mistrust, insecurity 
and fear in the way that both Foucault and Arendt advocate without falling into the trap of 
psychologising it as happens with proponents of sovereignty. In doing so, this preserves the 
main aim of the first two chapters which is to outline for modern life the value of 
challenging the domination of sovereign political systems.  The following chapter of this 
thesis temporarily turns away from the arguments of Foucault to draw once again upon 
Arendt and one of her greatest strengths, the recognition and defence of plurality. 
                                                                                                                    
34 This posits ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
from the cam?????????????????????????????????????? 
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3.0 OASES IN THE DESERT1: THE DEFENCE OF PLURALISM IN 
ARENDT 
   ??????????????????????????????(Arendt 1983: 73) 
3.1: Introduction  
For Arendt ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
every deed has the opportunity to be heard and shared with other people. Furthermore, in 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? is 
constituted by peers rather than a hierarchy. For Arendt, ?the world comes into being only if 
?????????????????????????????b: 175). What is troubling to Arendt and that which sits at the 
heart of her project is the concern that atomized individuals are estranged from the world. 
This estrangement carries the potential for politically catastrophic consequences. Arendt 
remarks that the ?success of totalitarianism needs an atomized and individualized mass? 
(1976: 318) and t?????????????????? ????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????ed 
??????????????????? 323). Perhaps however in her most prophetic moment regarding the 
direction that she saw modern politics heading she described a certain vision of politics   
[?] where we deal with people who either because of sheer numbers or indifference, or a 
combination of both, cannot be integrated into an organization based upon common interest, into 
political parties [?] or professional organizations or trade unions. Potentially, they exist in every 
country and form the majority of those large numbers of neutral, politically indifferent people who 
never join a party and hardly ever go to the polls. (1976: 311) 
Given the evidence of voter apathy and low voter turnout seen in a previous chapter these 
comments suggest a political relevance to today that is worthy of consideration. Furthering 
the importance of this issue in terms of the isolation that can arise in contemporary politics 
she states ?The modern age, with its growing world alienation, has led to a situation where 
man, wherever he goes, encounte?????????????????????????????: 89). Support for 
disconnections of this type in the contemporary context has been exemplified already 
through the work of Layard, Beck and Putnam. Other work supports increasing 
disconnection in contemporary society through migration (Hinchliffe 2009: 210-11) and 
disconnections between people because of a decline in ????????????????????????????????
                                                                                                                    
1 From The Promise of Politics (Arendt 2005) 
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coupled with greater fragmentation in the employment patterns of the contemporary 
individual (in Dawson 2004: 101-103). 
Arendt distinguishes in her oeuvre between the various w??????????????????????????????????
and terms these solitude, loneliness and isolation (1976: 474-478). This chapter focuses 
upon the arguments of Arendt regarding her view of political stagnation that arises from the 
paradox of the atomized, yet compressed, isolated yet ???????????????????????????????es 
how the limitations on power that this situation can give rise to can be minimized. The way 
that this attempt is made is via a defence of plurality of perspective. This chapter will show 
that in doing this Arendt replaced the traditional psychologisation of fear or enmity in the 
work of writers such as Hobbes and Schmitt with a politicisation of plurality. The chapter 
also details the value of giving plurality a pivotal role in political life such as Arendt does 
and outlines the particular salience of a defence of a plurality of perspective for political 
life today. It concludes that all effective future politics at the minimum requires genuine 
appreciation of this.  
For Hannah Arendt there are certain sine qua non conditions of plurality, identified by her 
as equality and distinction, and it is imperative that both equality and distinction co-exist in 
order that the political potential of plurality amongst humans is achieved. As foundations, 
one is meaningless without the other. This is because both equality and distinction, as 
stand-alone concepts, harbour a potential danger regarding the political realm. This chapter 
???????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
address her understanding of the importance of both equality and distinction that she makes 
a central part of her argument.  
3.2: Equality and Distinction 
?[...] each of us is made as he is ? single, unique, unchangeable? (Arendt 1976: 301) 
For Arendt, distinction and equality are the corner stones of plurality and on this basis 
constitute a non-instrumental form of politics (2005b: 62). It has been shown that the 
sovereign model of politics is deplored by Arendt because any potential for equality is 
destroyed; where one person rules, by definition, the establishment of equality becomes 
impossible. For Arendt equality is an important political precondition and she uses the term 
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in a very particular way. Drawing upon the Ancient Greeks for inspiration, Arendt argues 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? [?] the equality of those 
????????????????????????????????: 30-31). With reference to the importance of the Greek 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? [?] equality, but not because 
all men were born or created equal, but on the contrary, because men were by nature not 
equal, and needed an artificial institution, the polis, which [????????? ????????????????
(1965: 30-31). Thus, even though Arendt gives a pivotal position to the notion of equality 
in her defence of plurality, recognition of this between people from one person to another 
has to be created and encouraged, rather than a natural condition to be re-discovered. 
Arendt argues that people need to transcend, via a public sphere, the ontological inequality 
of humankind35.  
For Arendt then, equality is one of the cornerstones of plurality. Yet, the creation of 
equality within the public sphere will not constitute a genuine political sphere by itself. 
What exists alongside equality, and this time as an ontological facet of plurality, rather than 
something that must be created and maintained, is the fact of distinction: 
Human plurality [??] has the twofold character of equality and distinction. If men were not equal, 
they could neither understand each other and those who came before them nor plan for the future and 
foresee the needs of those who will come after them. If men were not distinct, each human being 
distinguished from any other who is was or will ever be, they would need neither speech nor action 
to make themselves understood. (Arendt 1998: 176)  
 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
distinctness which he shares with everything alive becomes uniqueness, and human 
plurality is the paradoxical ????????????????????????????????8: 176). What Arendt means by 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in a strange way and seemingly contradicting her earlier claims that we are ????????????????
equal, Arendt identifies an equality between plural humans, which is more accurately 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nction from 
????????????????????[??] we are all the same, that is, human, in such a way that nobody is 
                                                                                                                    
35 Arendt inherits this notion from Heidegger. As explained in the introduction, this thesis has a more socio-
political than philosophical angle which restricts the extent to which Heidegger can be considered here. The 
philosophical relationship between Arendt and Heidegger is considered by others such as Dana Villa (1992) 
and Schecter (2010).  
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ever the same as anyone else who ????????????????????????????????????????1998: 8). We are 
the same because we are not the same.  
Arendt shows then how plurality is marked by the fact that we are distinct from everyone 
else. This includes not only our contemporaries but also our predecessors and our 
successors. These distinctions, which cut across, as well as within time, mark every one of 
us out as unique beings. Arendt writes that  
Not the plurality of objects fabricated in accordance with one model nor the plurality of variations 
within a species ? this shared human sameness is the equality that in turn manifests itself only in the 
absolute distinction of one equal from another. (2005b: 61-2)  
For Arendt, the distinctness that makes us the same needs to be extended into a political 
equality, guaranteed and achieved by and amongst other people. The way that this equality 
is extended depends in part upon a revolution in the thinking processes of individuals; the 
rediscovery of the ability to exercise judgement, which in turn relies upon the possibility of 
thinking in solitude. That Arendt appeals to a vague hope that an appreciation of 
distinctness will come from a revolution in thinking such as this, is beset with problems. 
This seems to imply the need of a higher reflective ability and arguably by extension 
possibly imply an elitism which makes these claims problematic. These challenges are 
addressed in the latter chapters of the thesis. 
A?????????????????????????????????????, constituted by equality and distinction, is the 
ontology of humankind. With this recognition Arendt begins to conceive of the genuine 
political freedom that she charges the western tradition of failing to deliver. As far as 
??????????????????????????????????????e of freedom as a concept through experiencing 
???????????83: 148). The way that we experience freedom through others is because other 
people, in their distinction from us, yet their equality to us, offer the sharing of viewpoints. 
This sharing of perspectives is very important for showing what people commonly hold as 
important and what they do not. It also offers a balance against single minded approaches to 
problems and a form of objectivity toward the solution to them. Differing perspectives act 
as a series of checks and balances against bias and the potential for coercion immanent to 
the inequality that bias implies. Lastly, the space for differing perspectives also constitutes 
the space for the sharing of speech and deed. The importance of this for politics is tacitly 
and sometimes reluctantly demonstrated in arguments for the importance of referenda 
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(Cameron 2010) and is supported in examples such as participatory budgeting (Saward 
2009) and citizen?s juries (Shakespeare and Wakeford 2008). Arendt write????????[?] there 
must always be a plurality of individuals or peoples and a plurality of standpoints to make 
reality even possible and to guarantee its continuation (2005b: 175). This is where the 
beginning of genuine politics can be found, amongst people in the plural, sharing distinct 
and unique perspectives on a given matter that in turn give that matter and indeed the world 
an objective quality36. 
The medium through which perspectives are shared is via speech. This is seen by Arendt as 
further testament to the irrefutable fact that plurality is the ontology of humans. Speech is 
meaningless unless it is heard, hearing requires other people. Not only does hearing require 
others for speech to be necessary, but it requires a common world to allow any kind of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
speech amongst humans, is further evidence firstly of the necessity of recognising plurality 
and secondly that plurality is the only valid basis of politics (1998: 4).  
The importance of plurality ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
carried in the form of plurality of perspectives, to be heard and therefore shared. In turn, 
this sharing and hearing of perspectives is how genuine political freedom can begin to be 
experienced.  
 ?????????? ????????? ?????????????separation of isolation, loneliness and fear and the 
dangerous consequences of these situations, Arendt argues that it is only plurality that can 
safeguard us against these dangers because it is only in plurality that we can be seen and 
heard and our words and deeds remembered (1998: 95). This is something that she terms 
??????????Arendt argues that the way to ????????????????????????????freedom as s????????????
(Ibid) is to move toward a much more active appreciation of plurality which by its very 
components, that is the coordination of equality and distinction, leads to a non-sovereign 
                                                                                                                    
36 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Dana Villa (1996), Isaac 
(1997) Arato and Cohen (2009) and Martel and Klausen (2008) 
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freedom. The value of this contribution to contemporary politics is explained in the 
remainder of the chapter.  
3.3: The E limination of Spontaneity 
It is necessary to explain why Arendt seemingly stated the obvious about the human 
condition when she focused so much emphasis within her oeuvre on the plurality of 
individuals. The reason for this is that in her opinion genuine recognition and full 
appreciation of plurality, which once existed at very specific cultural and historic moments 
such as Ancient Greece, has since been lost (1998: 234).  
Arendt identifies fear as a negative aspect in politics.  This is crucial to an understanding of 
the Arendtian concept of plurality. This is because fear is both simultaneously destructive 
and creative. As shown in Chapter O????????????????????????????????????????????????????
linked. In explaining the consequences of the powerlessness of the many that results in 
certain forms of modern politics, she states ??????????????????????????????????????????????
arises, and from this fear come both the will of the tyrant to subdue all others and the 
preparation of his subjects to en??????????????????????b: 69). This recognition can easily 
be extended to ???????????????????????? of insecurity, anxiety and mistrust. They diminish 
the potential connections than can be made in the condition of human plurality, and in 
doing so diminishes the potential for alternative political freedoms experienced with and 
through the presence of others. In the void created by the absence of a greater appreciation 
of plurality, the fear arising through insecurity and mistrust creates isolation and 
???????????????????????????????????????[total] domination (Arendt 1976: 438).  
A???????????????????????????this show the more tyrannical aspects of sovereign politics 
because of this negative impact on the political potential of the plurality of people. This 
links back to its circular nature and parallels with the causes of fear in Fo??????????????????
shown in the previous chapter. This in turn, by definition, negates positive differences 
between people, reducing them ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????438). 
Any political system built upon this abolishes the possibility of any action or reaction not 
accounted for in the status quo, as demonstrated by the previous example of the 2011 
protests in the UK. These examples demonstrate that the political arrangement that is 
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sovereignty requires predictability to be maintained to ensure successful domination. As a 
result, Arendt correctly identifies therein an inherent rejection of anything that could 
nurture unpredictability, such as the type of spontaneous actions seen in these examples. In 
her eyes, the difference between the unique perspectives that each individual holds but 
which are homogenized by presentation as one perspective is something that eliminates 
spontaneity. She exemplifies this by looking at issues of ethnic differences: 
The reason why highly developed political communities, such as [...] modern nation-states, so often 
insist on ethnic homogeneity is that they hope to eliminate as far as possible those natural and always 
present differences and differentiations which by themselves arouse dumb hatred, mistrust and 
discrimination [??] ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
individuality as such, and indicates those realms in which man cannot change and cannot act and in 
which, therefore, he has a distinct tendency to destroy. (Arendt 1976: 301) 
This makes the very important point that where distinction without accompanying equality 
is present, so too may be an inaccurate perception of danger. With this point the previous 
??????????????????????????-???????????????????????? as a separate group from all people and 
the emphasis upon ??????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
??????????????????????????? she means that there can be the acknowledgement of distinction 
without an adequate ??????????????????????????????????????. This absence is a dangerous 
thing. This danger can be exemplified in the type of contemporary political rhetoric that 
places the concepts ??????????????-?????? and ????????, extre????????????????? in the same 
speech (Cameron 2011) thus consistently emphasizing specific differences which are 
supposedly indicative of danger.  
Distinction without equality allows for oppression, cruelty and in the cases of certain 
political regimes in the twentieth century, genocide. This is why Arendt argues that for 
plurality to offer us genuine ???????????? ???? ?????????????????????????????????????????
mu??????????????????????????: 301) which would offer protection from the potential 
catastrophes that unchallenged distinction might lead to.  She envisaged that this might be 
possible through political organization at a much more immediate level than the sovereign 
state such as the council movement or the town meetings of New England, both of which 
Arendt valued for being smaller in size, more local and providing more practically sized 
space for the sharing of perspectives. This allows immediate political engagement and 
reward both in terms of direct political action and proximity to the effects of this decision 
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making process. The further advantage of these mutually agreed equal rights made in these 
contexts are that they would be ones that had been settled through discussion between those 
directly concerned with them rather than by dictation from distant government. This would 
make them more representative and therefore more meaningful. Arguably, the 
contemporary examples of participatory budgeting and citizen?s juries enjoy a level of 
success on this basis. 
????????????????????????????????? idea resides in answering the question of what would 
be done about those individuals who do not agree with the principle of mutually agreed 
rights or the more likely scenario of not agreeing with specific formulations of those 
mutually agreed rights. For example, those with a high level of material resource might 
object to the agreement of a specified minimum standard of living for all, if maintaining 
this minimum standard meant that they had to relinquish some of their material wealth. A 
further problem might arise through the issue of ensuring a universal adherence to those 
rights if certain formulations of those rights happened to conflict with one or more of an 
???????????? particular prejudices toward religious or sexual orientation or national or ethnic 
appearance. Arendt, however, appears to give no direct suggestion for how mutually agreed 
rights might be upheld in these moments of a conflict of opinion(s).  
In partial redress of this it is worth considering that under systems of rights supposedly 
??????????????????????????, the observation and protection of those rights supposedly 
guaranteed by the sovereign ultimately rests upon observation and respect of those rights by 
people themselves rather than any overt, direct and continual external enforcement. The 
??????????? authority and punitive capabilities regarding the infringement of rights is 
actually only invoked après la lettre37. The changes in attitudes in the last twenty years 
towards greater acceptance, tolerance and changing legislation regarding sexual, ethnic and 
religious differences have come from civil society rather than the political sphere (Sampson 
et al, 2005, 675). In fact, in many cases the legislative and policy bodies within the political 
sphere are somewhat slow to catch up with the progress that individuals and groups make 
                                                                                                                    
37 Arguably the riots in London, Birmingham and Manchester in August, 2011 (BBC News,10th August, 2011, 
13:00hrs) illustrate this point. These moments of social disturbance demonstrate the consequences of an 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
react to these situations after they had occurred by which time, in terms of the protection and guarantee of 
rights, it was arguably too late. See BBC News,10th August 2011. 
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in these ways as ????????????????????e and Olzak 2004: 474), gay rights (Bachmann 2011: 
???????????????????d human rights (Reid and Toffel 2009: 1157) demonstrate. In this 
respect, it may be the case that in praxis large parts of society already approximate on a day 
to day basis toward the vision of mutually agreed rights that Arendt outlined.  
Distinction and equality must exist simultaneously because of the dangers contained in 
situations where there is equality without distinction. For Arendt, the modern world 
consists of this imbalance, so?????????????????????????????????????????This thesis 
exemplifies the contemporary form of this danger in more depth through the discussion of 
bureaucracy in Chapters Five and Six. For now it is sufficient to say that because Western 
Europe, North America and other developed countries are homogenised in political terms, 
the contemporary fears that are insecurity, anxiety and mistrust continue to play a greater 
role in politics than is necessary.    
In making distinction central to her description of genuine politics, Arendt, like Foucault in 
the previous chapter, politicises rather than psychol?????????????? The suppression of 
difference that exists in some societies feeds a mistrust of difference which frequently 
leaves people ????????????????????. The modern age, characterised by this loss of plurality, is 
termed by Arendt as living in ?????????????????????????The disconnection from knowing 
equality and distinction as two parts of the whole of plurality nurtures the fear of the 
??????????????????????????????mporary examples this means ????????????????????????????
what it means to be an ordinary taxpayer or to be British or white or non-Muslim or who 
subscribes to the ?unity of values? ?????????????????????????????????????????? 
For Arendt, fear, mistrust and insecurity38 destroys all of the inherent political potential of 
plurality by allowing too unquestioningly the homogenisation of distinction to occur and 
the failure to cultivate the culture for equality that has the potential to be facilitated by an 
                                                                                                                    
38 The previous chapter on The Critique of Sovereignty elaborates on how sovereign political systems 
facilitate the isolation of the individual which in turn feeds and feeds on such anxieties. These techniques 
include amongst others the value of the unending pursuit of wealth/more property/appropriation (Arendt 
1993?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
consumerist culture of the Western world today. Theorists such as Arato and Cohen criticise Arendt for not 
systematising the global implications of her theory more (2009: 319). In addition to the discussion in the 
previous chapter isolation as a pre-condition to circumvent the plural is discussed more fully at the end of this 
chapter. 
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appreciation of distinction. To underscore this point the homogenization of the plurality of 
people can be more accurately understood as non-difference and less ?????????????? equality. 
This is not at all the equality that Arendt advocated, but a form of same-ness that serves 
only destructive ends. In destroying the political equality arising from the plurality of 
humans and facilitating the more shadowy form of equality or non-difference known as 
homogenization (white, British, united in values, ideal body size, acceptable credit rating), 
the entrenched political system monopolises power through the suppression of  plurality; 
people are divided against one another. Through this recognition, Arendt foretells some of 
the claims of Foucault.  
It is clear then, that the basis upon which Arendt laments the absence of genuine plurality is 
more accurately described as the loss of distinction and equality between people. What we 
are left with instead is fear, anxiety and insecurity around difference, rather than an 
appreciation of the benefits of it, such as the sharing of perspectives giving a reality to the 
world. Alternatively, we are left with a distorted form of equality that is more accurately a 
?????????????????????????????????????????? a homogenous mass allegedly represented by the 
????????????????????????m. In situations of either type plurality appears not to exist and 
thus raises important questions regarding the level of freedom experienced therein. 
????????????oeuvre, not only does genuine recognition of the plurality of humanity prevent 
political catastrophes, but plurality also offers positive political experiences in their own 
right. These include the fact that plurality itself constitutes the public realm (1958: 220), the 
public realm itself is the only real site for political action as political action needs other 
people (2005: viii) and people in the plural achieve greater power together than any one of 
them does on their own (1970: 44). All of these points are explored and exemplified in the 
remaining sections of this chapter. In addition to this, the following section makes further 
elaboration of how Arendt argued it would not only be possible, but necessary, ????? 
????????? ??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
chapter turns now then ???????????????????????????????????????????????? characterised by 
deeds and speech. 
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3.4: ????????6 as Speech and Deeds and Action as Resistance 
?Action alone is the exclusive prerogative of man [?] only action is entirely 
dependent on the constant presence of others????????? 1998: 23)   
The reason that we only find genuine freedom in our plural condition is because of the fact 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Arendt 1998: 200) can 
find their full realization. In this moment Arendt further underscores the importance of the 
plurality of people for the sharing perspectives. ????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
faculty ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????he 
????? ??????????????????????83: 22-23). Like Aristotle, Arendt saw the political 
significance for the faculty of speech but more than Aristotle and therefore in distinction to 
him she saw it as fundamental for human experience rather than in establishing inequality. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be a human life because it is ?????????????????????? ????????8: 176).  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the loss of the relevance of speech, and the loss of all human relationships, the loss in other 
words of some of the most essential c???????????????????????????????1976: 297). Because of 
this, it is the los???????????????????????????????marginalised groups such as the poor, or 
stateless peoples, rather than the more visible burdens that they bear (Arendt 1965: 69). 
Later in this thesis this speechlessness is exemplified in its contemporary form through 
bureaucracy.  
For Arendt, only plurality allows words as speech and deeds as actions to take on meaning. 
For Arendt, human existence as plural beings is testament to the political importance of 
speech and deed. For speech to be meaningful, other people are needed to hear and 
                                                                                                                    
6 Problematically, ?????????????????????????????????erstanding of political action a distinction needs to be 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the wider sense to describe genuine political action that is constituted when words/speech and deeds/actions 
take place within the public sph??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? with a 
???????????? 
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understand the spoken word. Without others speech is also unnecessary. What is so 
politically powerful for Arendt and what needs greater emphasis in contemporary politics is 
that the speaking and hearing between plural individuals allows a sharing of perspective 
that augments the appreciation of distinction. Deeds as action and words as speech: 
[?] create a space between the participants which can find its proper location almost anytime and 
anywhere. It is the space of appearances in the widest sense of the word, namely the space where I 
appear to others as others appear to me, where men [...] make their appearance explicitly. (1998: 
199).  
 
 For Arendt, both action and speech are unimaginable without plurality (2005b: 61).  
Arendt exemplifies this in her early explanations of the French Resistance in ?Between Past 
and Future?. The political circumstances which gave rise to the resistance; namely the 
submission of Paris and the subsequent collapse of France to the National Socialist party of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????totally unexpected even????????: 3). This 
led the French people t???????????????????????????????????????????????????: 3). Despite the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
against their conscious inclinations had come to constitute willy-??????????????????????
(Arendt 1993: 3). Historical sources, ?????????????????????????????????????????????e. For 
example, an early resistant, Agnès Humbert, was surprised that Parisians were already 
rebelling within five weeks of the fall of France (2008: 8). Julien Blanc describes the 
????????????????????????????????? 280) an????????????????????????????????????? 282-3) 
with which this rebellion began.  Cobb (2009: 4) points out that this rebellion consisted of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2009: 61). Examples of 
this included the ??????????????????????? ???????????????????????? which Humbert was a 
part (Cobb 2009: 170) and the sweeping miners strike in May-June 1941 (Cobb 2009: 69). 
 The willy-nilly constitution of the public realm in this example happened because hidden 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(1993: 3). Arendt informs us in this work that this modern day example of a public realm 
did not last long. Upon the liberation of France, the pe????????????????????????????????????
back into [?] the weightless irrelevance of their personal affairs [??] ??????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????: 4), a claim independently 
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supported by Cobb (2009: 283). What was important for Arendt, however fleeting the 
existence of this public realm, was that the people of the French resistance has discovered a 
????????????1993: 4), evidential for Arendt of exactly the things that she claims about 
politics when politics is done in the public realm. For her the treasure found by the French 
resistance was two-fold. One part of this treasure was that those who joined the resistance 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????e able to be ?????????????: 4). Because of this self-discovery the second part of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
people of the French resistance were:  
visited by an apparition of freedom [??] beca?????????????????????????????????????????????????
initiative on themselves and therefore [??] had begun to create that public space between themselves 
where freedom could appear. (1993: 4) 
This view is once again independently supported, this time by Jean Cassou, founder of the 
??????????????????????. Cassou wrote that each of the résistants who went through the 
experience would have given ?????????????????????? that did ?????????????????????????? 
???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????ld have called ??????????????
Cassou called that moment of his ????????????????????????? 
Through her interpretation of this moment in French history, Arendt tangibly shows us both 
her vision of the public sphere and what it can achieve. In conditions that m???????????????
prescription for the public realm, i.e. plural, political, in equality and in distinction, through 
word and deed, the women and men of the French resistance found their humanity and in 
?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????impse of genuine freedom. This is 
given a contemporary relevance in recent events in the UK such as the protests against the 
sale of British forestry, against higher education fees (Morris 2011) and marches for the 
alternative to cuts in public funding (Casciani 2011, Kula, 2011).  
There are, for Arendt, certain conditions that must be put in place so that such genuine 
political freedom can be achieved within plurality.  It has already been explained earlier 
here how fear between humans strangles the opportunity for the fundamental political 
qualities of equality and distinction to reach their apogee. In recognising this fact Arendt 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????8: 243), by which 
???? ??????????????????????????????cannot be kn????????????????????????????????????b: 
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viii). Equality and distinction when separated from each other can become catastrophes for 
human political experience. Arendt argued that in order that these catastrophes are expelled 
from the experience of humans in the plural, humans need to ensure that they afford each 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
strength of our decision to guarantee ourselves mutually a?????????????????83: 30). This 
formal arrangement of rights, which allows the sharing of perspectives, characterises 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????lic 
sphere allows humans in the plural to share in words and deeds with an appreciation of the 
distinct perspectives that may be presented, yet also be reassured by their existence as 
equals. This in turn safeguards not only their perspective, but also a place in sharing that 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and heard as any other. In this space a different approach toward genuine freedom and real 
political experience is made.  
There are then three important reasons for ????????????????????????????????lurality is the 
only condition that allows speech and deed to have meaning, speech and deed is the only 
medium that allows the sharing of perspectives, or more specifically political Action and 
Action is the only way that humans experience, not only genuine politics but also genuine 
freedom ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????nd ?????????????????????8: 176), something that 
????????????[...] not only the condition sine qua non, but the conditio par quam ? of all 
????????????????????8: 7).  
In order that speech can be heard and thus take on meaning, and so that perspectives can be 
shared and appreciated through the balance of equality and distinction, there needs to be not 
only a recognition of but also an appreciation of plurality. Quite simply, power could not be 
claimed, negotiated, re-claimed, re-negotiated or seized without plurality. In the conclusion 
to this thesis this emphasis on plurality is retained as an important potential dimension of 
political action that can facilitate but does not limit the renegotiation of power.  
??????????????????????????????????????????????ly engaging in speech and deed, other ways 
in which people ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????of the French 
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resistance. She strongly emphasised not only the political, but also the human value, of 
beginning something new. Very soon ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
explored. For now another type of Arendtian action is examined, that of natality. 
3.5: O????????????s???Natality 
The political quality that Arendt sees ??????????????????????????????really gives Action its 
inherently promising nature for politics, is that it signifies a beginning. Beginnings for 
Arendt are very important, because they set forth into the world actions and chains of 
events that are both irreversible and unpredictable (1998: 241-243). The irreversible and 
unpredictable nature of Action, the fact that the consequences of an action cannot be known 
in advance or at the time the action is begun, is something to be applauded because there is 
an infinite plethora of outcomes that may be achieved, and within this plethora, by the law 
of averages, there will always be positive outcomes. On this basis, it can be argued that 
every beginning at the same time equates to a possibility for the realization of change. 
In the sense of beginnings, therefore, another el???????????????????????????????????????????
in the examples given above???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
resistance fleetingly discovered was quickly lost, brought to an end by the victory of the 
Allied forces and the reversal of the occupation of France by the Nazis. Deliberately, what 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ifespan. This is 
of no surprise as the people of the resistance could not have formed the resistance with the 
knowledge of where it would have led them, they just simply started it. The French 
resistance therefore exemplifies a beginning, something spontaneously set forth in response 
to and into the socio-political situation of the time and which created an effect in the 
challenge of power at many levels of everyday life.  
For Arendt the eternal hope that beginnings offer all people ???????????????????????????
world. Even something that is as apparently as pedestrian as the birth of another human is a 
?????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????is an example of 
Arendtian Action, an action that she desc??????????????????? (1998: 247). Arendtian ?????????
is the political equivalent of natality (1970: 82). Action is how human beings can bring all 
of the potential and possibility for change offered by the birth of a child, into the world. It is 
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ultimately this fact about Action that makes anyone who engages in it truly political. She 
???????????????[?] what makes man a political being is his faculty of action [??] to embark 
????????????????????????? 
E???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
irreversible and unpredictable nature. Arendt saw the positive in this, ???????????????????????
cannot be controlled means it can lead anywhere. However, Arendt recognised that besides 
??????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of errors and mistakes, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????998: 220). Her 
solutions to these issues are looked at more fully in a later chapter of this thesis. 
Whereas som?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
(2007: 45) and others overlook it in favour of loyalties based on biological groups (Miller, 
1999: 66), economic class (Gorz 1980: 280) or nationality (Arnason 1996: 212)  Arendt 
distinguishes herself in seeing plurality as containing three fundamental qualities of Action. 
These ???????????????????????????? outcome, the irreversibility of the process, and the 
anonymity of its ?????????(1998: 220). These elements have the potential to be both 
troublesome yet also positive for political experience. Action permits moments of genuine 
empowerment to shine and be within the reach of all people. It is for these reasons that 
Hannah Arendt stated in varying forms over and over in the Human Condition that:  
The only indispensable material factor in the generation of power is the living together of people. 
Only where men live so close together that the potentialities of action are always present can power 
remain with them. (1998: 201) 
With this in mind it is possible to see how contemporary politics requires more political 
moments like the French Resistance and Budapest in 1956 to demonstrate the possibility of 
genuine Action, direct politics and alternative moments of freedom than the constricted 
type o????????????????????????????????????????????  
For theorists such as Arendt, we do not have to accept political inertia quietly. We are never 
really without hope, just without the awareness, the tools and the space to ensure our 
challenges to power can succeed. As Arendt argues, wherever men and women retain the 
capacity to reform as individuals within plurality, there will always be the chance that they 
can reclaim power and the political domain. This, however, requires more than the 
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gathering of people together in multiple numbers. There must be Action, characterised 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of others as equals who are at the same time distinct from us. There must be within this 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s?????????????????????????????
as facilitating the sharing of unique and distinct perspectives. There should also be actions 
which allow natality, a willingness to begin anew and a celebration of the potentials that 
this offers; an action in itself because in doing so, the old is condemned to history. Arendt 
makes the crucial point, however, that these actions will not fall to us from the sky. It is 
imperative that these faculties are understood, not only as actions, but pro-actions, steps 
that people must be prepared to take for themselves and towards and ultimately for each 
other. This in turn, will allow the discovery of oneself, and ultimately a non-sovereign form 
of freedom within the public sphere. Suggestions for how these pro-actions might be begun 
in the contemporary context ?????????????????????????????????????????Without an approach to 
plurality that fulfils Arendtian criteria, we are without reality because the reality of the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????Arendt 1998: 199). However, we are also 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ssarily and not 
????????????????? 
3.6: Outside the Plural: Isolation, Loneliness and Solitude  
?A state [....] where each man thinks only his own thoughts is by definition a 
tyranny????????????83: 164) 
The previous two chapters on Arendt have explained how insecurity and mistrust are 
contemporary forms of fear that take on too much political significance and therefore have 
more political influence than is necessary. Arendt also identifies three singular experiences 
for the human who dwells outside the plural. Understanding this can give further 
explanation to the relevance of ????????????????????????? Arendt defines these isolation, 
loneliness and solitude. These singular experiences are not genuine psychological problems 
but are the consequence of the hegemony of a certain way of thinking about democracy that 
allows them to be construed as psychological issues. These three concepts form the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
between them. Isolation and loneliness are two symptoms of contemporary society as has 
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already been shown by previous evidence. These symptoms hamper the success of plurality 
and the potential for political life that plurality offers. Solitude is necessary for political life, 
yet cannot be successful without the plural to illuminate it and act as a counter balance to it.  
Isolation, loneliness and solitude are also fundamental to the distinction that Arendt makes 
between power, strength and force. This section explains the singular experiences in which 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is not achieved and political reality lost. The first of these is isolation. 
3.61: Isolation 
Isolation relates to the political realm. It is defined by Arendt as the condition that arises 
when an individual cannot act because they have no-one to act with them (1976; 474). 
Without others their action(s) is denied reality and therefore meaning. For Arendt, isolation 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????homo faber and the labour of 
animal laborans (1976: 474). Both work and labour are performed ?????????????????????????
(1976: 474), and as a result isolation connects to certai???????????????????????????????? 474).  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
isolated they are deprived of the capacity to act (1998: 188). For her power is: 
a power potential and not an unchangeable, measurable, and reliable entity like force or strength [?] 
power springs up between men and when they act together and vanishes the moment that they 
disperse. (1998: 200) 
Power then for Arendt, is something very different from force or strength. Strength is a 
force possessed by the individual in isolation, and in a contest between two isolated 
individuals, strength and not power will dictate the victor (1998: 200). Force is the 
preparedness to use that strength. Power can not be possessed like strength or applied like 
force (1958: 201). Power is boundless. It has no physical limitation unlike strength or force. 
The only limit to power is other people. This is no coincidence as human power 
corresponds to the condition of plurality anyway (1998: 201). People retain power by 
remaining together after ?????????????? ?????????????????????????????Arendt 1998: 201). So 
?????????????power corresponds to the human ability not just to a??????????????????????????
(1970: 44) and people, in doing so, discover together a potency greater than they do or 
could ever hold as individuals. In this way ?[?] whoever, for whatever reasons, isolates 
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himself and does not partake in such being together, forfeits power and becomes impotent, 
no matter how great his strength?????????????8: 201 my emphasis) 
Thus, when people become isolated by the absence of an appreciation of plurality, and the 
research of Layard (2003) and others supports this possibility, a fertile ground is opened up 
for an abuse of power, for example its monopolisation, because the power that exists 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and traditional theory the combination of force and powerless??????????????????????????
(1998: 202, 1976: 474). In this way it can be understood that where individuals are isolated 
from their plurality and are subsequently rendered powerless, yet subject to force, they are 
considered to experience tyrannical dimensions. The importance of this issue is taken up 
later on.  
All systems that psychologise fear compound the separation of people from one another. 
This in turn reduces the power of every individual. In Chapter One it was shown how this 
separation takes the form of a rights based system in a political sense and capitalist 
endeavour in an economic one. Tyrannies then are defined as arrangements which keep 
people isolated in order to keep them politically impotent. To do this tyrannies destroy the 
public realm, although they leave the productive capacities of man intact. There are 
however other political systems that embody not only the monopolization of power but a 
monopolization of power to its worst excesses. These are the political systems identified by 
Arendt as totalitarian. For Arendt, such systems rely on isolation, but via the destruction of 
the private realm, introduce a second anti-political condition into the void left by the 
absence of a full appreciation of plurality. This second condition is the transformation of 
isolation into something new; something that spills over from the political field into the 
social field. This second anti-political condition, and the most serious for Arendt, is 
loneliness.  
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3.62: Loneliness and Solitude 
In ?The Origins of Totalitarianism? Arendt explains that isolation and loneliness are not the 
same (1976: ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
loneliness in the sphere of social intercou??????????? 475).  Loneliness is where we are 
???????????? ??????????????????????????????? 474). We can be isolated without being 
lonely and vice versa. We can be isolated, that is unable to act because there are no others 
to act alongside me, yet not lonely, and we can feel devoid of all human companionship, 
yet not isolated (1976: 474). For Arendt, loneliness concerns the entirety of human life 
(1976: 475).  What is uniquely characteristic about totalitarian political systems is that 
besides basing itself on the isolation of individuals such as seen in sovereign political 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????1976: 
475).  
Loneliness is an effective tool in the domination over people because loneliness constitutes 
disconnection from the common human world. Arendt recognised this issue as relevant to 
old age and extended the issue of loneliness beyond it (1976: 478), an observation of 
American life that has been given more contemporary ??????????????????????????00) term 
?????????????????Recent studies show loneliness and its negative effect on individuals 
(Perplau and Perlman 1992, Stanley et al 2010, VanderWeele et al 2011) to be supported by 
studies of children and adolescents (Galanki and Vassilophou 2007), sufferers of mental 
illness (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009, Gillies 2010) and the unemployed (Dawson 2004, 
Skellington 2010) an issue ?????????????????????????????????-income effect of 
unemployment? (2003: Lecture 3). As loneliness is based firstly on isolation from the 
political realm, the disconnection is fully completed by their detachment from the social 
realm that is loneliness. In this way, all possible potentials of plurality, of men acting in 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ne experience usually 
suffered in marginal conditions like old age, has become an everyday experience of the 
ever growi??? ???????????????????????????? 478).  
Disconnection from the plurality of people as embodied by isolation and loneliness, are the 
corner stones of total domination. These two anti political principles foster the 
disconnection of people from each other, facilitating the domination of them. Arendt 
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explains why: ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-political 
principles, and throw men into a situation contrary to political action, so loneliness and the 
logical-ideological deducing the worst that comes from it represent an anti social situation 
and harbour a principle destructive for a???????????????????????????????? 478). In the 
absence of their political equals, which individuals experience in both isolation and in 
loneliness, rounded judgements become impossible under both conditions so that deducing 
the worst is made easier?????????????????????????????????????????????? unbearable is the 
??????????????????????????????????????????n solitude, but confirmed in its identity only by the 
trusting and trustwor??????????????? ???????????????? 477). Alongside the obvious loss of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????refore loses himself. In summarising the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????[?] it seems as if a way had been 
found to set the desert itself in motion, to let loose a sand storm that could cover all parts of 
??????????????????????????? 478) 
There is then something else about loneliness that leads Arendt to deplore it, besides its 
parallel with isolation. Loneliness is more than just the estrangement from the political 
world as embodied by isolation; loneliness is also the condition under which the individual 
can no longer keep connected to herself as well as her equals to allow the possibility for 
logic to become thought. In addition to isolation, loneliness is also distinct from something 
else. This condition is solitude. 
For Arendt solitude is different to loneliness. Loneliness is only experienced in company, 
the company that highlights the absence of the individuals? connections to it (1976; 476). In 
contrast, solitude is a condition where the individual is truly alone and therefore able to be 
??????????????????????? (2005b: 21).  Arendt draws on Socratic philosophy to illustrate how 
living together with others begins with living with oneself (Ibid). This is because in 
addition to the fact that ontologically humans are plural, they ?????????????????? in the polis. 
To fully appreciate our appearance to others we appear to ourselves through our own 
consciences (Arendt 2005b: 21).  In solitude the individual appears to themselves via an 
internal dialogue, he/she is not altogether separate from other people (Arendt 2005b: 22). In 
this way then, in solitude the individual is always connected in some way to plurality via 
the two individuals-within-one that exists within the self. Solitude therefore is a condition 
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where Arendt believed it would be possible to keep in touch with oneself, to translate cold 
logic into the warmer reflections of considered thought and judgement that could also at 
times be illuminated yet further by the presence of fellow humans whose perspectives could 
and would mediate the thoughts of the self and possibly turn the tide of sand threatening to 
spread the desert across the world. In addition to isolation and loneliness, solitude too is not 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? become loneliness (1976: 476) and 
further highlights the imperative of the plural. Not only is plurality the background against 
which solitude necessarily functions in order to retain all of its valuable properties, but it is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????to the anti-political.  
In distinction to loneliness then, despite all appearances to the contrary, a connection 
remains between the individual and plurality in solitude, a connection that is completely 
obliterated in conditions of loneliness. In loneliness ?????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????litude requires others and the 
fellowship between humans that can only arise through plurality. Arendt then makes 
solitude a socio-political state, rather than a psychological one. This argument about the 
self in relation to others is returned to regarding a later consideration of Foucault. 
3.7: Conclusion  
This chapter has explai?????????????????????????????????????ch gives further explanation to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????she sees that a more meaningful 
politics begins from the fact that people exist in the plural and that this plural existence is a 
strength that they can draw on. The potential consequences of the anti-political climate that 
refuses to recognise this fact should not be underestimated. For Arendt, herself a person 
who witnessed and lived through the absence of politics created by the Third Reich in 
??????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
when people have lost contact with their fellow men as well as the reality around them, for 
together with these contacts, men lose the capacity of both experience and ??????????????? 
?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
us [...] ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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(Arendt 2005b: 201-2). The importance of this to this thesis is the absolute importance of 
other people to a more comprehensive social and political empowerment.  
 
The weakness, however, that arises from the points made in this chapter relate to the 
question of how individuals can begin to re-appraise genuine plurality and on what grounds 
they could be persuaded to do so? Arendt herself points out the answer to these questions 
but with a much more contemporary angle so does Foucault. This thesis turns now to the 
work of Foucault and his work in excavating the dominations in power relationships that 
history has hidden, particularly the history of certain ways of thinking, which have led to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
forthcoming chapter show how oppressive political systems can be rejected in the name of 
a defence of plurality whilst having the simultaneous merit of sending the shepherd-flock 
into decline.   
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4.0: DIFFERENCE, DISCIPLINE, DOMINATION:  FOUCAULT AND 
THE PASTORALISATION OF THE PLURAL 
 
4.1: Introduction 
This chapter will show Foucault?? parallel with Arendt regarding the importance of 
defending plurality. Examination of this furthers and strengthens the contemporary 
relevance of a synthesis of their theories in terms of grounding this in aspects of everyday 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? for example, the key 
importance of distinction. Distinction will be shown to be an especially crucial point 
because of his desire to instill an agonistic [...] sensibility to achieve bellum omnium contra 
omnes (Thiele 1990: 920-1). Drawin?????????????????????????????????????????????the 
???????????????????????????? 85) Foucault emphasises the importance of pluralism because 
of the opportunity for provocation and struggle that it creates between different people and 
the circulation of power that this perpetuates. This is read in this thesis as a positive view of 
distinction absent from politics today. 
 Foucault, like Arendt, identifies a danger inherent when a positive view of distinction is 
lost. For him many modern forms of politics are very limited on the basis of totalisation 
(Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 375). The loss of plurality that totalisation inevitably requires 
is key to the governmental art that he calls omnes et singulatum????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????has 
historically ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????27-8). 
Distinction is crucial because it allows agonism which in turn has the potential to 
circumvent the stagnation of power because it allows a constant negotiation of power39. In 
contemporary society distinction becomes ????????????????????????????????????????????
positions which maximize the potential for the imitation of warfare as previous examples 
have shown in terms of religious affiliation, physical appearance and disunity in values. 
The danger of imitating warfare is shown in the history of normalisation and the subsequent 
                                                                                                                    
39 The explanation of this in this chapter will show why writers such as Gordon (2001: 125-6) are incorrect in 
charging Foucault with the assumpti???????????????????????????????? ?????? 
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pastoralisation of behaviours and attitudes that this process involves. In sentiments not 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ional 
fa????????????????????????????????????????????????????????that Foucault, like Arendt, is a 
pluralist who opposes existing forms of pluralism40 such as pluralism understood by 
political parties (Foucault 2003: 396) or social groups (Connolly 1969: 3). 
Foucault?????????? ??????????? [?] problems that approach politics from behind and [?] 
cut across ?????????????????????????????????????in Rabinow 1991: 375-6) begins with an 
explanation of the genealogy of normalisation. It is necessary to begin here because, in 
o????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
understand what it is that plurality must be defended against. This chapter turns to 
????????????????????????????????forms of social normalization that shed light on 
contemporary forms of social pastoralisation which further impede the potential of 
plurality.  
4.2: The Defence O f Society:  Permanent Purification41 and Techniques of Domination 
 
In contrast to the philosophico-juridical discourse that informed the claims made about 
Foucault in Chapter Two, this chapter looks at another type of discourse identified by him. 
This is of interest not only because Foucault uses this as the basis of his criticism of 
Hobbes, and so the discourse becomes not only the discours?????????????????????????????????
(2003; 59) but also because it is when this discourse begins to appear that the early stages 
???????????????????????????????????????????????3: 62) can be discerned.  
In his 21st January 1976 lecture at the College de France???????????????????????????????????
farewell to the theory of sovereignty [?] as a method for a???????????????????????????????? 
??????????????????????? [?] able to provide a concrete analysis of the multiplicity of power 
relations?????????????????????????? introduced was something that he termed a historico-
political discourse (2003: 57). This discourse is tied tightly up with myth (2003: 56) and 
appeared twice, once in the seventeenth century in England with the Levellers and the 
                                                                                                                    
40 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Martel and Kla???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
examined in any detail (2008: 21). 
41 Foucault (2003: 62) 
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Puritans, and later at the end of the reign of Louis XIV in France. This was a discourse in 
???????[?] truth functions exclusively as a weapon that is used to win an exclusively 
partisan ??????????????? 57). In distinction ????????????????????????????????????????????????
other person, Foucault identifies within the historico-????????????????????????????????????????? 
(2003: 51) defining conflict. By this he mean that it was two opposing groups or armies in 
conflict (2003: ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 51) established from 
hostile individuals. 
Foucault was very clear about the defining features of the two conflicting groups, 
identifying them unequivocally as racial groups. He stated that 
[?] war is the ?????????????????????????????????it] takes a specific form: The war that is going on 
beneath order and peace, the war that undermines our society and divides it in a binary mode is, 
basically a race war. (2003: 60) 
This race war has very particular features however, in that the conflict does not arise 
between an indigenous race and a conquering race but from within one race that splits into 
two and becomes confronted by its own history (2003: 61). These have already been 
identified in Chapter Two as the sub-race and super-race.  Although once waged on the 
periphery, by decentred camps (2003: 61), the discourse of this struggle soon becomes re-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 61).  
?????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????, the enfant-
terrible of pastoralisation. The centralized power takes the racial discourse of war and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????nd all deviations from it (2003: 61). 
This discourse of racial struggle ???????????????????????????????????????????????egation, and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????Foucault 2003: 61). The super- race or society 
now needs defending against the sub-?????????????????????????????????? This conflict, laid 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????the forms beneath which we can 
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????t 2003: 60). Eventually the racial 
element to this conflict begins to fade and instead global strategy(ies) of social 
conservatisms arise. These are methods of purification which society turns inward against 
itself, from super-race toward sub-race??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
permanent pu????????????????????????????????s of the dimensions of social normalisation 
(2003: 62).   
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At this point therefore Foucault identifies the beginning of social normalisation, the 
technique of domination so crucial to the contemporary arts of governmentality that he 
criticises. It has been shown that in bringing to light the historico-juridical discourse, 
Foucault simultaneously demotes the superiority of the philosophico-juridical discourse of 
power whilst showing the birth of the attack on plurality in the name of a centralized 
power. In explaining how a population splits into both sub-race and super-race, and in 
showing that the centralized power of the super-race is forced to defend itself by means of 
permanent purification against the threat to biological heritage (2003: 61) posed by the sub-
race, Foucault pinpoints the basis of social normalisation.  
With this recognition Foucault locates the beginnings of the attack on the plurality of 
society. The social normalisations that grew from permanent purification are still existent 
today. These can be found in the more contemporary examples of disciplinary codes more 
usually associated with Foucault, which in the main, revolve around madness/sanity, 
illness/health and legal/criminal. These three areas can be thought of as ????????????????
???????? ??????????? these areas are early historical examples of normalisation that Foucault 
bases his arguments upon. In examining these, the importance that Foucault places on 
plurality can be further elucidated. The next section then will show how for Foucault, as 
with Arendt, the key feature of plurality is the distinction that it allows.  Simply put, the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????n 
defending plurality, distinction too is defended.  
4.3: ?????????????: Foucault and Assujetissement 
The techniques of governmentality evolve to emphasise certain differences between people. 
Contemporary examples of these normalizations are the ?ordinary? hard working people 
exemplified earlier, those with ??????????? body size42 or those who become sexually active 
and/or parents at a socially ???????????????? (Williams 2011). This is done by the pastoral 
technique of normalising judgement looked at in Chapter Two.  One function of 
normalisation is to minimise distinction, yet curiously and paradoxically, another task is to 
create distinction, however this is only a distinction of a certain type. ????????????????????
                                                                                                                    
42 BBC News, 23rd May 2011. 
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is unique in linking these two functions together in modern society and in doing so shows 
how distinction underpins his defence of plurality. The ways that the techniques of 
normalisation work to undermine plurality are explained by the process that Foucault terms 
???????????????????????? 331). 
 
Assujetissement is a particular exercise of power that involves judgements. These 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????which arises from the meticulous 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????a corpus of knowledge about 
???????????aspects of individuals lives that leads to the control and use of people. This 
becomes a pastoral power in the art of governmentality, focused on each individual, rather 
than a population as a whole?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
known ? implying a knowledge of the conscience and an ability to direct it? (Foucault 
2003: 333 my emphasis). When Foucault c??????????????? consequence of this is that 
??astoralisa????????????????????????????????ation of the subject ??????????????????????????????? 
327) he means that the subject is not only divided from others on the basis of social and 
moral judgements as exemplified in the previous chapter, but also carries division(s) within 
him/herself on the basis of self-judgement and self governance. Foucault offers the 
?????????????????????the mad and sane, the sick and healthy, t???????????????????????????
????? (Ibid). Such divisions are carried within each self because assujetissement is a 
[...] form of power that applies itself to immediate everyday life. [It] categorises the individual, 
marks him by his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth upon 
him that he must recognise and others have to recognise in him. It is a form of power that makes 
individuals subjects. (2003: 331) 
 
Thus Foucault begins to clarify the oppressive nature of such a normalising power. There is 
a dual meaning to ???????????????????[...] subject to someone else by control and 
???????????????????331) ????????????????????????????????????????????????????-???????????
(Foucault in Dreyfus ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
power that subjug????????? ????????????????????????? 
Once an individual is known about and knows about themselves ? ??????????????????????????
in every sense of the term is created, all kinds of dominating practices open up that regulate 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? for 
example. ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
???????????????????????????????????? 80). Sometimes these dominations are achieved via a 
negative exercise of power, for example in the subjugation of individuals embodied in the 
socially endorsed sequestration of the sick or the mad or the criminal behind the brick walls 
of the clinic, the asylum or the prison43. This domination involves a positive exercise of 
power, in the creation of a moral discourse of sexuality, body size or the creation of codes 
??????????behaviour, a tool for the subject to know their conscience with and a cadre for 
them to measure their conscience against, which in turn prescribes to them regulations for 
behaviour. This ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
being made.  
Because assujetissement means bein?? ?????????????????????a corpus of knowledge, the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? require connections and discourse to become 
corpora of knowledge(s). Assujetissement is achieved through a positive exercise of power 
explained by Foucault in ?The Will to Knowledge?: 
[?] .never have there existed more centres of power; never more attention manifested and 
verbalized, never more circular contacts and linkages, never more sites where the intensity of 
pleasures and the persistency of power catch hold, only to spread elsewhere. (1998: 49). 
 
Foucault recognises here that domination involves power as a creative force as well as an 
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????superstructural positions with merely a role 
o???????????????????????????????, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
inequalities and disequilibriums which occur [?] and are the internal conditions of [?] 
differentiations [?] they have a directly productive role whenever they come into ??????
(1998: ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
operation of power.  Contemporary examples that illustrate what Foucault means here 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? the suitability of people 
in terms of body size or age to parent or the neo-liberal emphasis on the privatized 
prudentialism of the individual and the increased perception of everyday risk that is created 
by the over proliferation and high visibility of the insurance industry that results in 
                                                                                                                    
43 For other examples of this see Chapter Five. 
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insurance for hot water boilers, water pipes, extended warranties on material goods,  pets, 
dental insurance, private healthcare, windscreens on cars, motorcycle leathers, home 
contents, identity fraud or mobile phones. 
Ultimately though, any creative moments of the operation of power that is assujetissement 
inevitably descend into a negative force. Using sexuality as an example Foucault shows that 
assujetiss????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????(Foucault 1998: 83). Even the 
creative aspects of power become ones that fac????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ??????Ibid). Assujetissement is a technique of domination that 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
produces, if anything, is absences and gaps; it overlooks elements, introduces 
discontinuities, separates what is joined, and marks off boundaries; Its effects take the 
general form of lim??????????????????). ????????????????????????????????????????????
normalisations that surround body size. One contemporary form of such a refusal, blockage 
and exclusion is the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the basis of child abuse (Sherman 2008). 
Thus assujetissement as a dominating power has both a negative and a positive side. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
earlier permanent purification on the basis of race (although this can easily be discerned in 
other twentieth century cases of total social domination such as that of Nazi Germany) but a 
form of this type of discourse which has pervaded certain aspects of society and 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
by individuals themselves on the basis of, and with reference to, bodies of knowledge for 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? madness, illness, 
homosexuality, criminality which are ????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????, risk assessment and also individuals 
themselves ????????????????????????????????????????????-political practices to which they 
give rise. In attacking the body of knowledge that is psychiatry, and speaking of the 
transformation of the discourse of permanent purification from a racial one to the social 
disciplines of today, Foucault sums this view up when he says 
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 This transformation essentially made possible an immense process that has still not come to an end; 
the process that enabled psychiatry [?] to exercise a general jurisdiction [?] not over madness, but 
over the abnormal and all abnormal conduct. (2003a: 134) 
 
In making this point about psychiatry as part of the corpora of knowledge(s) which can be 
traced to assujetissement, Foucault makes a bigger point about the power of all of the 
demographic bodies of knowledge created by assujetissement: criminology, sociology, 
psychology, anthropology and political science. Each body of knowledge builds its own 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. Most are 
anxious to fall inside this ring fence and so their behaviour becomes disciplined on this 
basis. Those who sit outside these boundaries are marginalised because they are judged as 
??????? by those who fall within the boundary. The ????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
one chooses and marginality t???????????????????????????????: 184).  
In line with such ??????????????????????????? (1994: 369) the role of contemporary fears, 
anxieties, mistrust and insecurities in the art of governmentality are explained. It can now 
be seen more clearly how the issue of marginalization is the visible societal manifestation 
of the fear that Foucault argued allows sovereign political systems to flourish because war, 
insecurity and sovereignty are inextricably linked. These insecurities link to the permanent 
purification bound up in techniques of social normalisation, techniques shown in a previous 
chapter to be cultivated by governmentality informed by individualism and sovereignty.  
It can now be fully explained how this thesis sees the defence of plurality as important to 
everyday life in many western societies. Contemporary ???????????????????????????
purificat???? exemplified in lifestyle, physical appearance, work ethic or sexuality at 
different stages of life are ongoing techniques of social normalisation that fit with 
Foucauldian pastoralisation. These techniques of pastoralisation have been perfected 
between the need of the sovereign for permanent legitimation and the bodies of knowledge 
which have gro?????????????????????????????. Between these two stools is the exercise of 
general jurisdiction over all abnormal conduct and ?????????????? unity/totalisation of 
???????????????????????Foucault 1997: 31). This allows the permanent purification of the 
population to be achieved through a social discipline exercised singulatum. As every 
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individual adapts their own behaviour to fit the cadre of normalisation, the behaviour of all 
becomes adapted to fit ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, the 
governmental technique of omnes.44  
However, in facilitating amongst the population such normal/abnormal divisions, the 
sovereign becomes stuck between a rock and a hard place. This is because in introducing 
the separations of permanent purification between people, a new danger to the legitimacy of 
the sovereign presents itself. This is the danger of domination and repression born from 
judgements based on fear of difference.  Foucault showed how the art of governmentality 
suppresses this danger too. The neutralising of difference is achieved through the 
government omnes identified by Foucault. In addition to the legality that prevents couples 
from adopting on the basis of body size are other examples of this such as the legality that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
school45 or the legality of sexual activity at age 16 in conflict with the cultural judgement 
that parenthood at school age is ?too young? (Williams 2011). This culminates in successful 
domination over people through homogenising people collectively, confining them to a 
manageable and predictable set of behaviours. Once again, we are shown by Foucault, in 
parallel with Arendt, that uncertainty in behaviour is eliminated.   
[?] the power of the norm imposes homogeneity [?] it is easy to understand how the power of the 
norm functions within a system of formal equality, since within a homogeneity that is the rule, the 
norm introduces, as a useful imperative and as a result of measurement, all the shading of individual 
differences. (1991: 184). 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
homogenisation eliminates difference and the elimination of difference eliminates 
spontaneity. Normalisation provides a simultaneous two-fold function in the art of 
????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
set by the technique, homogenises them to neutralise distinction and at the same time uses 
the undercurrent of fear and insecurity to separate those who do not conform thus 
                                                                                                                    
44 This is presumably why writ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
45What is interesting about this example is that in order to bring to order those people who do not respect the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
everybody rather than address the initial issue which begins from contravention of the rules. A vicious circle 
is thus created. 
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marginalising them. This process weakens connections between people in the plural and 
thereby diminishes the potential for power that they constitute. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? manufactured and exaggerated 
social ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
escape from the dilem????????????????????????????????????in Martin 1988: 154). The dangers 
that arise from a contrived atmosphere of social ????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????that add to insecurity, anxiety, mistrust and fear. This dynamic is 
reflected ??????????????????????????? [?] proceeds encased in privileges that he possessed 
in advance and will never agree to question. On principle, he possesses rights authorizing 
him to wage war [.?] There is something even more serious here; in this comedy one 
mimics war, battles, annihilations or unconditional surrenders, putting forward as much of 
???????????????????????????????????????????? in Rabinow 1991: 382-3). In outlining his 
rejection of those types of discussion that mimic warfare and parody judicial procedure 
(1994: 296) Foucault claims it ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and therefore is both oppressive and dangerous.  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
advocates of sovereignty. Bertrand de Jouvenel described that Hobbes ?[...] could think of 
nothing worse than uncertainty in behaviour and this is encouraged by differences in 
??????????????? 288). Likewise, Bodin wrote that the sovereign had to have tools as his 
disposal to be able to deal with the unexpected in a juridical way; this could be achieved if 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Bodin in Franklin 1992: xxiv). 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ere is a 
rationale exercised within sovereign political systems to both use difference to cultivate an 
undercurrent of danger defined specifically by the normal/abnormal distinction, or even 
distinction in general whilst simultaneously fearing the potential of such difference and 
taking active measures to repress those potentials.  
This thesis seeks to draw upon ???????????rejection of the governmental art of 
individualization and totalisation that constitutes contemporary power structures to 
advocate challenges to contemporary examples of assujetissement such as increasing 
legality to address ?disrespect???? ensure social conformity or social policies which dictate 
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???????????????????????????????????optimum age for active sexuality and parenthood or 
work ethic. The importance of refusing this kind of subjectivity that has been imposed for 
several centuries by advocating new forms of subjectivity was seen by Foucault (1994: 
336) as well as Arendt. Like advocates of sovereignty such as Bodin and Hobbes, Foucault 
recognised the challenges that difference might cause for the sovereign, but in distinction to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????).  Once more in 
comparison to Arendt, Foucault argues for the development of new power relations. The 
way to circumvent the difference-danger-discipline-domination cycle, Foucault claimed, 
was via an alternative view of difference which is another aspect of Foucauldian thought 
central to the argument of this thesis. In order that difference can be re-conceived it is 
firstly necessary to fully understand how the current view of difference can be understood 
and how ultimately this works against the empowerment of people. 
4.4: Divide and Rule: The Value of Distinction 
?[?] prefer what is positive and multiple, difference over uniformity [?] mobile 
arrangements over systems????????????in Rabinow 1991: 109) 
What is of ultimate importance to this thesis is that for Foucault social sites of 
normalisation are  paramount in resisting oppression46 and for cultivating a different view 
of distinction than that which feeds insecurities and anxieties around difference. Foucault 
argues that it is ??? ????? [?] of [...] studying what is rejected and exclud?????in Kritzman 
1998: 335). This argument asserts that one such thing that is rejected and excluded is a full 
appreciation of difference.  
This thesis uses the parallel between Foucault and Arendt to highlight the possibility that 
the suppression of difference stands as testament to its anti-sovereign qualities. For 
Foucault, the infinite differences that are necessarily constituted where people exist in the 
plural have inherent value as a bulwark against hierarchical, oppressive forms of power. In 
                                                                                                                    
46 In this way Foucault offers something important that other theorists of oppression/repression do not. For 
???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
economic field. By definition therefore Marxist solutions to these issues are economically centred and require 
a co-ordinated resistance on a vast scale dictated by the economic realm and class tensions. Freud too is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
therefore require a psychological re-wiring at the deep level of the mind. 
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response to disciplinary society Foucault invites another view of individuality (Hooke in 
Smart 1994: ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
exist as a self whose differences can be perceived and accepted positively rather than 
negatively [...] it is fair enough to say that Foucault supports a [?] sense of the right to be 
????????????????? 293).  
The discourse of the sovereign political model loads difference or distinction in a negative 
way such as ?????????????????????????????????, in other words as non ordinary and a cause for 
anxiety. Rather than homogenise everything into one negative over-generalisation about 
power or difference or struggle, this chapter argues that there is still a need in contemporary 
society for the Foucauldian suggestion to study specific rationalities (in Dreyfus 1982: 212) 
more. ?????????? value for this argument is through his observation that the most effective 
sites where an alternative view of difference could begin and power can be opposed is 
found in actual experiences (1998: 231) such as health, sexuality, psychiatry and in the 
humanities. ?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? to be criminology/penology. This for 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
could begin to be opposed. Foucault claimed  
[...] It is this form of discourse that ultimately matters , a discourse against power, the counter-
discourse of prisoners and those we call delinquents -  and not a theory about delinquency. (1998: 
209) 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
prisons alone. He extended this claim to encompass many sites where knowledge had 
become a form of social discipline pivoting over the normal/abnormal division. His insight 
that ?????????????????? ????????????????????????????? ???????????????? (1997: 154) suggests 
the necessity to direct an incision against al???????????????????????????????then all those on 
whom power is exercised to their detriment, all who find it intolerable, can begin the 
struggle on their own terrain and on the basis of th??????????????????????????: 216). The full 
value of this is examined in the final chapter of the thesis because it is this aspect of social 
and by extension political empowerment that ???????????????????????????????? based upon. 
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Foucault explains that the art of governmentality can be challenged at precisely those points 
where the normal/abnormal division is at its most marked, where indeed the power of the 
state is most visible and contemporary examples of this visibility have been stated already 
in terms of judgements on body size and acceptable sexuality. These points of visibility 
really come back to a well established form of statecraft known as divide and rule. By 
locating points at which people can be divided from each other (normal/abnormal, 
bad/good, mad/sane, sick/healthy, workshy/hardworking) on terms that the sovereign or 
state can easily influence, the sovereign art of governmentality achieves the two-fold aim of 
ostensibly manifesting the might of its power and secondly planting and cultivating the 
seeds that grow into a self-imposed divisions between those it seeks to control, thereby 
weakening the power of the multitude by their own hand. These divisions are constantly fed 
by the backdrop of battle that underpins society because of the fear, uncertainties and 
anxieties of the marginalised by t???????????????????????????????????? too many human 
relations, or more accurately the lack thereof, begin to mimic this bellicose model. This 
suppression of difference leads not to positive empowering experiences, but just as Arendt 
argued, to forms of domination with totalitarian aspects.  Where differences in opinion, 
political stance or ideology take ???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
when difference collapses into polemic, the potential for resolve becomes more remote. 
Politics be?????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????ve and ultimately in 
the pastoralising model ?????????????????????????? 
4.5: Permanent Provocation47: The Defence of Plurality V ia Agonism and Action  
?????????????????????????????????????????? (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 385) 
???????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????do you 
???????48 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????petty swiping at another.  Instead 
???????????????????? [?] ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????
??????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????in 
Rabinow 1991: ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                                                                                    
47 Foucault (in Dreyfus 1982: 222) 
48 With Paul Rabinow (1991: 385) 
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????????????????????????????????, he closes the book immediately (in Rabinow 1991: 381). 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
prior to any particular issue. In answering his question as to whether it is suitable to place 
????????????????????in Rabinow 1991: ??????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
???????????????????????????Ibid). This is in line with his rejection of polemic. Partisanship 
se??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be accused and vanquished, the discourse in which to speak, the grid in which to work. In 
short, when an individual takes a partisan position, no matter what it actually is, they act as 
a conduit for all of the potential danger inherent in the warlike games of the institution. 
Polemic is futile, because as Foucault intimates, nothing new really comes from polemic (in 
Rabinow 1991: 383). No advance is made because the game of this institution only incites 
the participants to fall back continually on rights, defend a claimed legitimacy and affirm 
an innocence (Ibid). 
This thesis employs the Foucauldian cutting capacity of knowledge in which a new 
perception of difference and distinction is carved out, to echo his argument for the 
abandonment of the perception of difference that becomes the limiting framework of 
partisanship. In contemporary society this is based in such perceived ?????????????????
female versus male, hard working against non hard working, Christian against Muslim, 
law-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
mimic war, such as partisan allegiance does, Foucault astutely noticed that for a polemicist 
?the person that he confronts is not a partner in the search for truth, but an adversary, an 
enemy who is wrong, who is harmful, and whose very exist???????????????????????????in 
Rabinow 1991: 382).  Instead, he proposed that  
[?] we abandon the game in which someone says something and it is then denounced as an 
ideologist of the bourgeoisie, a class enemy ? so that we can begin a serious debate. If it is 
acknowledged, for example, that what I say about the crisis of governmental rationality raises a 
problem, why couldn??????????????? as the basis for broad debate? (1994: 296) 
 
The value of Foucault here is his recognition that ????????????????????????????????????????? or 
??????????(in Rabinow 1991: 381-2) and is reminiscent of Arendt with the claim that 
dialogue can exercise as a creative process as opposed to a battle (Ibid). We can abandon 
the games of the institution by not viewing plurality and difference negatively, but by 
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valuing distinction. Foucault advocates a ????????????????????????????????????
individualizatio????in Dreyfus 1982: 212) in order to rescue the positives that differences 
between people allow.  Instead,  
[...] ????????????????????????????????????????????? of a relationship which is at the same time 
reciprocal incitation and struggle: less of a face to face confrontation which paralyzes both sides than 
a permanent provocation. (Foucault in Dreyfus 1982: 222) 
Thus, Foucault recasts struggle as a basis for freedom. The permanent provocation to which 
Foucault refers is that which sees differences, distinction, and plurality as a positive force 
that can challenge and negotiate power, and to recreate49.  
Thus like Arendt, Foucault considers distinction and difference as the fundamental 
principle that needs to be defended. It is the defence of the difference principle that 
necessarily requires that plurality is defended. This is then the basis upon which plurality is 
defended, and is ultimately what leads to the emphasis in this thesis on the parallel of 
Foucault with Arendt in the defence of plurality.  For both theorists politics has little 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????like Arendt, 
Foucault sees freedom and plurality as important to one another. The bond between 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
agonistic tension that has the potential to offer resolution as long as descent into polemic or 
war is avoided.  This is important because viewing difference in a positive way minimizes 
?????????????????????????????h necessarily requires sides. Furthermore, where the proclivity 
for war is minimized a space is vacated for consideration and resolution. To put this 
differently, minimizing polemic also minimizes the tribalism to which it can give rise.  
 The next section goes on to identify where the recognition of the power of plurality can 
take politics and this argument once again makes use of Foucault. It will show why, for him 
liberty is identified as arising from struggle yet ending with prolonged inactivity (Thiele 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????conditio par 
quam[?] of all political life (1998: 7). In the previous chapter it was shown why for 
                                                                                                                    
49 Thus Foucault outlines individuals not only as recipients of but also conduits and therefore challengers of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (2009: 58) is one that he contradicts 
later in his thesis (2009????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????? 
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Arendt plurality is essential for speech. For Foucault plurality is essential for agonistic 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????50. It is to 
the promise of the Foucauldian explanation of the potential for action offered by plurality 
that this chapter now turns. 
4.51: Foucault, Action and Speech 
?There is not one, but many silences? (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 310) 
For Foucault, the importance of defending plurality is rooted within a need to resist any 
coalescence of power. Such coalescence is ??????????????????????????????????????????
recognition, where power is permitted to concentrate, inequality is established. Foucault 
observed, through painstaking genealogy of governmental forms of power, an identical 
observation that defenders of hierarchies purport, which is that the natural differences 
which exist because of the plurality of people, have the potential to challenge the status 
quo.  
Foucault saw that it is by far a less dangerous political system that is based upon the 
continual circulation of power rather than one that allows power to concentrate in one place 
inequitably. In addition, Foucault wanted people to free themselves from the bastion of the 
philosophico-juridical and historico-political understandings of power that lean heavily on 
the fear of war and difference. He argued against retaliatory action in politics, which is 
always dictated by the st??????????????????????????????????????? of polemic and the legacy 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????
sentiment that recalls Arendt?s defence of distinction, Foucault stated that tradition allows a 
reduction of the difference prope???????????????????????????????: 21). He explained this in 
an interview when he said that 
Discussions on political subjects are parasitized by the model of war: a person who has different 
ideas is identified as a class enemy who must be fought until a final victory is won. This great theme 
?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  ties, when 
they are examined in ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
border beyond which an enemy could be forced to flee. (1994: 297) 
                                                                                                                    
50 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????heir study of action. 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
juxtaposition and disj??????????????? 108).  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
distinction and plurality is valued so that the potential that plurality offers can be 
maintained. On this basis, this section will also show therefore, how the Foucauldian 
emphasis on action as necessary for greater political freedom mirrors those claims made by 
Arendt as seen in the previous chapter, and lastly, why this thesis argues that such an 
approach would be both relevant and empowering for individuals today.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????exactly the same as b??????????? 256). He went 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??
position leads not to apathy but to a hyper and pess??????????????????????????????????????? 
for Foucault meant that those who were effected by the disciplining nature of the art of 
governmentality (and this is all of us to some extent or another as both previous and 
forthcoming examples show) but particularly those constrained by the most visible 
tentacles of the art of governmentality can an?????????????their actions, their resistance, 
their rebellion, escape them, transform them, in a wor???????????????????????????????? 
294). The way in which people should cease being submissive parallels with claims made 
by Arendt, and uses the faculty of speech51??????????????????????????????????????????? ???
must never be a silent residue of policy. It grounds an absolute right to stand up and speak 
??????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????red by his 
emphasis on a need for people as collectives as well as individuals to challenge the silences 
created by abuses of power, and Foucault extends this across geographical borders into 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
out against abuses of power under all circumstances; in short to show mutual solidarity 
(1994: 474). 
                                                                                                                    
51 What can not be fully discussed here is that Foucault, at certain points in his work, emphasised the role of 
speech and the various functions that it performed in various societies, particularly within Ancient Greece. 
That speech has such an important role for humans and therefore has merited a place in the work of Foucault, 
is yet another way in which Foucault parallels with Arendt. See ????????????????????????????????). 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
pr????????????? ?????????????????in Rabinow 1984: 377). Foucault made this point in 1984 
using the then current example of Poland52. He stated that although it may seem as if there 
is nothing that can be done politically about the problem, people could and should raise 
issues in te?????????????-?????????????Ibid????????????-accepta??????????????????????
extends even toward the passivity of other governments toward foreign abuses of power 
(Ibid).  It is through non-acceptance, verbalized in speech, that this takes on a political 
????????????????????????????????????????????????s not co???????????????? ????????????????? but 
in making of that attitude a political phenomenon that is as substantial as possible, and one 
which those who govern [?] ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Foucault, in further comparison to ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????(1994: 108) because political action does not rest upon 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????? (Ibid)???????????????????????????????
operate a decentring that leaves no ??????????????????????????????: ????????????????? action 
therefore has several parallels with the political vision of Arendt all of which highlight the 
importance of not accepting something as necessary simply because it is established or 
most visible or has habitually or traditionally been done that way. His use of the concepts 
of speech and action is more implicit, yet present nevertheless in terms of suggesting 
alternative forms of power and resistance. Throughout his work, despite the multifarious 
subjects that he addressed, there exists at all times the intuition that Foucault advocated 
????????? action that also often took the form of subversion ??????????????achieved through 
????????? a necessary undertaking for Foucault, so that power is not allowed to stagnate, but 
is always under negotiation and renegotiation so that its essential dynamic quality is 
maintained.  
                                                                                                                    
52 Poland in the early nineteen-eighties went through much political turmoil, which historians now marks as 
the beginnings of the fall of Communism in the country (Michnik 2011). Continually rising food prices had 
led to a chain reaction of strikes that eventually became a general national strike. To combat this, a situation 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
murder and imprisonment against the union leaders. 
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In another parallel with Arendt, Foucault believes that there is much that needs to be 
challenged about the limited relationships that exist between people. Having stated that in 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-self and others than 
the encounter between technologies of domination ??????????????????????????????? 225), 
Foucault offered a critique of the limits that are placed on human relationships by the art of 
governmentality. In relation to the institutionalised face(s) of the art of governmentality of 
which contemporary examples are the hospital, the school, the university, the prison, the 
clinic and government itself as embodied in institutions such as the civil service or welfare 
system, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nstitutional world where the 
only relations possible are extremely few, extremely simplified, and extremely poor [??] 
because a rich relational world would be ???????????????? ?????????????? 158). Foucault 
????????????????????????? [?] the relations of mar??????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
institutions, but in possible supports, which is not at all the case? (Ibid). In describing the 
consequences of such impov???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
use of the concept of isolation, even though his terminology is different, thus underscoring 
the importance of this contemporary issue. In endorsing a re-conception of the possible 
relations between people53, Foucault picks up the current inadequacy of them, which this 
thesis argues is as much of a concern in the contemporary context, and in doing so 
underscores the importance of plurality for sharing perspectives with the overarching aim 
of engaging in agonistic struggle54. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????? holds particular salience for the western world today 
because the modern incarnations ????????? identified in the thesis as anxiety, insecurity and 
mistrust greatly contribute to the diminishment of plurality such as is constituted by limited 
relationships between people. The main issues identified by both theorists and explained in 
this and the previous chapters arguably characterize some societies today better than at the 
                                                                                                                    
53 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
importance of relationships cannot be explored in more detail. Kingston however offers valuable discussion of 
the importance of this asp??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
comparisons with Arendt made here.  
54 The importance of Arendt as an agonistic theorist is also recognised by Kingston although I would argue 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????inking. 
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time during which both Foucault and Arendt wrote. The next section looks at these main 
aspects of everyday western life which exemplifies the contemporary relevance of this 
parallel. 
4.6:  The Coldest of all Cold Monsters55 : The Pastoralisation of the Plural and its 
Relevance to Today 
The parallel between Foucault and Arendt suggests that power may operate more equitably 
when it is disseminated horizontally rather than vertically. This is because vertical 
organizations of power limit the potentially diverse, rich human relationships that can be 
found in the plurality of people into flat, empty, disaffected experiences characterised by 
mass society. For Arendt, these include the enforced isolation of each person from another 
and for Foucault a limited and therefore impoverished set of human relationships. The 
purpose of this section is to undertake an examination of the relevance of this parallel 
whilst also drawing together the discussion of this and the previous chapter. The most 
compatible aspect of modern western life that exemplifies the ideas explained so far in this 
thesis is that of politics56. 
Foucault ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
an?? ????????????????????????in Rabinow 1984: 300). In making such a seemingly 
generalised statement he noted that the political organisations and experiences in the 
varying countries of the western world have as much that unites them as sets them apart. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????even when there may be variations in terms 
of political systems, for example power held by an elected party, power that comes as an 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
modelled on a pyramid of power, with the one at the top and the many below.  Even 
examples of devolution of power, for example from Westminster to the Welsh and 
Northern Irish assemblies and the Scottish parliament, have been cases of devolution from a 
huge centralised body into smaller, but still nonetheless large, centralised bodies. These are, 
in any case, arguably token devolutions because Wales requires the veto of Westminster on 
certain policy matters and the power imbalance of the West Lothian question is still 
                                                                                                                    
55 Michel Foucault (1994: 417) taken from Nietzsche (1997: 45). 
56 Other contemporary examples, such as those regarding bureaucracy, are discussed in subsequent chapters.  
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unresolved (Stephens 2004: 134). Furthermore, in the case of both Scotland and Wales 
these devolutions have the potential to be reversed. Therefore, despite the many variant 
political systems, there are certain political systems that exemplify the parallel between 
Foucault and Arendt of the problems of v???????????????????????????????????????????? 
particularly is exemplified in those institutions such as the EU, the European Court of 
Human Rights and G8 (amongst others) in which power has become even more centralised 
since Foucault made his observations and ??????????????????????????????????????????????
such organisations of politics will be an unbridgeable void ???????????????????????????????
?????????005: 97). It is easy to see other symptoms of the abyss separating the ruler from the 
ruled in contemporary political examples other than those given in Chapter One. The 
International Institute for Democratic and Electoral Assistance (2004) shows the political 
apathy that characterises the EU elections. In many countries the voter turnout for the EU 
elections is considerably less than the turnout for domestic elections. It is clear therefore 
that there is evidence that the bigger the gap between ruler and ruled, the greater the chance 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? is characterised by political disenfranchisement 
manifested in lack of interest in taking the political step of electing representatives. 
It is already a condition in contemporary western politics of modern day voter apathy 
shown most ostensibly, although not exclusively, by declining voter participation57 . This 
may be due to, but is certainly combined with ??????????????????????????????????????????. Bell 
(2000: 169) cites the Downey Report as showing that ??????????????????????????
????????????????????????ians and government ministers came bottom in a public survey58. 
This was no better exemplified in the UK than in 1997 when Martin Bell became the first 
Independent MP to be elected to the House of Commons for 47 years (Bell 2000: 15). This 
was further compounded by the fact that he was elected by a landslide majority59 to the 
fourth ?safest? conservative seat in the UK (Ibid). Bell (2000: 209) himself points to outside 
the UK and ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????as testament to a 
level of dissatisfaction with party politics (Ibid). Further examples are the rising number of 
Americans who register as Independents (Bell 2000: 210). In the UK, other instances have 
                                                                                                                    
57 As shown in chapter one and also by the 2004 IIDEA survey. 
58 14 and 11 percent respectively. 
59 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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compounded the crisis of the career politician and include ??????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-marital sex scandals 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????k to traditional family 
???????60, to those MPs with the most dubious use of their position including highly 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????61, ????????????????????62 , 
questions around British passports for party donations63,   blatant abuse of the public purse 
in the name of job related expenses to the extent that some MPs and peers64 have been 
jailed for between 12 and 18 months for their wrongdoing regarding this. In addition, 
parliamentarians have been jailed for perjury and perverting the course of justice65. Other 
scandals include inappropriate financial patronage to party funds 66 and tax evasion by 
advisors in charge of tax policy67. The endless blatant abuse of position and constant 
hypocrisy demonstrated by these examples accelerates the ever declining legitimacy of the 
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????escribed by one former MP as the 
?second worst thing that political parties do? (Bell 2000: 205). Comparably, Foucault also 
intimated such ?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
are not the most stultifying political inventions since the nineteenth century. Intellectual 
political sterility seems to me to be one of the s???????????????????????????????? 396).  
The declining faith in contemporary politics comes at the same time as the widely 
perceived absence of social, community and employment based relations as demonstrated 
earlier in the thesis. Arendtian scholars identify that this modern political situation is 
??????????????????[?] when [?] inflation and unemployment dissolve old social relations, 
[there are] vastly increased numbers of ?????????????????????????????? 1992: 4). The 
stultifying nature of modern, western politics has also been recognised by other 
contemporary academics such as Darrow Schecter (2000). In explaining the problem with 
                                                                                                                    
60 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Conservative Party MPs showed no regard themselves (Assinder,1999). 
61 See Bell (2000: 178-9) 
62 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2000: 197)  
63 See Bell (2000: 177) and Stephens (2004: 140-1, 250) 
64 There are six in total. Elliot Morley, Jim Devine, David Chaytor and Lord Taylor (Robinson 2011) and Eric 
Illsley (Davies 2011, Bates 2011) and Lord Hanningfield (Malik 2011).  
65 Jonathan Aitken (Leigh 1999) and Jeffrey Archer (Kelso 2001).  
66 See Bell (2000: 179) and Stephens (2004: 138, 140) 
67See Bell (2000: 181) and Stephens (2004: 139) 
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modern party based politics, he ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the political that is bound to vary from individual to individual into the homogenous 
language of vote totals [?] Parties use people, by way of their votes, to get power, which is 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(2000: 84). Thus, contemporary scholars such as Canovan and Schecter also underwrite a 
contemporary relevance to the political issues raised by both Foucault and Arendt. 
The above issue is thus illustrated directly through the examples given so far. However, the 
underlying sentiment is extended by both Foucault and Arendt to relate to the social 
phenomena of mass society. The contemporary examples of those issues that each discusses 
??????????????? ???????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
endless reducible repetition?????????????? ?????????????????8: 8)  can be seen in the 
????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? ??????????????????? food, music and 
leisure activities that characterize mass consumerism. Moreover, many modern societies 
can be understood in terms of ????????????????? ????????????????????????????? lives that 
allow governments to discipline them by informing them of, amongst other examples, at 
what age their sexuality (ies) can begin, how they are best educated, how much money they 
should aspire to earn, the average age for marriage, having children,  the health issues that 
they will face and the type of health care that they will need, their expected age of 
retirement and likely ???????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
opens up ??????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????uld be 
allowed to have, which will then feed into issues such as the amount and type of risk to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
further mass consumerism of services that are needed to safeguard against all known 
contemporary dangers. Foucault and Arendt????????????????????????? that where forms of 
mass society can be identified so too can examples of conformism within an average or 
???????? margin. This facilitates estrangement between individuals within the context of 
their everyday lives and the extent to which they are empowered whilst simultaneously 
squashing them together into categories based upon their demographic qualities. Both of 
these aspects result in the loss of an appreciation of distinction that has political and social 
ramifications. Conformism, argue both theorists unequivocally, is a dangerous socio-
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political instrument because of the domination that it permits. As if speaking for both of 
them, Arendt writes that: 
The danger of conformism and its threat to freedom is inherent in all mass societies [??] Under 
conditions of an already existing mass society [?.] conformism could conceivably be used to make 
terror less violent and ideology less insistent; thereby, it would serve to make the transition from a 
free climate into the stage of a pre-totalitarian atmosphere less noticeable. (1998: 425) 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
we are not talking about sovereignty; we are talking about domination, about an infinitely 
dense and multiple domination th???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????? 
[?] totalitarian government [?] substitutes for the boundaries and channels of 
communication between men a band of iron which hold them so tightly together that it is as 
???????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????Arendt 1976: 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????d by the 
monolithic entities of today such as supra-national or national political organisations or 
???????????????????????????????????????? ?????????asses the GDP of some countries. In 
UK foreign policy, one former UK Prime Minister put forward an argument for ?????
???????????????????????????????? 114). In the instances where these examples overlap or 
?????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????bigger still, leading indeed to 
?????????????? ????????????????????????????????? 97). 
Many aspects of contemporary western experiences demonstrate the relevance of Foucault 
???????????????????????????????the inherent human condition of the plurality of people. It 
has been shown how the hierarchical model of power that both Arendt and Foucault 
critique fits several aspects of western politics today. The stagnant nature of such politics 
belies the plural condition in which people exist. In expecting, quite myopically, that people 
will become an actively voting political collective choosing between virtually 
indistinguishable political parties results not only in the failed attempt to unite people at all, 
but to turn them away from politics altogether.  What occurs instead is the situation that 
Arendt described more then fifty years ago, of politically isolated individuals, isolated not 
only from each other but from the political world. This estrangement is reinforced from 
within the social sphere, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????, then certainly in 
terms of ?????????????????????????????????t omnes et singulatum. It can be shown 
therefore that social conformism replaces the plurality of people, and when this happens in 
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a society, as the parallel between both Foucault and Arendt highlights, a very disturbing 
and dangerous socio-political stage is reached. For Foucault, the 
main characteristic of our modern rationality  [?] is neither the constitution of the state, the coldest 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
effort to integrate individuals into the political totality [?] the main characteristic of our political 
rationality is the fact that this integration results from a constant correlation between an increasing 
individualization and the reinforcement of this totality. (1994: 417)  
For Arendt the stage where conformism replaces plurality is the invisible transition to pre-
totalitarianism. Contemporary examples that hint at those pre-totalitarian elements 
forewarned against by both Foucault and Arendt68 can be found in some of the methods 
????????????????????????????????69. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
considered not only necessary but morally right by those states who were directly attacked 
by the terrorist elements of Islami?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
own citizens to war and let them be killed [??] except by activating the scheme of racism?? 
From this point onward war is about two things: it is not simply a matter of destroying a 
political adversary, but of d???????????????????????????????? 257). The full salience of this 
question to this thesis will become apparent as this section moves on. It is first necessary, 
however, to examine some claims by Arendt. 
                                                                                                                    
68This is also recognised by Duarte (2007: 6) 
69This is the phrase used by the former US President George W. Bush, Jnr. to describe the action that the US 
took in response to the attack on New York on the 11th September, 2001 by the Islamic fundamentalist group 
???-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
attacks by the group and also to locate the leader of al-Qaeda, Osama Bin Laden, and his supporters. The 
attempts at locating Bin Laden took many forms and is argued by some to have been instrumental in the later 
decision of Bush and the US administration along with the UK government to invade Iraq and bring to end the 
dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, who was believed by some to have given refuge to Bin Laden after the 9/11 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Cohen (2009: 316) and Martel (2010: 154).  A further attack by al-Qaeda on London on 7th July brought a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? th ?????????????
as they became known, were British Muslims who were raised in the UK. The British government was 
therefore forced to face the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
military force on the 2nd May 2011. 
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 In her ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
totalitarian governments was to create isolation, and although it is quite a stretch to claim 
that any current western government is totalitarian, it is not so much of a stretch to see 
aspects that Arendt defined as pre-totalitarian (1976: 435). Where situations of mass 
isolation are facilitated or allowed to grow because of negligence towards them, 
immediately a move toward pre-totalitarianism is made. Arendt writes that ??????????? ???
be the beginnings of terror; it certainly is its most fertile ground; it always is its result. This 
isolation is as it were, pre-totalitarian; its hallmark is impotence insofar as power always 
comes from men acting together; isolated men are ??????????????????????????????? 474).  
In this comment Arendt makes two points. She points out that isolation can be the 
beginnings of terror and also that it allows a fertile ground for the proliferation of terror. 
Terror is too strong a word for contemporary society, however its more contemporary 
corollary of fear characterized as insecurity and anxiety is much less out of place in the 
contemporary context; these too find a stronghold where individuals are isolated. The role 
that fear plays in the oeuvres of both Foucault and Arendt is already outlined by this thesis, 
so it is sufficient to say that the example of ????????????????????further exemplifies this 
parallel concern of Foucault and Arendt largely because it takes place in societies 
characterised by political apathy and social fragmentation and thus where insecurity is an 
identifiable feature. 
 However, what is just as interesting about th????????????????? from this parallel point of 
view, are the methods employed by the governments concerned to legitimate ????????????
What occurred almost immediately is t????????????????????????????? to combat a generic 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
from without [??] even the emergence of totalitarianism is a phenomenon within, not 
outside, our civilization. The danger is that a global universally interrelated civilization may 
produce barbarians from its own midst by forcing millions of people into conditions which, 
despite all appearances are t???????????????????????????????? 302). Like Foucault, Arendt 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
borders, because a perception of danger can be cultivated within those borders.  Foucault 
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already offers the explanation of why this happens; because governments use pastoralising 
techniques ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????ize, family size, working 
life and values to magnify and distort issues. The insecurities, anxieties and mistrust that 
takes hold where individuals are estranged from one another means that the connections 
between plural people which might contradict, reassure and thus reduce these anxieties and 
which are essential for negotiating power and thus the possibility for new, multiple or 
different forms of freedom are yet further damaged.  
This point was superbly exemplified by the British government, which during it??????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
put posters in public places depicting the name plates and numbers in a block of flats. The 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????70. Despite the vague  use of the term 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
spotting an individual who fitted this bill were then expected to make an objective 
assessment o???????? ????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????-?????????????????????????????????????
individuals who were innocent despite their appearance was nothing in comparison to 
?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????objective enemy ? defined by the policy of the government 
and not by his own desire to overthrow it. He is never an individual whose dangerous 
????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
like ???????????????????????????????424) 
At the opposite extreme, in contrast to the ridiculousness of the contemporary example 
above, is the suggestion that these instances constitute dangerous and arguably pre-
totalitarian methods to combat the ephemeral contemporary social enemy now labelled the 
                                                                                                                    
70 Gloucestershire Constabulary Poster in Cirencester, Glos, September 2006. This issue is also recognised in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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??????????????This contemporary example can only have reinforced divisions within a body of 
people. When Arendt wrote that the emergence of totalitarianism comes from within, she 
was describing exactly this type of situation, the situation that Foucault would point out is 
????????????????????????upon, society. Arendt elucidates for us exactly why the danger 
now comes from within?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
neighbour gradually becomes a more dangerous enemy to one who happens to harbour 
dangerous thoughts than are the officially ??????????????????????????????? 422) and one 
could add, a more immediate and therefore damaging enemy than one outside the borders 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????n midst by forcing millions of people into the conditions of savages has 
relevance. 
4.7: Conclusion 
This chapter opened in stating that for Foucault, in parallel with Arendt, it is necessary to 
defend the plurality of people. This over-arching parallel was shown as being the result of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Arendt. The chapter provided 
three functions, ???????????????????????????????????????f plurality, the second was to bring 
more detail to the parallels between these two theorists and the third was to point out the 
relevance of this parallel for modern politics.  
The genealogy of the binary racial code excavated by Foucault implies that what may 
appear as a plural society is in reality a pseudo-pluralism, manufactured by the state and 
directed toward individuals and their place in society marked out by a form of social 
grouping that results from a governmental social matrix. This is a version of Foucauldian 
permanent purification, political rationality formulated as social normalisation and is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
perception of the risk to the individual that is both proliferated and managed through the 
paradox of the objectivisation of the subject or assujetissement, undermines the liberal 
notion of autonomy in the further paradox that individuals are not unrestricted in many 
aspects of their everyday lives nor in their potential to form connections and relationships 
with others whom they exist alongside. The political rationality of social normalisation is 
also anti-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????what constitutes the 
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anti-political moments of modern life??????????????????????????????????????????????????
a coming-of-age might y????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
dispense with [modern] politics before [modern forms of???????????????????????????????????
109).  
It would be too easy to disregard the arguments presented here on the basis of the historical 
specificity of both of the theorists, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
furthest away from ours. It is true that Foucault offers a more contemporary dimension than 
Arendt, and this strength in his work addresses a weakness in hers. However, the fact that 
neither theorist lived to see the twenty-first century does not render their claims irrelevant 
to today, indeed this thesis contends that it is the opposite. The overarching aim of this 
chapter is brought to fruition here, to make salient not only the futility of polemic but also 
the importance of a re-conception of struggle. This must involve the recognition that it is a 
major socio-political failure to equate the absence of struggle with the presence of 
consensus. This recognition is all the more urgent in contemporary western politics where 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Simultaneously at the societal level there must be a cessation of submissiveness and 
negative judgement and a fostering within every individual of the proclivity to identify the 
silences and resist them. To resist the spread of the desert examined in the previous chapter, 
this chapter has emphasised that the notion of difference needs to be viewed in less 
threatening terms rather than being contrived and manipulated for political advantage so 
that alternative forms of freedom can be created. As difference is found within the plurality 
of humans it is for this reason that this thesis emphasises the Foucauldian/Arendtian 
parallel that plurality must be defended.   
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5.0: AR??????? ???????? ???????????????RATIONALITY 
5.1: Introduction 
The previously discussed parallels of Arendt and Foucault can be extended through the 
exploration of the critique of instrumental rationality, which begins in this chapter with 
???????????????????This is has pertinence for two reasons. Firstly, instrumental rationality 
may also be understood as means-ends rationality and this chapter uses these two terms 
interchangeably. It is also a form of rationality that results in imposing limits on political 
experience(s). However, an understanding of this type of thinking is important to this thesis 
in a secondary way, because it acts as a pre-emptive strike to certain criticisms of Arendt 
for example those found in the work of Wolin (1994) Connolly (1997), Reinhardt (1997), 
Pitkin (1998) and Medearis (2004). These criticisms usually revolve around the question of 
what purpose Arendt sees for politics carried out in a public sphere, given that she exhorts 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
her oeuvre which is a question often sidestepped by many critics of her with the notable 
exceptions of Connolly (1997) and Pitkin (1998)71.  
 
This thesis attempts to gain a more accurate understanding of the problems for politics that 
Arendt identified in instrumental rationality. Through doing this the relevance of her 
critique of modern, western politics can be better understood. This new understanding will 
then be used to underscore the later claims of the thesis. This chapter examines how Arendt 
shows us that the ultimate expression of instrumental rationality is violence and this makes 
war the absolute political expression of instrumental rationality. This, it will be shown, is 
one of the characterising features for Arendt of modern politics, and connects well to many 
of the claims made in the first chapter about the sovereign s?????????????????????????????. 
                                                                                                                    
71 No discussion of instrumental rationality is made by these writers. Marquez (2010) briefly alludes to this 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????it. 
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This chapter will also make use of contemporary examples to show how prophetic Arend????
claims were on this basis, and thus how her arguments are relevant today.  
The final part examines what is for Arendt, the consequence of a political sphere 
characterised by an instrumental rationality entangled with socio-economic issues. This 
entanglement takes the form of bureaucracy. One prominent theorist of bureaucracy is Max 
Weber (1864-1920). In his sociological lectures (in Gerth and Mills 1974: 196-245) Weber 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 197) or 
????????????????????????????form of organisation, where its rationality arises from the 
?????????????????????? ?????????s and matter-of-???????????????? 244). Weber saw 
bureaucracy as having a technical superiority over other forms of organisation (1974: 214) 
describing bureaucracy as analogous to a machine over non-mechanical modes of 
production (Ibid) and for these reasons as a fo????????????????????????????????????????????
(Weber 1974: 216). As this chapter will show Arendt at times reaffirms this analysis of 
bureaucracy, but at other times she is quite distinct from it.  This chapter now turns to a 
preliminary definition of what Arendt meant by means-end rationality. 
 5.2: ?????????????????????????? ????-End Rationality 
?[?] ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Arendt 1998: 154) 
 ?The Human Condition? is the best starting place for an understanding of what Arendt 
meant by means-end rationality. What becomes clear in this book, through discussion of the 
technology, science, violence and bureaucracy of the modern age is the rationalisation for 
or against something based on its perceived utility or function in a process directed towards 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????? 
In this book, Arendt traces this mode of thinking to the ideas and attitudes that lie behind 
homo faber or (hu)??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Action72 (1998: ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
attitudes that lie behind homo faber are looked at in more detail. 
                                                                                                                    
72 This chapter once again uses the distinction of Action to describe genuine (Arendtian) Action and the term 
??????????????????????????????????-???????????????????????????? 
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Arendt marks out several aspects of instrumental rationality as being characteristic of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? (Ibid). Homo faber is 
confident in his/her own sovereignty above every??????????????????????????????????????
immense fabric from which we can cut out and re-s????????????????????????????????8: 
305-??????????????????????????[?] the productivity of the market of artificial objects, which 
therefore leads to a rationalisation tha??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Ibid).  This anthropocentric way of thinking means that there is an unquestioning faith in 
the all comprehensive range of means-end rationality, which then by definition results in 
contempt for all tho??????????????????????????????????[?] for the fabrication of artificial 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????-of-course identification of 
fabrication with ac??????????????The (matter of course) identification of fabrication with 
action was referred to by Arendt as Philistinism, or banausic mentality (1993: 215).  
 Arendt implies (1993: 201-21) that this mentality involves an overarching loss of 
judgement in homo faber that sets him/her apart from both people of genuine political 
action and those who might undertake more creative endeavours and/or labours of love 
which are not undertaken with utility in mind, where there is no distinction between 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????-end process. 
The real world consequence of this absence of judgement is examined in more detail later, 
through the example of Adolf Eichmann. 
Arendt identified that instrumental ration?????????????????????????????(1998: 297) of the 
natural and historical sciences. I????he Human Condition?, she critically wrote of this mode 
of thinking within the academic disciplines of both the historical and natural sciences, 
arguing that the study of  ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????function 
in the overall process (Ibid)???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
characterist???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ss surpasses 
?????????????????8: ?????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
extent that eventually the means subsume the end. As well as exemplifying how it is that 
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banausic mentality has come to limit ways of thinking outside that of fabricating artifice, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????ought in the natural sciences also illuminates 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? discussed in the next 
section. 
Most pertinently for this thesis is her insight that instrumental rationality restricted the 
politics of the modern age. She offered many examples of this. ?The Promise of Politics? 
(Arendt 2005b: 4) contains an extract from a 1951 article that Arendt wrote for 
Denktagebuch. In this article, Arendt explained that to conceive of politics in the terms of 
means and ends was ludicrous because it leads to self-deception. This self-deception is the 
inevitable consequence of three issues that arise from understanding politics in instrumental 
terms. The first issue at which Arendt levelled a critique was that political acts undertaken 
as means to achieve an absolute end, examples of which in her Denktagebuch article are 
????????????????????? ????????????????(Ibid) because all ideals or absolutes are at one and the 
same time subjective to each individual and therefore unknowable in concrete terms. In this 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????pursue. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nything will do as an 
absolute [such as] ???????????????????????(Ibid) and thirdly in the pursuit of this absolute or 
????????????????????????????????????? [...] anything goes [...] reality appears to offer action as 
little resistance as it would the craziest theory that some charlatan might come up with. 
Everything [including bestia???????????????????????????????????????????????? cannot be used a 
yardstick because i) it does not yet exist in any other form than as ephemera, subjective, 
unknowable and as-yet-unreached and by virtue of this and ii) it encourages any means to 
be used to achieve it because it is perceived as the absolute ? a notion which is self-
delusional in that it is conceived as the ideal or perfect incarnation in which it can be 
???????????????). 
The paradox here, points out Arendt, is that when the ideal is felt to be achieved, it is also 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? [??] and so finally the 
ostensible realisation of ????????????????????? ?????????b: 4). To capture the essence of 
what Arendt says in the 1951 article, it can also be said that another worrying paradox of 
instrumental rationality, in opposition to the subsuming of the product into the process (or 
118 
Beyond the Social and Political 
????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????any means to achieve it, 
even those means which are its most blatant and total opposite. Arendt poses this issue 
most saliently when she asks in ?The Promise of Politics? (2005b: ??????[?] what ends can 
justify means that under certain circumstances could destroy humanity and organic life on 
???????? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????an ethic of absolute 
ends cannot stand up under the ethical irrationality of the world (Weber 1974: 122) to the 
extent that it is not possible to decree which end justifies which means (Ibid). This paradox 
can be ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ese 
ideals, which are indeed relative to whichever subjectivity conceives of them, are often 
???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. Examples of this 
would include making war in order to keep peace such as the British gover?????????????
bombing of Kosovo, the intervention in Sierra Leone to end civil war there (Stephens 2004: 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? provided by the death of Osama 
Bin Laden73. Theoretically and factually these do allow and have allowed, the most unjust 
and non -peaceful means to be carried out in the pursuit of reaching them.  This shows the 
paradox of the latter danger. The fact that in some contemporary examples such unjust and 
un-???????????????? are now used as commonplace and automatic governmental techniques 
is the example of the paradox of the former danger that ??????????????????????????????
???????????????? ????????????????????????????as principles are abandoned by the practice and 
in the course of trying to achieve them a????????. Means and ends, or process and product 
are explained, rationalised and accepted in terms of their function or utility in relation to 
each other. This is the legacy that political thought in general, and modern politics in 
particular, has been bequeathed. 
For Arendt, the proof of the persistence and ultimate success of the parasitisation of 
genuine political Action by instrumental rationality is  
??????????????????????] by the whole terminology of political theory and political thought (1958; 
229) [which...] makes it almost impossible to discuss these matters without using the category of 
means and ends and thinking in terms of instrumentality. (2005b: 197) 
                                                                                                                    
73 BBC News, BBC 1, 2nd May 2011. 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and utility are established as the ultimate standards for the l????????????????????? ?????1998: 
157). What Arendt meant by this was that in fabrication, which can also be understood as 
the making of something new in the world that was not previously there, utility or the 
purpose of the object is the guiding reason for its undertaking and also the guiding principle 
for the process that leads to its manufacture. In other words utility reflects the reality of that 
object. 
However, when utility or purpose becomes generalised into a guiding principle behind the 
reasoning for everything outside fabrication, such as the world, the lives of individuals and 
politics, it ceases to fulfil what it does in the sphere of artifice. This is because utility 
dictates that what can be made in artificial terms ??????????????????????????????? 1998: 300), 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ity within 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
generalization of the fabrication experience is therefore inappropriate for human affairs 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????r Arendt using 
utility as a guiding principle for politic????????????????????????? and a modern political reason 
????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
??????s analysis of the paradox of instrumental rationality and distinguishes herself from 
him in her explanation of why it is a misplaced conception for human affairs. For the 
purposes of this thesis, violence has the secondary, but certainly not lesser, advantage of 
being instantly recognisable as the overarching characteristic of modern political action. In 
this way, therefore, it also provides a direct and irrefutable link between this aspect of the 
political theory of Hannah Arendt and what passes for politics in the world today. 74  
                                                                                                                    
74This is also noted in the work of Duarte (2007: 1) 
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5.3: ??????????ritique of V iolence 
?[?] ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
(Arendt 1970: 150) 
Arendt understands violence in the everyday sense of physical harm born from aggression. 
In ?On Violence? she links it to wars, revolution, aggression, death (1970: 5) and brutality, 
torture, slaughter and genocide (1970: 14). ??????????????????????????????????????????????
not one that can simply be labelled as a form of generic pacifism because far from being 
simply a reaction against war and aggression in general, Arendt analyses violence as the 
unique and specific instrument (1970: 11) that characterises modern politics. For Arendt, 
violence is the paragon modern political example of instrumental rationality. In this way 
Arendt agrees with theorists of instrumental rationality such as Weber in seeing politics and 
violence as linked (Weber 1974: 121). However, unlike Weber, Arendt always took great 
care to separate violence from power and force with which it is often confused, to show 
violence as fundamentally anti-political due to its instrumentality. Through this more 
nuanced consideration of politics and violence, Arendt marks out her distinction from both 
Weber and generic pacifism. 
For Arendt, violence is completely un-political whereas power, achieved and experienced 
among people in the plural, is the epitome of genuine politics. In the close examination of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????, authority and ???????????????? 43).  For Arendt, violence 
and power are mutually exclusive forces (1970: 56). This idea stands in direct contrast to 
the modern understanding of violence as the manifestation of power or power defined by 
the willingness and capability to use violence. Arendt shows that the mutually exclusive 
aspects of violence and power mean that what characterises one is entirely absent from the 
other. Probably the biggest characteristic of violence, according to Arendt, is that it is ruled 
at all times by instrumental rationality. Power (and force and strength) are never ruled in 
this way. Furthermore, violence carries an arbitrariness which goes beyond the 
unpredictability of action (1970: 4). Arendt moves on to point out that this intrusion of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  
For Arendt violence always stands in need of instruments that multiply the capacity for it. 
121 
Beyond the Social and Political 
????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????chnology of 
violence allows, in extremis, the standing of one against all, or the few against the many. In 
contrast, power never needs implements. Its only requirement is numbers and in its extreme 
form, power is the standing of all against one. Because of this, genuine power can only be 
found, used and perpetuated by the human ability to act in concert, as examined in Chapter 
Three. In testament to its inherently instrumental nature, violence and its aims are rendered 
useless by virtue of the means that are at its disposal. That is to say that technological 
developments within the means of violence that are possessed by contemporary sovereign 
states have reached the stage whereby their destructive capability renders the threat of 
violence meaningless because of the likelihood of the insane possibility of mutual 
destruction (1970: 4-6). The means of violence are such that all ends become irrelevant 
because no ends can survive such means ????????????????????????????????160). Violence is 
the best example of the earlier point that this type of rationality contains the potential for 
dangerous excess:  
The very substance of violent action is ruled by the means-ends category, whose chief characteristic, 
if applied to human affairs, has always been that the end is in danger of being overwhelmed by the 
means which it justifies and which are needed to reach it. (1970: 106). 
Further to its inherently instrumental nature due to the form of rationality upon which it is 
based, violence is also un-political because in all its manifestations, it marks out the point 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(2005a: 308). Chapter Three has already explained how for Arendt, speech constitutes a 
genuinely political action. By this definition therefore, any form of politics that uses 
violence is a limited politics because Arendt points out ???????????????? is incapable of 
speech, and [...] speech is helpless when confronted with violence [?] because of this 
speechlessness political theory has little to say about t???????????????????????????
(1965?????????????????????????????????????????????[?] sheer violence is mute, and for this 
reason violence alone can never be great??????8: 26). Furthermore, because speech does not 
exist where violence exists, modern political theory is impotent when faced with it. This 
has pertinence for contemporary politics, and also bodes very poorly for it. Despite these 
immanent contradictions, however, violence retains a place in modern politics because it 
finds what passes for rationality in its instrumental nature. Arendt recognises this in ?On 
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Violence????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
it is effective in reaching the end tha?? ?????????????????????? 176 my emphasis).  
Using violence as an example helps to illustrate how Arendt saw that potentially genuine 
political motivations could degenerate into un-political ones and therefore why she 
endorsed political goals over ends. Violent action, which introduces into the world weapons 
made to coerce and kill, is always justified in modern politics by ends pertaining to self-
preservation (defence), conquest or revolution. For Arendt these things are always ends and 
never the more politically effective goals (2005b: 193).  As soon as violence or brute force 
is introduced into human affairs then politics takes on the face and means of instrumentality 
and is never genuinely political. Arendt replies to those critics of her view of genuine 
politics by contrasting politics that uses goals from bogus politics that uses ends. It is worth 
quoting at some length f??????he Promise of Politics' to underscore this view, where 
Arendt describes how violence offers no hope for politics. 
If a political action that does not stand under the sign of brute force does not achieve its goals ? 
which it never does in reality ? that does not render the political action either pointless or 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
been directed at goals, more or less successfully; and it is not meaningless because in the back and 
forth of exchanged speech ? between individuals and peoples, between states and nations ? that 
space in which everything else that takes place is first created then sustained. What in political 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-between space, which all 
violent action first destroys before it proceeds to annihilate those who live outside of it. (2005b: 
193).  
There are a multitude of reasons why violence contributes little to nothing to political 
endeavour. Firstly, violence is the antithesis to the manifestation of power achieved through 
the plurality of people. Secondly, violence is arbitrary. Dangerous excess is immanent to it 
because its rationality drives it to surpass everything in the pursuit of ends. Violence also 
relies on the technological intervention in the order of things that allows a magnification of 
capabilities that distorts and reverses all balances of power. This magnifies the potential for 
dangerous excess. Violence is mute, it destroys speech and because of this it renders 
political theory powerless when challenged by it. Lastly, violence transforms the motif of 
genuine politics, goals, into the abyss of instrumental politics, ends. This has the 
consequence of destroying all of the political potential offered by the relational space 
between humans. 
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As shown in previous chapters, the ultimate modern statist expression of violence is war. 
Predictably then, Arendt is critical of both war and revolution as political acts. This 
?????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
politics as it was to the politics of fifty years ago. The following explanations will make 
abundantly clear how the political theory of Arendt can be used to make some candid 
assessments of politics today, and to show how and why it is vital to reconsider aspects of 
contemporary politics. 
Arendt believes t??????????????-????????????????b: 165).  This is easily understood because it 
?????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
domain of violence [??] and this sets them apart from all other political phenomena [?] in 
so far as violence plays a predominant role in wars and revolutions, both occur outside the 
?????????????????????5: 18-19). This means that through their use of violence, wars are 
contemporary real-world examples of political means-end rationality. The instrumental 
nature of war and its capacity to show exactly how the means surpass the ends, is most 
forcefully ????????????????????????????????????????????????????he Promise of Politics 
(2005). Here Arendt marks out, that the face of war changed with the splitting of the atom 
and the discovery of nuc??????????????????????????????????????????b: 157)  represented 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? [?] a culminating point, achieved [??] 
by one [...] short circuit toward which events in any case had been moving at an ever 
accelerating pac????????b: 154).  
It also marked a new era in inter-national political violence. This new era of violence took 
mankind out of the limits imposed by nature???????????????????????????????b: 158) 
processes brought to earth with both productive and destructive potential (2005b: 157)  
Where Arendt links the instrumental nature of science and technology, which is the modern 
manifestation of homo faber, and political violence, she observes with her characteristic 
incisiveness that it is no longer denied by anyone, even major powers, that ?once war has 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????b: 158) and 
these weapons include the nuclear bomb.  
In creating the nuclear bomb, science and technology reflect the instrumentality of homo 
faber by the use of a perceptio?????????????????????????????????????????-sew nature into the 
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devastating tool to achieve a given end. Nuclear arsenals are means which are used to reach 
an end, such as submission of an opponent in war (a sovereign state government), 
irrespective of the interim consequences that those means cause. In the case of the nuclear 
bomb these interim consequences range from the psychological terror and physical 
hardship endured by innocent people that have the misfortune to be inv?????????????????
conflict, to the threat and reality of outright death for those within the most immediate 
vicinity of the nuclear explosion to consequences which even stretch beyond the 
achievement of the end. In nuclear war this would be both the geographical and temporal 
large scale destruction of entire biospheres caused by nuclear fall-out.  
Such excessive means which have effects far beyond any original end prove that in politics 
????????????????fait accompli for the whole world (2005b: 160) and war i?????????????????
ultima ratio ??????????????????????b: 159)75. The existence of people, animals and plants 
are what is at stake in the event of nuclear attack, and this cost cannot be considered within 
the sphere of negotiation. Arendt tells us that with nu??????????????????????????????????????
be a means of politics and as a war of annihilation begins to overstep the bounds set by 
politics and to ann??????????????????????????????b: 159).  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????hreats of total 
destruction w???????????????????????????????b: 158-61).  The devastation wrought on 
Hiroshima by one atomic bomb took only a few minutes to achieve an end that otherwise 
??????????????????????????????????????????(Ibid) to achieve. This led the way to a swift and 
????????????????????????????? ????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
people, but turning the world th???????????????????????????????b: 154). Arendt also points to 
??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????f war between the superpowers of 
the USA and former USSR that started after the Second World War and lasted until the 
1990s. In this stand off, where both powers held considerable nuclear power (the 
destructive capacity of which is what actually made them ???????????????????????????????
once again that the violent means could potentially surpass the end as for both nations it 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
occurred between them (2005b: 159). 
                                                                                                                    
75 See also Chapter One. 
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Lenin prophesised that the twentieth century would be a century of wars and Hannah 
Arendt agreed76??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
governments and democratic party apparatus have shaped the basic political experience of 
the twentieth century. To ignore them is tantamount to not living in the world in which we 
???????????????????b: 191). The above examples of Hiroshima and the Cold War are 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????? ??????????????????
else was violence, to the extent that the modern western world now equates (my emphasis) 
political action with violence (2005b: 192)  and not with the Action identified in Chapter 
Three of this thesis. Arendt felt that the glorification of violence that she witnessed in her 
lifetime was one of the direct reasons for the absence of genuine political power arising 
between people in the plural. T??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
frustration of the faculty of act??????????? ??????????????2005b: 180).  
Within the global political landscape of the last century there have been at least twelve 
major wars, fought on both western and non-western terrain with Europe being the most 
war prone continent. This means that the most devastating wars of all time have been 
fought in the most recent and supposedly most rational and enlightened century. Two of 
these wars were world wars where millions of military and civilian personnel have been 
killed. The death toll of the Second World War, with its nuclear technological means, 
exceeded the total death toll of all other wars throughout world history. Three quarters of 
all military personnel lost in the situation of hot conflict died in the last world war.77 There 
has also been an ideological Cold War, which in spite of being cold in Europe has led to 
bloodshed and violence in places outside Europe. Even the end of the Cold War was 
marked by war, death and destruction.  
Hannah Arendt died in 1975, exactly three quarters of the way through the twentieth 
century. The fact the she was in absentia during the final quarter does not alter the 
relevance of her analysis of violence and contemporary politics???????????t miss any 
changes to the politics that she witnessed in her lifetime. In truth, all that she missed was 
further examples that strengthened her claims. At least three of the wars mentioned above 
                                                                                                                    
76 Arendt includes Lenin in her work because of this prediction about the twentieth century rather than any 
ideological stance that he may (or may not) have had. 
77 All information from Nobelprize.org 2008. 
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?????????????????????????????????????78 and the beginning of the newest century is still 
marked out with political action embodied by war79. It seems therefore that although the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????last century of war. Not 
three years since it began, the twenty-first century continues the legacy of the century 
before it. Arendt did not have to physically witness this to be able to accurately predict it 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ty and the examples used in 
this section is that whatever end violence is the political means to achieve, it is condemned 
to failure, unless of course the end required is further violence. This will always be the 
outcome for politics conceived of in instrumental terms for all of the reasons outlined in 
this chapter. Violence is characterised by an absence of speech. It is arbitrary, 
technological, super-natural, and it literally is single minded because of its location outside 
of the plural and within the h????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
where an absolute end can justify any means and means themselves can subsume any ends 
finds no better illustration than in the bloody and ultimately futile contemporary marriage 
of politics and violence.  Arendt gives us the insight that both means and ends collapse into 
each other due to the tunnel vision that they induce. Where each collapses into the other, 
both lose any meaning connected to them.  
Bureaucracy is another modern day example of instrumental rationality ????????????????????
work yet more contemporary relevance. This example of the application of instrumental 
rationality to the sphere of everyday lives will be seen to be just as destructive an example 
as violence is to the political world. Indeed, for Arendt it can equate to violence.  
                                                                                                                    
78 This applies to both Gulf Wars and the conflicts resulting from the collapse of the former Soviet Union, in 
Eastern Europe. 
79 ????????????????? ???????????-Blair, which began in 2003 and the fallout of which is still ongoing at the 
time of writing this. To date in Iraq and Afghanistan over 500 British military personnel have been killed 
(www.mod.uk) alongside countless indigenous and foreign civilians.  This death toll does not account for the 
death toll of military and civilian personnel from countries outside the UK.  
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5.4: Tyranny without Tyrants:  A rendt and Bureaucracy  
?Bureaucracy is rule through secrecy [....] ??????????????????????????????????????? 
(Arendt 1976:  214, 403). 
For the vast majority of developed countries there are both major and minor everyday 
challenges that are faced which relate to economic position within the capitalist economic 
system. Contingent to the economic position that individuals hold in this type of market are 
everyday problems th???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
location on this financial spectrum. The capitalist market is, by the very dynamics of it, 
numerically bottom heavy in terms of people, but top heavy in terms of wealth of resources. 
There is then an imbalance in both people and wealth at the opposing two ends of the 
continuum, with the lowest positions being sine qua non for the position of those at the 
highest. As capitalism involves, despite all of its apparent riches, a finite pool of wealth, 
this symbiosis between the top few and bottom majority of the hierarchy, is necessary for 
capitalism to grindingly perpetuate as an economic system. It has become the task of 
modern western government to administer and manage amongst their populations solutions 
to the constellation of everyday socio-economic problems that are the result of the position 
a person has in the capitalist hierarchy.  
In the endeavour to ensure that individuals? rights are kept intact, bureaucracy is the 
organisational face of governmental attempts to manage the above problems. So for 
??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
better themselves should not be impeded by lack of education, their right to life by ill health 
and poverty and their right to security by threat and danger. In short, it has become the 
responsibility of western governments to maintain ???????????????????????????autonomy by 
policing all that may threaten that autonomy. All of these issues, when undertaken by a 
government on the scale of a national population, require efficient and accurate 
administration. Bureaucracy is the site where governmental policy attempts to expediently 
protect the rights of the individual from the impediments to it wrought by socio-economic 
problems. I??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Arendtian terms t???????????????????????????????? 243). This section will use the terms 
administration and bureaucracy interchangeably.  
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Bureaucracy is the site whereby contemporary political instrumental rationality collides 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????for example through the workplace, 
education, healthcare, social security benefits and managing legal requirements that range 
from having an accurate drivers licence to completing a census every ten years. This shows 
bureaucracy to be a ubiquitous feature of contemporary western life. This is recognised by 
many commentators (Pitkin 1998: 254, Blakely and Saward 2009: 352). This section 
undertakes a discussion of the Arendtian critique of bureaucracy because it allows her 
comments on instrumental rationality to be tied even closer to western society today. This 
?????????? ???????????????????????criticisms of sovereignty as discussed in Chapter One. 
The forthcoming explanations also provide a basis for the ultimate conclusion of this thesis.  
Arendt sees bureaucracy as a modern form of domination which has gathered particular 
strength in the last century (1970: 179).  In On Violence she refers to several forms of 
domination seen in history such as one over the few in monarchy or the best over the few as 
in aristocracy (1970: 38). However, toda???????????????????????????????most formidable 
form of such domination: bureaucracy [...] where no men [...] one or many [...] can be held 
????????????????????  
Arendt describes ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????This is because 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? [??] decrees remain anonymous 
[??] and therefore seem to flow from some all over ruling power that needs no justification 
[??] in government by bureaucracy decrees appear in their naked purity as though they 
were no longer issued by powerful men, but were the incarnation of power itself and the 
administrator only its ???????????????????????? 243-4). She comments that for some 
theorists the idea of administration was supposed to mean the absence of rule80, but she 
counters this by pointing out that in fact administration via bureaucracy is indeed rule. It is 
????????????overnment in which no-one takes responsibility [?] and in which the personal 
element of ruler-ship has disappeared and [...] such a government may rule in the interest of 
no-????????????b: ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? no 
men [??] can be held responsible and which could properly b??????????????????????????
(1970: 38).  
                                                                                                                    
80 In the Promise of Politics Arendt attributes this idea to Marx (2005, p77).  
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The rule by nobody has considerable political significance in that the absence of an 
identifiable ruler does not equate to an absence of rule or to no rule, indeed rule and 
constraint is achieved very effectively over all of those who are subject to it when looked at 
from their perspective. What is particularly disquieting about this Arendt points out is that 
???-man-rule [??] has one important trait in common with the tyr??????????b: 77-8). This 
important trait is elucidated by Arendt in the following way. Tyrannical power is 
traditionally defined as arbitrary power where no-one can be held to account. In situations 
of tyranny this translates into rules which owe no-one any responsibility, and this is true 
also, in the rule-by-????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Arendt 2005: 78). With this analysis a further distinction from Weber can be discerned. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? (1974: 198) 
[...] ?????????????f bureaucracy allows t???????????????????????????????? 197). The ostensible 
lack of will in the rule by nobody means that there can be no appeal. 
In her discussion of bureaucracy, Arendt shows how the absence of a figure from who an 
account can be demanded results in the absence of speech. This completely parallels with 
the earlier absence of speech that occurs in violence and politics. Where violence destroys 
the space for individual relationships in the political sphere, so too does bureaucracy in the 
everyday sphere. The importance of a space where plurality can be experienced has already 
been shown in previous chapters, so this strangulation of the social space for plurality 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????they are 
????????????????? ?????????????????? ???????????????? ?????????????????????????????? 
2005: 78). In this quote Arendt puts government by bureaucracy as something beyond 
tyranny. The absence of any opportunity for recourse through speech reflects the claims in 
earlier chapters of the dangers of isolation and loneliness of the contemporary individual. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????[?] organized loneliness is 
considerably more dangerous than the unorganized impotence of all those who are ruled by 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????? 478). The danger of this organized 
loneliness is fully exemplified when the governmental bureaucracy in contemporary society 
is considered. 
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Given the proliferation of bureaucracy to many aspects of contemporary life in developed 
countries there is a large number of people who are at all times, on one level or another, 
subject to it. They will be familiar with the endless paper chain of form filling that 
individuals must undergo in order to qualify for any kind of help from the state or 
???????????????????????????????????behalf. Form filling is only one example where human 
contact is minimized in the process of asking for help, but the lack of human contact in the 
process is compounded at each stage through the nameless and faceless entities within  
bureaucracy who take ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Furtherm?????????????????????likelihood of receiving help depends upon such correctly 
following the minu????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
desk that there is by but not before or beyond an allocated time, or in finding the person in 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????multitude of people in the same 
organisation wh???????????????????????????????all adds a contemporary weight to the 
Arendtian claim that ????????????????????????????????????????t??????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????????????  (2003: 31).  
???????????????????????????????????e discerned in the modern day bureaucracy. The 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
to an unoccupied employee who is sat at a desk with no-one else to see, or lining up several 
times in the same office to address multiple queries that a single person could answer, or 
the 100 or more assessments that are needed to receive special educational needs support 
(Gove 2011)??????????????????????????????????????????Arendt 2005b: 78) are seen in issues 
that range across a spectrum from something as trivial as rarely getting the same answer 
twice to the same question, depending on who you ask to more serious issues such as the 
length of time an individual has to wait to receive financial support to feed themselves and 
their dependents, if indeed they receive it at all, to the most serious examples such as 
??????????????????????????????????? (Bungay 2005, ???????????????????? 2011).   
The bureaucratic process stumbles along because of the unquestioned assumption and faith 
in instrumental rationality that as long as each in the process is doing their role according to 
????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
unwavering and unreflective faith in the effectiveness of bureaucracy has continually and 
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frequently allowed the process to fail many of the very people it allegedly exists to 
protect81??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rationality the means (bureaucratic rules) can surpass the end (social care). Inflexible rules  
create a restrictive and ultimately dangerous cage from which there is no escape. This 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????? ????????????anagement to rules is embedded in 
b???????????????????????????????? 198). There is no room for manoeuvre within this cage, 
because the rules do not allow for judgement, flexibility or discretion, in fact they decree 
exactly the opposite in that judgement, ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is revisited later in this chapter. 
The rules of bureaucratic process are as debilitating for those who are employed by it as it 
is for those who have cause to appeal to it.  In line with the means-ends symbiosis that 
characterises instrumental rationality, like Weber (1974: 228) Arendt conceives of 
bureaucrats as cogs within a machine. They become merely components or means in a 
greater process toward a given end. The bureaucratic process must perpetuate at all costs, 
????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????Arendt 2003: 58) with little or no consequence for the system 
itself (Arendt 2003: 29).  
Indeed this way of thinking of people as cogs in a greater machine pervades all of modern 
life according to Arendt??????????????? ?????????????????[ ?] in the age of mass society [?] 
everybody is tempted to regard himself as a mere cog in some kind of machinery ? be it the 
well oiled machinery of some huge bureaucratic enterprise, social, political or professional, 
or the chaotic, ill adjusted chance pattern of circumstances under which we all somehow 
spend our lives (2003: 57).  These points ??????????????????????????????????????????? rule of 
nobody [?] is [?] for this reason perhaps the least human and most cruel form of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                                                                                    
81 There are many individual examples of the failure of a bureaucratic system to deliver, efficiently, or 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? cases such as the murder of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
in the nineties (see Parton 2004) and Baby P (Hughes and Milmo 2008). The Calwell and  Climbié cases 
occurred because ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(see Parton 2004: 84). 
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de-personalisation in a regular contemporary social experience. These reasons exemplify 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? for good or evil, and regardless of their 
source ? which purport to govern human action from without are apolitical and even anti-
???????????????????????????? 2005b: x). 
5.5: Banality and Evil: Instrumental Rationality and the Loss of Judgement 
? [?] far more, and far more hideous crimes have been committed in the name of 
obedience than have ever been committed in the name of rebellion? C.P.Snow 
(1961) 
 
The very real dangers of instrumental rationality are embodied in the inflexible and 
anonymous rule by bureaucracy, often carried out at ground level by people who believe in  
??????????????????????????? above all else. The unwavering obedience that follows the rules of 
the process so that an end can be achieved that fosters and actively cultivates the absence of 
judgement is something that Arendt refers to as philistinism. Beiner describes this well 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
technocratic and depoliticized structures of modern life encourage indifference and 
increasingly render men less discriminating, less capable of critical thinking and less 
inclined ???????????????????????????????? 53) .  
Beiner refers here to a hideous psychological transformation that can happen to some 
human beings when unwavering faith  in the infallibility of the process, obedience over 
resistance and rules over reflected judgement converges with the human life lived in 
sovereign privacy and the awareness that one ??? ????????????????????????????his 
convergence is exemplified by Arendt in what is widely accepted as her most controversial 
work: her report and reflections on the trial in Jerusalem of the Nazi bureaucrat, Adolf 
Eichmann82 (1906-1962) (Arendt 1992a). In her examination of Eichmann, Arendt 
illustrates the prescience of the recognition that what characterises the bureaucrat is 
?faithful management in return for secure existence? (Weber 1974: 199). 
                                                                                                                    
82 The example of Eichmann shows why Marquez (2010, 28) fails to recognise that not all elements of 
totalitarianism necessarily rely on violence??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
over simplified by Marquez.  
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Adolf Eichmann was a high ranking official in the Sicherheitsdienst (SD); a branch of the 
Schutzstaffeln (SS) of the German Nazi party. Originally created as an intelligence service 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in a merger with the Gestapo (Arendt 1992a: p36).  From a low position in the SD, 
Eichmann rose in importance83 until he became an influential member of this organisation, 
and it was as a result of this position in the Nazi party and his part in the organisation and 
??????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????a: 
21). 
?????????????????????????????????? in particular the psychological character of Eichmann 
himself, argued how easily, under certain specific yet not totally alien political conditions a 
human being could become a perpetrator of the most extreme and horrifying acts. What the 
trial of Eichmann and his own interpretation of what he had been accused of confirmed, is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and forked-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be found, created even, in the most unremarkable pedestrian and mundane, banal to coin 
?????????????????????????? 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????on 
example of the dangers of several of the problems of the modern era, that have been thus 
far discussed in this thesi??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
carried out his procedural role according to the rules regardless of what the consequences or 
???????f those rules were. Like all bureaucrats who carry the unquestioning legacy of homo 
faber that the absolute end justifies any means or that the means have to be carried out 
??????????????????, he demonstrated his unwavering faith in the effectiveness and therefore 
the sanctity of the rules ?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? [?] seemed 
to exclude ? probably they were meant to exclude ? all individual initiative either for better 
                                                                                                                    
83 Eichmann sat at the top of the Nazi State chain of command receiving direct orders from Himmler and 
Heydrich who in turn only took their orders from Hitler (Das Fuhrer) and Goring (Das Reichsfuhrer) (Arendt 
1992a: 83-4). In this way, in true hierarchical fashion, Eichmann was very close to the top of the Nazi chain 
of command.  
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???????????????????? 250). Eichmann himself felt that all he had done was to try and do his 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????a: 21) also 
that  
With the killing of Jews I had nothing to do. I never killed a Jew or a non-Jew [?] I never gave an 
order to kill a Jew or a non-Jew. I just did not do it. (Eichmann in Arendt 1992a: 22)  
Arendt herself points out that Eichmann indeed ????????????????????????????????????????
(1992a: ????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in efficiently sending list A to that desk, or putting certain names on list B, in short in doing 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
(Arendt 2003: 243) and that killing people was indeed what he had done. It was this lack of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
much from mens rea84 as it does from the failure to think at all. 
 ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
???ctors, lawyers, scholars, ban???????????????????????a: 18) and as such was the perfect 
bureaucrat. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nly 
carried out orders and since when has it been a crime to carry out orders? [??] He 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
it, not because he had none, but because his voice spoke with the voice of respectable 
??????????????????????992a: ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
had a bad conscience only if he had not done what he ?????????????????????????????a: 25). 
In a society which culturally values instrumental rationality, Eichmann was a paragon 
example of the professional bureaucrat chained to his activity by his entire ideal and 
material existence, a single cog who could not squirm out of this machine (Weber 1974: 
228). Furthermore, this example suggests that behind him was a society with values similar 
to many societies today characterised by many aspects that Arendt deplores, such as a 
marked and inflexible hierarchy, distant central authority, individual privacy as a measure 
of individual sovereignty, concern with individual security and a manner of cultural 
thinking that prioritises means over ends no matter what the issue under consideration, 
                                                                                                                    
84 Malice aforethought 
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where obedience and acceptance is held in higher regard than resistance and critique and 
where homogeneity trumps diversity.   The recognition of the common thread of 
instrumental rationality between these societies is not to claim that the bureaucracy that 
produced Auschwitz and Eichmann is the same as the DSS as clearly many aspects of each 
is totally different. However, it is possible to recognize that instrumental rationality can be 
viewed as a continuum, and the contemporary state welfare organisations would be 
positioned at the benign end of such a continuum whereas Auschwitz and Eichmann would 
be at the opposite end. Arendt herself alluded to this assertion when she wrote that:   
The transformation of the family man from a responsible member of society, interested in all public 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
inter-national modern phenomenon [??] the exigencies of our time can at any moment transform 
him into the mob man and make him the instrument of whatever madness and horror. (2005a: 129) 
Arendt never sought to exculpate Eichmann for his deeds and non deeds, nor did she. At the 
end of her most controversial book she indeed thought that Eichmann should be punished 
by the Jerusalem court (1992a: ??????????????????????????????????[?] politics is not like the 
nursery; in politics obedience a??????????????????????????1992a: 279). The Eichmann 
example is of particular value to this chapter as he is a real world example of where the 
instrumental rationality of bureaucracy converges with the instrumental rationality of 
violence. This is to the paradoxical extent that a senior architect of the most horrifically 
violent end modern European history has ever seen was orchestrated at many points by 
such seemingly non-violent and banal means. 
5.6: Conclusion 
This chapter examined two examples that illustrate the problems with instrumental 
rationality, one from the modern political sphere and the other from the modern social 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and modern politics is violence. This brings out implications for the modern world because 
rather than recognising the total incompatibility between power and violence, modern 
politics marries the two as identical; the capacity for one is the measure of the other. This 
means that modern politics, by an Arendtian definition, is instrumental, arbitrary, and 
unilateral because violence is all of these things. This recognition is supported by recent 
global events.  
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Violence is fundamentally non-political because it is locked in the futile means-end cycle, 
and to this end, ?????????? ?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
in that the end can rarely survive the means in any case. Lastly, violence completely 
destroys the space for the essentially political action of speech and therefore so too does 
modern politics. This idea underscores the claims made in Chapter Three. For all of these 
reasons there are numerous implications for the political integrity of the modern state and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????contemporary 
relevance. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rests on a conflation by Arendt of ends (as absolute aims of the means) with consequences 
(which arise from means but have no connection to the ultimate end desiring to be reached). 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????8: 300).  Just as Arendt went 
to great length to distinguish ?????????????????????his thesis proposes that it should also be 
noted that some consequences are related to ?????????????????????????? the means or process 
employed to achieve them. This idea is illustrated in this chapter through the example of 
nuclear wa???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
addition to the overarching, ultimate end of getting an enemy to submit. Indeed it is the 
destructive and self-contradictory results of non-end but means related consequences that 
fully show the paradox of the type of rationality that exhorts by any means as long as a 
given end is reached. 
?????????????????????????????s desire to banish the problem of expectation or 
predictability from considerations surrounding the realm of human affairs, this inadequacy 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????judgment that 
Arendt exhorts. Indeed, in terms of means-end thinking, there should be a lot more 
reckoning with consequences when those consequences consider every effect of the process 
rather than the single-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????judgment is fully explored in the last chapters of the 
thesis. 
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????????????????????????????ue of instrumental rationality within the social sphere is that of 
bureaucracy. When Arendt equates bureaucracy with a tyranny it is because within 
bureaucracy there is no-one that can be held responsible. The paradox of this is that 
bureaucracy, the rule by nobody, is simultaneously cruel yet de-personalised. Many of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????o the bureaucracy of contemporary society. 
There is the implication that in locating bureaucracy as an absence of power within society , 
it is at the same time a surfeit of authority that results in domination. Arendt appears to 
under ?explore this positive view of power. As the next chapter will show Foucault 
strengthens this weakness in Arendt.  
It was pointed out in this chapter that the society that facilitated the ignoble position from 
which Eichmann found such infamy is not vastly different to other western societies. This 
carries further implications for a need to fully understand exactly the type of socio-political 
environment that can allow such acts to go unchallenged by both the people given the task 
of carrying them out and also society itself.  This socio-political space seems to be one 
where obedience is valued over questioning and submission is valued over resistance 
fostered by unwavering faith that comes from the application of utility as a principle.  
There is, however, a further criticism that can be made of Arendt, and this relates to the fact 
that for all of the problems that she identifies with instrumental rationality, she gives very 
little explanation for how this can be reversed. It is in an attempt to address this issue that 
this thesis turns again to the work of Foucault where he demonstrates further strengths that 
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
theory that form a critique of instrumental rationality. This requires a great deal of 
interpretation because Foucault does not criticise instrumental rationality with the same 
overt disdain as Arendt. The following chapter looks in three ways at an implicit critique of 
instrumentality in Foucault, some of which parallels with Arendt whilst other parts have no 
parallel at all. Given these differences in the outward critique of instrumentality it is not 
surprising then that it is at this point in the thesis that the parallels between Arendt and 
Foucault begin to diverge.  The following chapter therefore acts as the point where the 
questions that Arendt and Foucault might ask each other, if they were able, begin to be 
made visible.  
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6.0?????????????? ???????? ??????????????? ?????????? 
6.1: Introduction 
This chapter shows that it is possible to identify a critique of instrumental rationality in the 
work of Foucault85 which argues against  rationalities which operate in linear terms i.e. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?[...] the means employed to attain a certain end; it is a question of rationality functioning to 
?????????????????????????????? 346). This chapter argues, therefore, that in those places 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ngeably with instrumental 
rationality.  The argument that follows is based on this premise.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????rned in three key ways which 
dictate the structure of the chapter. The first section argues that there is an identifiable 
critique of instrumental rationality which appears implicitly ??????????????????????????????
the influence of Nietzsche. This is a critique of instrumentality as a principle. This section 
looks in particular at two aspects of Nietz???????influence on Foucault, the value of 
agonism86 and ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  
The second section examines a critique of instrumentality in the way that it appears in 
social forms such as ??????????????????????????????e and punishment, medical positivism 
and sexuality. In addition, examples are also made of more contemporary forms of social 
domination such as the ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
more cultural judgements of individuals. ???????????????????????????????????????????????
subvert the power relationships that facilitate these social instrumentalities. In this section, 
?????????????????? is located onto tangible areas of contemporary social life.  
Contemporary examples of social instrumentalities fulfil the aim of the thesis to show the 
parallels that Foucault has with Arendt on this issue. To this end the third and final section 
moves on to take the previously explained social forms of instrumentality and bring them 
                                                                                                                    
85 In the course of researching this thesis the only other secondary writer found who also recognises this 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
developed in the detail it is here either solely in terms of Foucault or in comparison with Arendt. 
86 This builds upon the discussion of agonism in relation to plurality seen in Chapter Four. 
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up to date with regards to discussion of how they exist in the socio-economic instrument 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
greatest parallel with Arendt. This can be understood as a critique of instrumentality in its 
contemporary socio-political form.  
This section thus completes the two-fold purpose of this chapter. On the one hand there is 
the continuance of the aim of part one of this thesis to draw attention to aspects of 
??????????????????????????????????????th Arendt can be seen. However, the point is also to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? theories begin to 
diverge. The final section then identifies the divergence between Foucault and Arendt for 
the remaining chapters of this thesis. 
6.2: The C ritique of Instrumental Rationality as Principle 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Foucault in Kritzman 
1998: 174) 
Nietzsche emphasised the Ancient Greek notion of agonism, that is to say, the cultivation of 
the human self through a process of contestation and struggle. Agonism was an ethos in 
which citizens strove to surpass each other and to set new standards of nobility (Owen 
1995: 139). Greek society therefore took an evolutionary approach to the development of 
the individual, which was informed by the principle that struggle between people would 
allow the continual improvement of each individual. In this way, the ancient Greeks were 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ego ???????????????????-
Pearson 1994: 77). This development through struggle meant that individuals constantly 
improved themselves as individuals which in turn fed into the well being of the polis 
(Nietzsche 1998: 43). 
From this ancient Greek principle Nietzsche developed his emphasis on the importance of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? something that 
he termed ?????-??????????????????????????????????????? 23). This refers to the constant 
quest, through struggle, for individuals to surpass what they are at any given point in time. 
Nietzsche summarises this in Zarathustra, the tale of a wandering nomad who represents 
????????????????????????. Zarathustra proclaims ?I am that which must overcome itself again 
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????????????Nietzsche 1997: 16, 17, 33, 192, 193). What Nietzsche means here is that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
there was in Greek agonism (Nietzsche 1993: 98). Nietzsche inherits from the Ancient 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????urpass what 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
fundamental principle is not the ?????????????????????????????????????72). Likewise, for 
Foucault it is not the goal but the process that is important. In due course, those aspects of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? shown. Prior to this, 
however, this section explains the other debt that Foucault owes to Nietzsche and this is the 
value of genealogical method.  
For very similar reasons to those discussed above, Nietzsche placed an importance on 
genealogy as a method for understanding ourselves. For Nietzsche what was needed was a 
different method for reading history, one which critically reflects upon the contingent 
routes in history through which mankind has come to be understood.  This is so that a 
??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
s/he has arrived at the point from which the study of history is made. In short, what 
Nietzsche advocated was a history of the present to reflect the present (Nietzsche 2003b: 2). 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
situation. It permits an understanding of the present situation and more importantly how it 
both limits and enables what people have become. In seeking to understand history in this 
way, mankind can open up space for new levels of self-understanding (Owen 1995: 39-41).  
Through genealogical method, therefore, as with agonism, Nietzsche offered another way 
?????????????????????????????????-transformation. In aphorism 14 of Beyond Good and 
Evil, Nietzsche criticizes the traditional view of history (one which promotes a simplistic 
method of tracing events backwards through time with the effect of putting pins in a 
timeline) to reject a view of history which equates the temporal move forward with a 
universal progress and a concomitant betterment of mankind (Nietzsche 2003a: 44). In 
short, genealogical method rejects the primacy of a linear explanation of human history, 
where history in its entirety pushes with an overarching totalising telos to the present of 
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mankind. How a celebration of this method links to a rejection of instrumental rationality in 
the work of Foucault can be fully clarified through examination of his work.  
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? genealogy as anti-scientific, by 
which he means not a seeking a unified, totalising and systemic answer to how humans 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????been possible [?] were it not 
for one thing: the removal of the tyranny of overall discourses [?] Genealogies are, quite 
specifically, anti-?????????????????8-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
himself recognised. He pinpoints this when he said     ?[...] if there is an irritation [??] ?????
more because of an absence of schema. No infra or super structure, no Malthusian cycle, no 
opposition between state and civil society: none of these schemas which have bolstered 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Foucault in Burchell 1991: 85). His response to criticisms of this type levelled at his work 
was blunt and reiterated his commitment to the anti-scientific nature of what he wanted to 
????[?] ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????inciple of analyzing 
???????????????? 
Foucault reiterates the Nietzschean view of histor?????????????????????????????????????? 
14) when he challenges the love of monotonous finality as perceived by certain traditions of 
thought. Foucault ??????????????????ological image of a progressive maturation of science 
still underpins a good many historical analyses: it does not seem to me to be pertinent to 
??????????????? 54). He further qualifies this rejection of applying a teleology to the history 
of mankind when ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
advanced, or better understood than what happe??????????????????????? 50) and drives his 
view on this fully home when he points out that  
It is sometime since historians lost their love o??????????????????????-????????????????????????????????
of historical intelligibility. The way they work is by ascribing the object they analyze to the most 
unitary, necessary , inevitable and (ultimately) extra ?historical mechanism [??] ??????????????????
we have to put ourselves, under the sign of a unitary necessity. (in Burchell 1991: 77-78) 
It is clear by these comments that Foucault recognises that there may well be no historical 
progress that exists independently of the human interpretation of one and for that reason 
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history, as with any epistemology, does not automatically show evidence of a continual 
improvement of the subject which it studies. In fact, it could be argued, as Foucault does 
like Nietzsche before him (Nietzsche 1998: 43) that history shows evidence of regression. 
An example of this is identified and elaborated in the final section of this chapter. For now, 
it is ???????????????????????????????????????????????the necessity for progression to take a 
linear form. 
??????????????????????????e historical tradition and its tendency to ascribe a telos to the 
course of history is exemplified in his circumspection regarding the Age of Reason, and 
what it actually bequeathed the modern world. In referring to the period of modern western 
history where scientific enquiry began to be recognised as the most valued epistemological 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
expense of every other form of knowledge. He asks  
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of reason has been turned upside down, resulting in a domination by reason itself, which increasingly 
usurps the place of freedom? (1994: 273)  
???????????????????? ????????????????????????tury soon started wondering whether reason 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
between a rationalization-prone society and certain threats to the individual and his 
liberties, the species and its survival???????? 298). As this thesis has already shown in 
previous examples, these issues culminate in the threat to the freedom(s) of the modern 
individual such as a full freedom to hold your own values or practice your sexuality. With 
this recognition, he reite?????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
free??????????????????????????? 14).   
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
history, and in the development of political technology, I think we have to refer to much 
more remote processes if we want to understand how we became trapped in our own 
??????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? the ways that 
modern individuals develop and use knowledge about themselves upon themselves and this 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
but to analyze these so-called sciences as very specific truth-gam??????????? 224).  
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Foucault???????????????????????????????????????????????e again to his circumspection about 
the Enlightenment and the model of rationality that it gave rise to,  a model which seeks to 
emulate science in order to enjoy the high status of an episteme grounded in an objective 
system ???????????????????????????????-yet-undiscovered truths. Emulating this model 
recreates the totalising functions of an entire system coupled with the idea that there are 
underly??????????????????????hich need ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s not reason in 
general that is implemented but always a very specific type of rationality???????? 313). The 
link betwe?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? (Foucault 1994a: 469). Foucault 
went on from this claim to point out that once the pseudo-scientific claims of such 
knowledge is excavated, that is subjected to genealogical method, what can then be 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????[ ?] 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sc??????????????????????????????? 1994: 416).  
Fouca??????Nietzschean roots are useful in bringing out his latent critique of instrumental 
rationality. By virtue of his use of genealogy we can see that Foucault rejects the necessity 
for identifying beginnings and endings. This can be translated into a rejection of 
rationalities conceived of in origin-means-end terms. On this matter, it is worth pointing out 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
much more salient, and marks out their distinction as political thinkers. Genealogists such 
as Foucault are committed to hostility toward the Platonic ideal, described by Arendt as the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
(1958: 220). In rejecting linear models in the explanation of the human condition 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????distinction from Plato when 
she states ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????: 
128). Extending ??????????????????????????????? application of agonism is important for 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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resist such domination through agonistic techniques that greater depth is given to his 
critique of instrumentality. 
6.3: Political Rationality, Power and the Application of Agonism   
?Every power relationship implies [...] a strategy of struggle [...] a point of possible 
????????? (Foucault 1994: 347). 
For the purp????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ality, it is necessary 
to bring together as an overview the very distinctive way that he conceived of power, worth 
quoting at length. For Foucault: 
??????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
type of relation between individuals [....] Many factors determine power ? rationalization constantly 
works away at it. (1994: 324).  
 
For this reason 
one may call some systems of power strategy the totality of the means put into operation to 
implement power effectively or to maintain it. One may also speak of a strategy proper to power 
relations insofar as they constitute modes of action on possible action; the action of others. Thus one 
can interpret the mechanisms brought into play in power relations in terms of strategies. (1994: 346).  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
constitutive of an instrument. The particular forms of these strategies are looked at in more 
depth in due course. The point is that for Foucault it is important to understand these 
strategies because they have the potential to become forms of social domination that 
prevent individuals from having or adopting children, fully exercising their sexuality or 
engaging in protest. This happens, as has been shown, when the freedom for the circulation 
of power becomes constricted (1996: ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
techniques of power are recognised by Foucault as having the capability to quickly become 
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????-??????????????????
underpinning the rationalities that Foucault rejects.  
?????????????????????????????????????????cation of agonism takes on its greatest significance. It 
is within his argument for the subversion of such means and ends that a critique of 
instrumentality can be pinpointed. It has already been shown in previous chapters that 
????????????????????????????l rationality has grown and imposed itself all throughout the 
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history of Western societies. It first took its stand on the idea of pastoral power, then on that 
?????????????????????????? 325). His conclusion to the problem of the domination of reason 
beque???????????????????????????????[...] that the political, ethical, social, philosophical 
problem of our day is not to try and liberate the individual from the state [....] but to liberate 
us both from the state, and from the type of individualization linked to the state???????? 336, 
my emphasis), reiterating the Nietzschean claim (2003a: 39) that ?[...] the target nowadays 
is not to discover what we are but to refuse ??????????????Foucault 1994: 336 ? my 
emphasis).  
Foucault had many suggestions for how it is poss????????????????????????????? all of them 
lean heavily on an agonistic principle. Such resistance begins with the recognition that even 
???????[...]  there cannot be a society without power relations [...it] is not to say either that 
those which are established are necessary, or that power in any event constitutes an 
inescapable fatality at the heart of societies such tha???????????????????????????????? 343). 
The fact that Foucault recognises that power can be undermined allows the space for 
agonistic negotiation over domination by reason. This is why Foucault claims that we 
should adopt a constantly critical and pro-active vigilance in challenging the operation, 
freezing over and immobility of power and by implication those types of social practices 
exemplified thus far in this thesis. Foucault goes as far as saying that this agonistic 
negotiation constitutes all political questions, because such forms of domination are at the 
heart of many social relationships. Rather than accepting power practices as ????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
increasingly political task ? even the political task that is inherent in all social 
???????????????? 343). Such observations leave Foucault to conclude that of all 
???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????? 346).   
When the earlier example of the importance of plural distinction is recalled, it becomes 
possible to appreciate more fully all of the reasons for encouraging the agonism that this 
allows. Foucault uses the biased power relationshi????????????????????????????????? 
permanent pur?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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that permanent purification becomes is in its broadest sense, an end that is social 
normalisation. This is to say that social normalisation acts as a tool of exclusion and by 
extension of limit and control. This is why Foucault explains and argues for the micro-
critique and resistance that constitutes permanent provocation. Engaging in permanent 
provocation means that the movement of power should never be allowed to settle as an end, 
but should always be negotiated, challenged and circulated through an agonistic contest, a 
?????????????????????????????????? 
This is a very important point in the work of Foucault, because in recognising it he directly 
provides a response to his detractors who he identifies as being those who challenge that ????
????????????????????????????????????????87 (see Foucault 1996: 441). Foucault firstly 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
there needs to be at least a certain degree of freedom on both sides...in power relations there 
is necessarily the possibility of resistance because if there were no possibility of resistance 
there would be n???????????????????????????????? 441). Hence immanent to the very dynamic 
of power relationships is some space for freedom. When the space for freedom narrows, 
power relationships become domination. They become ???????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????Foucault, 
1996: 441). When the space for freedom disappears altogether the relationship becomes 
something very different to one of power. This is exemplified later ???????????????????
???????????????????????  Above all, what it is important to recognise about ???????????
analysis is that he sees that in all relationships of power there is always the space for 
????????????????????[....] there is no relationship of power without the means of escape???
(1994: 346).  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????n be the case that freedom, albeit in very 
limited forms, potentially exists in societies where many power relationships are 
unchallenged. The aim of politics is to find the free space where resistance to the current 
relationship of power can be challenged, and by taking an agonistic approach, the form of 
power itself can be altered, reclaimed and even reversed????????????????????????????????????
????????????[....] power relations are not something that is bad in itself (sic), that we have to 
                                                                                                                    
87 See for example Habermas (1994) as well as secondary commentators who came later such as Grumley 
(1998: 65), Gordon (2001: 125-6) and Kingston (2009: 58). 
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break free of [....] the problem is to [....] play these games of power with as little 
?????????????????????????????? 446). This is how and why, according to Foucault, he 
????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? 432). 
It is possible to see th???????????????????????????????????????????very clear emphasis on two 
things which constitute the importance of a critique of instrumentality. The first element 
that brings out this critique ????????????? refusal to accept totalising, uniform and fatalistic 
explanations of our present such as those that appeal to the inevitable progression of history 
or science that follow a model of origins-means-ends. It is through the rejection of the 
????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????iticises 
instrumentality. This rejection of instrumentality is reflective of a partial critique of 
instrumentality in which a political need to apply agonistic critique to all frozen 
relationships of power is identified exemplified in the permanent provocation of Chapter 
Four. Permanent provocation translates into resisting the settling of power into an end, for 
example in refusing the necessity for holding ?????????????????????to judge other people as 
???????????????????????????? Foucault reiterates the importance of finding the space for 
freedom that inevitably exists in power relationships and the requirement to engage in 
constant struggle on the basis of the circulation of power that it allows. Furthermore, he 
exalts this dynamism because by extension it necessarily translates into the rejection of 
stasis. For Foucault, as with Nietzsche, stasis must be rejected. Failure to do so means that 
an end is created from which no thereafter can be conceived of. As long as agonism is 
engaged in there will never be a finality and a space is continually retained for 
improvement, transformation and change to become tangible possibilities. This is why for 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
297). 
By adopting agonism as a political principle, Foucault advocates that power should not be 
accepted in linear terms. This can be thwarted by the ongoing resistance and critique of an 
??????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
question ????????????????????????????????????????????88???Habermas in Smart 1994) is found.  
                                                                                                                    
88 With this ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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For Foucaul???????????????????????????????????????????????, but in fundamentally 
challenging and altering relationships of power. If the basis upon which the relationship of 
power is questioned, then a space for freedom has been either located or created. Once the 
space for freedom is located, then the potential for the relationship of power to be altered 
simultaneously exists. Even if this does not necessarily bring about a greater equity in 
power relationships, or in Hab??????????????????????????????????, it certainly has the effect 
of preventing power settling as taken for granted, biased, long-term confrontations between 
two adversaries, or in other words, a form of domination. What it is clear that critics such as 
Habermas miss ???????????????????????????????????for him just like Nietzsche, the process is 
always more important than a goal or end because the continual challenge that this 
constitutes ensures that  power is circulated much more frequently. 
There are ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
instrumental rationality can be discerned. T?????????????????????????????????????????????
rationality is linked with other forms of rationality. Its development [...] is dependent upon 
economical, social, cultural and technical processes [....] political rationality is always 
embodied in ins???????????????????????????????? 416). It is to these social institutions and 
strategies of domination, the instrumental rationalities themselves to which Foucault felt 
that agonism as a principle should be applied, that this chapter now moves. 
6.4: Sovereign Positivisms: The C ritique of Instrumental Rationality as Form 
?My problem is [?] the history of rationality as it works in institutions and on the 
???????????????????? (Foucault 1996: 299) 
The quote above ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
is something that he links to a form of thinking which is able to bring itself to bear firstly 
on the behaviour of individuals, but ultimately on every aspect of their lives, where each 
individual governs him/herself according to certain rule???????????????????????????????????
??????????????????. This thesis has already explained this as assujetissement.  
It is now necessary to take another approach to the techniques of assujetissement using a 
slightly different perspective than previously seen in the thesis. This time the perspective 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????power as previously outlined, but the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
rationalities that follow an overarching theme whereby they are all techniques directed 
toward an objective, that of assujetissement. In this way each area of the rationalities of 
assujetissement can be seen as instrumentalities ???????????????????????????????????????????
work in this way, and in drawing upon the Nietzschean aspect of his genealogies, it can be 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? at the techniques involved in the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. These are 
medical reason, crime and punishment and sexuality89. In each of these areas, Foucault 
identified, in painstaking empirical detail, techniques and practices which measured the 
individual in terms of normalisation and judged their behaviour in relation to this. From 
these subjectifications of individuals a totalised population of good citizens ensues. 
Continuing his ovine analogy of the ????????????????????????????Foucault termed this 
pastoralisation.  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????
diversion within the context of this thesis. What is important for this chapter is that these 
subjectifications come together in the sense that they are all a form of instrumentality, 
defined as such by their existence as strategies. They all fit the description that Foucault 
gives [about his work on prisons] in that ????????????????????????????????????[??] being 
here as places where what is said and what is done, rules imposed and reasons given, the 
planned and the taken for granted mee?????????????????????????? 75) ?????????????????????s 
their own specific regularities, logic, strategy, self-???????????????????????????????????????
in this way, it can be claimed that what Foucault says about one of them in terms of  
instrumentality likewise is applicable to all of them in the same sense.  
In addition to the originality of his work regarding the pastoralisation of deviance, there are 
endless examples of these instrumental rationalities at work which stretch beyond Foucault, 
                                                                                                                    
89 Foucault also included other social groups as subject to the same techniques such as women and 
conscripted soldiers (1998: 216) 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. The areas of contemporary 
western life which reflect the techniques of normalising judgement to direct the behaviour 
of individuals so that they are either amassed homogenously or marginalised on the basis of 
difference are commonplace90. The former is exemplified in the furore of a man too large in 
body mass to adopt children, and the latter in studies that bring forth the western societal 
??????????????????????, where people of a senior age are infantilised and therefore 
marginalised into what could be argued to be a form of second class citizenship (Brown 
2005). 
 It can be established therefore that the instrumentalities that the art of government puts to 
use are many and varied, and yet, although varying in type, these micro-dominations are 
alike in their form, that is with the objective(s) to re-enforce a cadre of normalisation by 
acting upon the behaviour of people. These micro-dominations have one mantra common to 
??????????????????????????? [...] that border on unreason must be thrust into secre?????????: 
68); this is why, argues Foucault, 
[??] the age of reason confined [??] the debauched spendthrift fathers, prodigal sons, blasphemers, 
????????????????????????????????????????????? [.?] in each of these cities we find an entire 
population of madness aswell [?] Between these and the others, no sign of differentiation. Judging 
from the registries, the same sensibility appears to collect them, the same gestures to set them apart. 
(1998: 65). 
This historical sensibility which characterised the age of confinement and which has 
evolved into the ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
examples of body fascism and ageism are therefore clearly explicable as social 
instrumentalities; they exist to pastoralise individuals. Further strength is added to this 
claim when the agonistic arguments of Foucault seen in the previous section are recalled. 
Any and all of the social instrumentalities looked at here fit with the description that 
Foucault gave of exactly the kind of ossification of power practices that constrict the space 
for resistance through the application of agonism. Each of them exist as truth ?claims about 
individuals on which ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
an overall discourse regarding the deviant from the norm that is ?????????????????????????
                                                                                                                    
90 Gordon (2001: 130) applies pastoralisation to the modern day context of the office cubicle frequently used  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
extends beyond industrialisation.  
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????????????????????????????????????????? On this basis, a type of scientific rationality 
informs political decisions first at the individual and then at the plural level. In these ways, 
the social instrumentalities of pastoralisation became the paragon examples of the loci of 
established power practices both official in the sense of psychology, medicine, social care 
and less official in the sense of person to person judgement to which Foucault also 
suggested this agonistic principle be applied. 
Foucault saw that it is not necessary for individuals to fear difference and instead could 
appreciate it. It has also been explained that the way that he felt this could be done was 
through valuing of distinction.  What can now be understood through this chapter which 
provides greater tangibility in terms of the contemporary situation is exactly how such a re-
invention of distinction could be undertaken. In locating the forms of pastoralising 
instrumentalities as seen above, Foucault shows all of those areas of social life upon which 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
criminology and penology, or discourses and practices of mental and physical healthcare or 
the politics of sexuality or individual to individual judgements of a cultural kind, Foucault 
saw real possibilities to refuse repressive subjugations and create new forms of subjectivity 
(1994: 336). He tells us that the political double bind of hierarchical organisations of 
power, in other words the negative effects of the system (1994: 367) allow us ? [?] to 
distinguish two tendencies. We can see that dependency results not only from integration, 
?????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? 
367).  Those suggestions for how we can and should respond to these threats, in line with 
the agonistic position that he adopts, comes firmly from the position that as many forms of 
repression as possible should be attacked (1998: 224).  
Foucault argued that conflicts could be made more visible and that individuals could seek 
to dis-???????????????????????????????????????????????????Foucault in Kritzman 1998: 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or opposite to us, perceived threats could be resisted based on the specific repression that 
they embody. So, the parent could resist the repressive nature of every proscription for 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? and every 
individual could resist the push toward privatised prudentialism that is carried in the 
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ubiquity of the insurance industry that increasingly marginalises those who have recourse to 
welfare systems.  People over a certain age have the potential to resist the societal push to 
sequester them at the end of what society perceives to be a useful life and people who are 
told that they are not the correct shape or size to adopt children could resist the body 
fascism that scrutinises them on an oppressive ????????????????????????????????????????????
subject to.  In all of these sites of repression is the room, however limited, to act out 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that limit us in order that we overcome ourselves. If each person uses a principle of 
agonism to critique constraining social norms then the self-transformation of each has the 
potential to become the self-transformation of all91. This idea is revisited and built upon 
further in the final chapter of the thesis.  
Through the above examples it becomes clear that the instrumentalities of pastoralisation 
have a far wider reach in the modern day than Foucault originally described in his original 
examinations of criminology, health and sexuality. Individuals in the contemporary western 
world are subject to social repressions of many forms which shepherd their everyday 
existence and experiences. Foucault points out that this is because 
[?] the activity of judging has increased precisely to the extent that the normalizing power has 
spread [?] The judges of normality are present everywhere...it is on them that the universal reign of 
the normative is based [???] ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the greatest support in modern society of the normalizing power. (1991: 304).  
 
This argument now moves on to explain the significance of the analysis contained in the 
quote above ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sur????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
economic and political organisms are charged with this regulation of the population 
(Foucault 2007: ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????a: 92) has been 
inherited from the notion of economy in the classical sense of the management of a family 
(oeconomy), and is most familiar to the contemporary ??????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????ult 2007: 16) which constitute 
modern bureaucracy.  
                                                                                                                    
91 This is also succinctly recognised by Kang (2005: 170) who states that where we are all governed one way 
or the other we are also in solidarity.  
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Modern bureaucracy is important because it shows the exact point where the social 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????ng out his critique of the instrumental 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
instrumentality into the most contemporary social form for modern western life. Thirdly 
and most significantly for this the?????????????????????????????????????????????his parallels 
with Arendt continue. Paradoxically however, it is also where their parallels cease. 
6.5: Dazzling the K ing : Foucault and Bureaucracy 
?Life has now become, from the eighteenth century onwards, an ???????????????? 
(Foucault 2007: 161) 
As a result of the rising importance of the economy in the art of government, that is to say 
the means that attempt to strengthen the state, the notion of population takes on two key 
functions. The first of these important functions is population as a reflection of the sum 
total of the strength and productivity of all and each. However, for the purposes of this 
chapter, population takes on a second key function which is as the object of knowledge 
from which the tools for useful and efficient government must be drawn, thus creating a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
its citizens. This need for knowledge forces enquiries about and advice regarding economic 
issues such as  ?the welfare of the population, the improvement of its condition , the 
increase of its wealth, longevity, health etc [??] it is the population itself on which 
government will act either directly or indire????????????????????a: 100). Poverty was the 
earliest focus of this realisation that knowledge was needed about the strength and 
productivity of the population omnes et singulatum.  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e art of 
governmentality. This visitor was ostensibly concerned with dispensing aid, acting as the 
instrument of the benevolence of the sovereign in the distribution of household relief. 
However, a dual function arose which saw the visitor of the poor also ???????????????????????
of the sovereign, carrying out surveillance on sectors of the population and gathering 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
population, who provided information to assist in effective government. This information 
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would have included where they lived, what their habits were and what aspects of character 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????social 
administration (Procacci 1995: 140). So, in an unwitting state of quid pro quo, the pauper 
provided knowledge at the same time as they accepted poor relief.  
The dual technique of helping whilst at the same time accumulating knowledge is 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Polizeiwissenschaft (1991a: 
92, 96). In assimilating the necessary and required knowledge about the pauper, knowledge 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
of the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
general form of ???????????????????????????????? 314). Surveillance as an instrument in the 
art of government finds its footing. As Foucault observed, agents who a????????????????????
the sovereign became figu???????????????????????????????a: 165) and in doing so provided 
the answer to the question facing the rationality of the art of governmentality of how to 
introduce the economy into state management.  
The policing of poverty within the population to foster strength, productivity and wealth, 
becomes instrumental as a prototypical form of bureaucracy. The ?[...] antisocial problem of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????es something entirely 
different, an economic and social citizen (Procacci 1996: 166). Foucault identifies that this 
moves even further and eventually a point is reached where government becomes exercised 
over more than economic issues. It can be shown then that for Foucault, economy has a 
crucial role in the development of governmentality in its entirety and as it is experienced in 
the developed world today. Foucault shows that economy is the reason par excellence for 
the acquisition of knowledge of the populace and thus the instrument par excellence of 
pastoralisation.  
The ever increasing knowledge that grows from the surveillance of the multifarious aspects 
of individuals lives means that knowledge becomes crucial to the art of governmentality, 
and by this token therefore so do statistics and quantification. Foucault points out that the 
term statistics itself comes from its early function in governmentality   
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?????????????????e art of government was linked [?] with knowledge of the state.... questions which 
were termed precisel????????????????????????????science of the ?????? (1991a:  96 my emphasis).  
Thus economy is fundamental not only to the art of governmentality in general but also as 
an instrument of bureaucracy in particular. Foucault evaluates such knowledge in parallel to 
???????? evaluations of it, describing ??????????? ????[??] hateful knowledge [...] This too 
is a knowledge that can dazzle the king [?] it is an administrative knowledge and above all 
a quantitative economic knowledge: knowledge of actual or potential wealth, knowledge of 
tolerable levels of taxation and of usefu??????????????? 132). In short, the police state 
cultivated the pastoral.92 
These issues of knowledge, the economy, and government of the two, clearly show the 
early stages of bureaucracy and as such illustrate how bureaucracy is a key instrument of all 
techniques of government including contemporary ones. From examples too numerous to 
exhaust, contemporary bureaucracy gathers knowledge by monitoring individuals through 
welfare, through taxation, through work, through the ten-year census, through recording 
crime, through the amount of savings that they do or do not have. The bureaucracy of the 
private sector gathers knowledge by recording income bracket, household income, 
consumption habits, insurance details, criminal activity, health, history of family health. 
Political bureaucracy gathers knowledge on voting habits, location of residence, local crime 
rates, marital and familial status. Not only do these bureaucracies gather this information ad 
infinitum, but they store them, sit on them, share them between themselves and use them on 
individuals as the means to reach the end of guiding and governing behaviour. This is an 
idea which is also visited by ???????????????????????????????????????????????o behaviour 
which is characteristic of social man, who participates in the pr??????????????????????????
(1958: 42-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
modern politics, just as it is for Arendt. In recalling the last section and all of the micro-
social normalisations that Foucault identifies, it is easy to see how bureaucracy is the 
modern instrument in creating an individual who is self-monitoring, self-limiting and self-
governing. As a modern tool of pastoralisation, bureaucracy is a major part of the process 
?????????????????????????????????? government of a population. For Foucault, as with Arendt 
                                                                                                                    
92 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(1991) 
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in the last chapter, bureaucracy is the method sine qua non for the anonymous exercise of 
government over the masses. 
6.6: Instrumental Rationality in Modern Form: The A rendtian Aspect 
There is then a parallel that can be discerned between Arendt and Foucault in seeing 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
In echoing the discourse of the rationality of homo faber used by Arendt, Foucault 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????arding its goals and values 
can be judged from a rational po???????????????????????????????? 417) and this can clearly be 
applied to bureaucracy. The possible parallel ??????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Rabinow et al in April, 1983 (see Rabinow 1991: 377-79). Rabinow, using an over 
??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
definition of power rather than his own. Foucault replied, in what reads as a critique of 
Arendt, that the distinction that Arendt makes whereby domination is always dissociated 
from power in the form of consensual politics does not liquidate the power relation, 
although he did suggest that this distinction might well have been a verbal one.  At other 
times however, Foucault seemed to reflect power and domination in a much more 
Arendtian way. In another interview in 1983, this time with Thomas Zummer (see 
Lotringer 1996: 418), Foucault stated that domination is only one form of power relation. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????m the notion of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????y settles on a coherent 
distinction of power and domination (in any case Arendt had already made one some time 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????? 
 
This section brings forth in more detail those areas of social commentary where Foucault 
makes some strikingly similar assessments to Arendt, but also it marks the final point of 
parallel between them. This final point of convergence is embodied in this section in 
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?????????? critique of violence and the importance that he places upon thinking.  There is in 
his work a most tangible angle of a critique of instrumental rationality, discernable through 
his description of bureaucracy as the means of power that achieves the end of social 
control. This shows that bureaucracy is a dominating force because of the fact that its goals 
can be judged and described by ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
bureaucracy however goes beyond this and he points out, again in parallel terms to Arendt, 
how the values and very features of bureaucracy, such as those embodied in the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Foucault uses a concept that he ???????????????????????????????: 11-12) to articulate his 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
having (Ibid). This is of interest, argues Foucault, because the situation arises whereby the 
effects of power become maximised by the very unsuitability of such an entity for wielding 
such potency (Ibid).  This is as much to say that there is a rationality that makes sense out 
of the paradox that if a seemingly inappropriate wielder of power exists, then the necessity 
of such a power dynamic must be very great indeed. The irony of this situation is 
something that Foucault sees as offering validity to it in the eyes of others. 
 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????aucracy. As ?one of the 
essential processes of arbitrary sovereignty [... it is] also [...] a process inherent to assiduous 
???????????????????? 12). This is because, like Arendt, Foucault sees the bureaucrat, the 
????-????????????d) as a necessary part of the process which gives bureaucracy its 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
superficial, ridiculous, worn-??????????????????????????????????????2003a: 12). Furthermore 
like Arendt, Foucault links this issue to twentieth century political systems characterised by 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nistrative 
grotesque is a real possibility for bureaucracy [?] the pen pusher is a functional component 
of modern administration just as being in the hands of a mad charlatan was a functional 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
bureaucracy could also be said about many other mechanical forms of power such as 
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?????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
notion of the grotesque, because they are inherent to the mechanisms of power, and this is 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
was theatrically got up and depicted as a clown or a bu?????????????????????????????????
Arendt, Foucault identifies in a distinctly Weberian vein (Weber 1974: 214) the inverse 
relationship between the bureaucrat as a powerless cog and the real world potency of the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
from despicable sovereignty to ridiculous authori???????????????????? 13).  
Foucault argues however that showing power to be this way does not result in limiting its 
effects. Instead, it gives a striking form of expression to the unavoidability and inevitability 
of power which can function with even more rigor at the extreme end of its rationality, even 
when in the hands of one who has been discredited (2003a: 13). The ridiculousness of the 
sovereign only serves to strengthen their power. From Nero the founding father of the 
despicable sovereign down to Hitler93 ???????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????on, Foucault 
repeats the claims of Arendt on Eichmann, that modern western societies accept 
arrangements of power whose very ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
excessive political potency. This led Foucault to conclude that his experience of growing up 
in France at the end of WW2 was the experience of a society which had met Nazism and 
?[...] had lain down in ??????????????????? 247). On this basis Foucault saw, in parallel to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????? 
From its seminal stages in issues regarding population and poverty to its most modern 
incarnation in bureaucracy and the paradox of the powerless/powerful bureaucrat, the tools 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this rationality adjusted to leave pauperism behind and another concept in its stead, that of 
the socio-economic citizen. In this way economy became a vital tool in the arsenal of the 
                                                                                                                    
93 To fully illustrate the buffoonery of the despicable sovereign Foucault describes Hitler ???????????????????
with the trembling hands crowned with forty million deaths, who from deep in his bunker, asks only for two 
things; that everything above him be destroyed and that he be given chocolate cakes until he bursts (2003a: 
13). 
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art of government. The contemporary face of economic knowledge about individuals is 
bureaucracy. As the contemporary agent and repository of knowledge about the modern 
population, bureaucracy is the modern instrument of the rationality of how best to govern, 
and therefore the modern instrument of control. Bureaucracy is therefore for Foucault, as 
with Arendt, the method of anonymous government, whereby the micro-instrumentalities of 
control are embodied at state level but implemented at societal level. Another aspect of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
violence. Violence ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rationality(ies) manifest in modern political form. Interestingly, this focus on violence 
echoes those claims of Arendt seen in Chapter Five. For this chapter however, this example 
provides another example ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
6.7: V iolence and the Importance of Thought 
Foucault, like Arendt, made a distinction between violence and power and like Arendt he 
defined violence as a physical violation, a ?primitive ?????????????????????????????Foucault 
1994: 340-1).  In seeking to define the character of power relations, Foucault stated that 
power is something that acts upon conduct whereas violence is not. Violence acts upon a 
body or upon things. It allows no space for resistance by forcing, breaking, bending, 
destroying and closing down all possibilities. In fact, when violence meets with resistance it 
has no choice but to try and break it down (Foucault 1994: 340). In contrast, power does 
not work directly or immediately on others. In a relationship of power there are always two 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
Faced with a relationship of power there is always the potential for a whole field of 
responses, reactions, results and possible inventions and reinventions. In power 
relationships there is always the space for freedom, for the opportunity to resist, refuse and 
challenge, in short to re-negotiate the bases of the power relationship. This is why when the 
space for resistance disappears from the power relationship entirely, a power relationship 
ceases to exist and instead transforms into something else.  
In their parallel nuanced analyses of violence and power both Foucault and Arendt 
distinguish themselves from political theorists such as Schmitt, who describes power as 
physical force (Schmitt 2005: 17) rather than violence. Schmitt makes no such distinction 
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between the important modern political phenomena of power and violence. In this sense, 
???????????olitical theory is crude in comparison to Foucault and Arendt, and this 
observation becomes more salient with particular regard to contemporary politics. 
Foucault saw the connection between a certain type of rationality which has prevalence in 
the modern, western world and the core of political power, which independently supports 
an earlier claim in this thesis. ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
between rationalisation and the essence of political power is evident. And we should not 
need to wait for bureaucracy or concentration camps to recognise the existence of such 
????????????????? 299). That Foucault refers to concentration camps here shows that he, in 
parallel with Arendt, also connected this modern type of rationality to politics characterised 
by violence and indeed also noted that rationalities of this type had a most dangerous 
potential. Drawing upon his disdain of the Enlightenment, Foucault explained this when he 
said: 
What is most dangerous in violence is its rationality [?] the deepest root of violence and its 
permanence come out of the form of rationality that we use. The idea that if we live in the world of 
reason we can get rid of violence ????is quite wrong. Between violence and rationality there is no 
incompatibility.  My problem is [??] to know what is this rationality so compatible with violence? 
(1996: 299)  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
question. Had he demonstrated a greater awareness of the detail of Arend???????????????????
have found a more than adequate answer to his question of what the rationality behind 
violence looks like. He would have known of her analysis of it as being the legacy of homo 
faber which is ?????????????????????????????????????????????ity as a principle and also as a 
rationality that permeates modern, western thought to the point where it marries politics 
with violence. ??????????????????????? why rationality and violence are so compatible and 
why it is easy today to see so much evidence of anti-enlightenment thinking in what passes 
??? ???????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
denounce violence or criticize an institution. Nor is it enough to cast the blame on reason in 
general. What has to be questioned is the form ??????????????????????????????? 324), Foucault 
seems to prescribe a need in thinking that Arendt already fulfils. The importance of this for 
social and political thought is explained in the remainder of the thesis.  
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Foucault should also have noticed that as a fellow thinker who drew upon Nietzsche, 
Arendt endorsed the importance of thinking and judging in terms other than instrumental. 
This parallels with ?????????? own emphasis on the crucial role that thinking must take on 
in the agonistic challenging of accepted power practices. He ?????????????????[?] the very 
???????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????[?] thought as the 
???????????????????????????? xvii). Foucault recognised that thought can exist 
independently of system and frameworks of discourse, even though it may not be visible. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ht 
even in the most stupid institutions; there is always thought even ??????????????????????
Kritzman 1998: 155). In answer to this, and in keeping with his advocacy of the cutting 
capacity of knowledge and agonism as a principle of resistance to instrumental ways of 
thinking, Foucault prescribed that thought needs to ????????????????????????????????????? 
156).  
??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
been altered, [and] whatever the project for reform, we know that it will be swamped, 
digested by modes of behaviour and institutions that will always be the same (1994: xxxv). 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????ation becomes [?] very urgent, very 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be exercised without a critique far more radical than a test of optimization. It should inquire 
not just as to the best (or least costly) means of achieving its effects but also concerning the 
possibility and even the lawfulness of its sche???????????????????????????????? 74). In this 
way, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
beyond the shallow measure of means to ends efficiency94. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
further Arendtian aspect through his discussion of the importance of judgement as a key 
form of thought working upon thought. For Foucault, judgement is a particular type of 
thinking which frees itself from the knee-jerk reactionary judgement which abounds in the 
                                                                                                                    
94 For a book length study of Arendt and Foucault as comparative critical thinkers see Kang (2005). 
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capillary network of social normalisation. This judgement might be better described as 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sends me to sleep. ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????uld not 
be sovereign or dressed in red, it would bear the ligh???????????????????????????????? 323) 
In recognising the ubiquity of normalisation throughout society, Foucault remarks at how 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????erywhere, all the time. 
Perhaps it is one of the simplest thin??? ???????????????????????????????????? 323). 
However, recalling that even when the power grid behind social normalisation appears to 
be creative, it is in fact repressive; Foucault envisages a different form of judgement. Far 
removed from the negative judgement of social normalisation there is the possibility of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????dge but to bring an oeuvre, a 
book, a sentence, an idea to life; it would light fires, watch the grass grow, listen to the wind and 
catch the sea foam in the breeze and scatter it. It would multiply not judgements but signs of 
existence; it would summon them, drag them from their sleep. (Foucault 1994b: 323)  
The type of critical thinking that Foucault exhorts is positive, creative and life-affirming 
and not one which acts as the judgemental, divisive instrument for the negative and 
exclusionary ends of pastoralisation. In possibly the last instance where the two theorists 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
sacralisation of the social as the only reality and stop regarding as superfluous something so 
es????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
6.8: Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how it is possible to identify a critique of instrumental rationality in 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
rationality in the same overt way that Arendt does, an anti-instrumentalist argument 
nevertheless ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
instrumentality  rest on the use of genealogical method to reject uniform, linear models of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the adoption of agonism ??????????????????. The overarching implication of these aspects  
is that both equate to a resistance of ends. In these ways, Foucault not only uses agonism as 
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a principle against instrumentality to silence some of the critics of his work but also in 
doing so parallels with Arendt in terms of her rejection of instrumental rationality. 
In directly identifying assujetissement as a set of strategies, it can be shown how they are 
equally micro-instrumentalities. These plural instrumentalities, which are exemplified both 
???????????????big ??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
toward the end of social domination. This chapter brings these forward as specific and 
appropriate sites for permanent provocation, and in doing so, shows them as vehicles for 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????-????????????????????? ????????????????
???????95. This parallels with Arendt???????????????????ople should become challengers.  
???????????????????????????????????????? ???? ???? ?????????????????????????????????
micro-???????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ?????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
which for him is the object sine qua non of pastoralisation. It is also the most modern 
incarnation of pastoralisation where many of the micro-instrumentalities of the art of 
government are gathered together. This is because bureaucracy is the ultimate instrument of 
the police state. Like Arendt, Foucault draws a connection between systems which rely on 
the imbecilic bureaucrat and totalitar??????????????????????????????????? of bureaucracy as 
an instrument of the police state and as an instrument of social control is another way that a 
critique of instrumental rationality that can be found in his work.  
A further parallel between Foucault and Arendt shows violence as a key aspect of modern 
politics and points out the need to understand the rationality behind the use of violence, 
which for Foucault defines a situation where the freedom inherent in power relationships 
has disappeared. This question, however, illustrates a weakness in his theory, in that it 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
homo faber. The parallel continues ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
instead of judgement. Like Arendt, Foucault identifies this as a key weapon in subverting 
instrumentality and also as an important factor in transforming human relationships. This 
                                                                                                                    
95?????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????t that Foucault reduces social 
agents to passive bodies. 
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underscores his argument for society to be transformed beyond what it currently is, for 
??????????????????????????????? 
An analysis of contemporary forms of political rationalities is achieved by Foucault???
parallel with Arendt in the identification of violence as a political instrument. Likewise, 
there are also parallels between them through his description and critique of bureaucracy, 
which is the institution upon which the social, economic and political spheres converge. 
Bureaucracy however, throws up a paradox of its own in the comparison of Foucault and 
Arendt in that it is in this area that the questions that Foucault and Arendt might ask each 
other begin to take on a more tangible form. This means that the final angle of comparison 
between these two theorists, such as bureaucracy is, at the same time also stands as the 
basis upon which the ultimate divergences between them can be shown. 
The ultimate divergence between these two political theories cam be found in their 
explanation of bureaucracy. This is because Arendt sees bureaucracy as a substitution for 
power or in other words the instrument through which the genuinely political is displaced, 
replaced and restricted by issues relating to the social. Foucault, however, sees it in entirely 
the opposite way, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
which the political becomes omnipresent through the colonisation of the social96.  It is this 
ultimate divergence between Foucault and Arendt that is examined in the rest of the thesis 
in more detail.  What will be shown is that the polarisation of the two theorists regarding 
the separation of the social and political is what distinguishes their theories from each 
other. In addition, the thesis will set out its ultimate argument for why there is a necessity to 
move beyond it. 
 
 
                                                                                                                    
96 ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????? ????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? of power as outlined 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
instances. Coercion and domination do not only rest on acceptance but can be identified where acceptance 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
recognition that it is the anonymity of bureaucracy which is its most insidious facet.  
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7.0 ARENDT: THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL 
7.1: Introduction 
This thesis now breaks away from the parallel strengths of Arendt and Foucault to focus on 
their significant divergences. These can be considered to be significant because besides the 
parallels between them, what is just as striking about the two thinkers is the very different 
conclusions that they reach regarding the social and political97. This chapter will show that 
Arendt sees that the social has come to dominate and constrict the political sphere whereas 
the final chapter of the thesis shows that Michel Foucault sees the political as constraining 
the social?????????????????????????????????????????????????diverging argument regarding this 
relationship. Arendt unequivocally saw genuine politics as a space free from social 
considerations. That is to say that for genuine politics to exist, at all times and in all 
situations a separation of the social and political had to be maintained. This chapter 
ultimately asserts that although this is not as easy as Arendt made it sound, neither is it as 
far-fetched as some interpretations of her imply (Reinhardt 1997, Pitkin 1998, Kingston 
2009, Marquez 2010a: 18).  
 
The following chapter ?????????????????????????????????????the questions and intuitions posed 
in the introduction whilst also examining what is perceived as certain injustices towards 
??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
separation of the social and the political, but one which takes the original step of at least 
pointing out other interpretations of her weaknesses98. This includes considering what it 
might have been that Arendt meant when she talked of the social, by paying particular 
attention to her use of misery and poverty in the politically revealing moments of 
revolution?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
covered by other commentators (Reinhardt 1997, Pitkin 1998, Grumley 1998, Medearis 
                                                                                                                    
97 This is an idea that was originally discussed in a journal article (see Edwards 1999). Other theorists who 
also remark on divergences between them include Agamben (1998), Grumley, (1998), Medearis (2010).  
98  ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
historical, economic, political, psychological and sociological phenomenon. ??????????? ?????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this thesis see Connolly (1997: 15-16).  
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2004). The second section look???????????????????????????????????????????????? for 
contemporary politics. This includes responses to other ???????????????????????????????
finally offer a more sympathetic critique of her arguments regarding the social and political. 
For Arendt, the movement ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
historical moment which she identifies as ???? modern age [....] when, and not before, men 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(1965: 22). The modern age 
and the Arendtian social therefore coincide and it may well be that the point in history 
where she sees this coincidence take place, marks out the beginning of the modern age for 
Arendt. There are two important aspects for ????????????????? discussed in this chapter. The 
first of these is her analysis of poverty, misery and want.  
7.2: Misery and Want: The Predicament of Abject Poverty 
 ????????????????? of the social is a theme which pervades her oeuvre. Pitkin has given the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? ??? ?????????????????????????????????) and a 
????????????????????????8: 15) to describe the way that Arendt uses the concept. This is the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????Fenichel Pitkin, 1998). This thesis makes 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
many levels to be a disservice to it, not least because Pitkin seems to limit her analysis of 
??????????????????????????????????????????? ?de in The Human Condition and in doing so 
neglects many of the qualifications above that Arendt made to her idea of the social in other 
works, most notably ?On Revolution??????????? narrow focus has been repeated by both 
Medearis (2004) and Kingston (2009). 
 
The social question pervades the whole of the book ?On Revolution?, mainly through 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????hat ?On 
Revolution? is vital for providing an important insight into what Arendt meant when she 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????he differing outcomes of the 
American and French revolutions that Arendt gave is the American attitude to politics 
which saw every individual in that country engaged in the political process (1963: 119) in 
???????????????????????????? ??????-in-diversity of the plural multitude was 
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???????????????????????: 93)99?????????????????????????????????????????????xemplified 
many genuine political qualities. The French experience by contrast lacked such political 
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
or by, the people [?] and at worst the usurp???????????????????????????????: 75) 100.  This 
comment may well refer to Robespierre in the first statement and Napoleon Bonaparte in 
the second.  If this analysis is ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
French Revolution were very different characters who were politically unsatisfactory even 
at the extremes of their difference.  However, for this chapter it is the second key 
differential between the two revolutions which is of pertinence here, because for Arendt, 
not only did the two revolutions contrast in terms of the above, but in addition they were 
separated by something that Arendt calls ??????????????????????(1965: 24) and within this 
most specifically, the particular components of poverty and misery. In this sense, the 
French Revolution can be used as an early exam??????????????s criticisms of a politics 
????????????????????????????????????.  
Poverty and misery are two key issues in ?On Revolution?. Arendt marries them as the 
issues that constitute the social question exemplified in the French Revolution. She writes 
that poverty in France was about more than mere deprivation, it involved a constant want 
and misery that dehumanized its sufferers (1965: 60). This combination of want, misery 
and dehumanization meant that the poor of the French Revolution were perpetually under 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
totally abject conditions (Ibid). Such was the level of poverty and misery amongst most of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????orn [??] freedom had 
to be surrendered to necessity and to the urgency of the ????????????????????????????????5: 
60). Arendt concludes that this immediate ???????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????y this, Arendt 
                                                                                                                    
99 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
(Almond 2002: 26  my emphasis). Beiner (2000: 55) states that Arendt saw the success of this revolution 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
100 Almond (2002: 37) gives a similar interpretation of the French Revolution 
168 
Beyond the Social and Political 
meant the satiating of necessity, meeting the needs of biological life. There was in this shift 
a move away from the freedom of the political into the constriction of the social.  
In contrast, the American Revolution was ???????????????????????????????????????????Arendt 
1965: 23)101.  ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
politically least solvable of all problems to all other revolutions [??] the terrifying 
??????????????? ?????????????????5: ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????: 44). Black independently supports this interpretation, stating that in 
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? 266).  Arendt, however, qualifies this 
difference further. For her it is not only a case of abject poverty being omnipresent in the 
French revolution whereas in the American one it was not. What is also apparent to the 
close observer of her work is that there was a differing attitude, a contrasting cultural 
psyche, which separated the two historical events and their agents. Arendt firstly identifies 
this in the French revolution through her distinction of compassion, pity and solidarity 
(1965: 75).   
 
For Arendt one of the defining features of the French revolution can be seen at the point 
where a difference is established between the people and their representatives. In her 
analysis of this revolution, Arendt saw that liberation only happened for a few, many 
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????: 75). The revolution in France moved 
away from the establishment of a res publica and instead focused on the happiness of many 
???????????????????????????le ??????? became the phrase of people exposed to the sufferings 
                                                                                                                    
101 It may seem that ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
aspects of the race debate in America as a social issue, yet at others it was a political one, such as when social 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
236) but also persecutory (in Baehr 2000: 240) and completely against her belief that every person should be 
given the opportunity to engage in public affairs (1972: 233). There is no space to explore this issue further 
here, but these points show that Arendt was by no means ignorant of the race issue or wedded to elitism. She 
reflected the reality of these issues into her criticisms of Marxism (1965: 226) and in letters to Jaspers she 
stated that the 1964 Nobel Peace P????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????in 
Kohler 1992: 558, l354), writing that she found the radically conservative Republican Barry W. Goldwater a 
?????????????????????????????? ??????????????evel, Arendt never visited the southern states of America 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????for 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????in Baehr 2000: 
231-2).  
169 
Beyond the Social and Political 
of others, yet not a victim of those hardships themselves. Neither however, were these 
sympathizers active participants in government102. This form of sympathy, from an in 
between group of people, Arendt terms compassion (Ibid).  Its damage to the course of the 
French R????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
Arendt uses Robespierre to represent) to neglect the issue of forms of government to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reiterates that the maxim ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
stability (Ibid). For Arendt, the compassion that led to the catastrophe of the French 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
count???????????????????????????????: 89). This lack of words and speech means that 
compassion abolishes the politically necessary distance between people and is thus 
irrelevant to politics (Ibid).   
Arendt extends her explanation of compassion to discuss the perversion of it which she 
?????????????????????positive alternative to ??????????????????????: ??????????????????????????
s????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
dispassionately creates a community of interest with the oppressed and exploited (1963: 
88). This is particularly noteworthy because Arendt indicates here that she does indeed see 
that certain issues of necessity merit political attention. This point weakens criticisms of her 
work, such as those by Reinhardt, who appear to take a far too simplistic approach to what 
Arendt meant in her ??????????????????????????????? 155, 158)103. What critics such as 
???????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the social how attention to the oppressed and exploited is formed. In the trinity of 
compassion, pity and solidarity, Arendt places pity over compassion but solidarity over 
them both (1965: 89). This is because solidarity, in her opinion, partakes of reason (rather 
than sentiment), can comprehend a multitude conceptually (rather than as a nation or 
                                                                                                                    
102 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
politics can be seen in the fact that there are very few places in the western world at least, where these issues 
are not the rule in some or all ways. It is important however to recognise that prevalence is no measure of 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????mistake just because it is repeated many times 
(1965????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? 
103 ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????On Revolution? 
(1998: 217) but still only devote less than ten pages of discussion to it (217-226) in which it must be noted, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
explanation of the social that Arendt gives.  
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people), is aroused by suffering but not guided by it and comprehends the rich and the 
strong no less than the poor and the weak (1965: 88-9). Arendt concedes that this may seem 
???????????????????????????????????????? [?] but [it] remains committed to ideas such as 
???????????????????????5: 89). For her, then compassion is a passion, pity is a sentiment 
and solidarity, a principle (Ibid). The course of the French Revolution displayed rather too 
much of the former, and not enough of the latter (1965: 90-1).  
 
In contrast, the American Revolution showed the opposite, an absence of compassion and a 
??????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? [?] and 
celebrated the plural and diverse multitude and the exchange of opinion between ????????
(1965: 93)104, a realm which for Arendt, ???????????????????????????????????????????????
such as that seen with Les Malheureux in the French revolution seems plausible under 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? isused in the struggle against tyranny and repression 
(1965: 112). This, claims Arendt, has been the fate of every revolution since the French 
one, with the notable exception of Hungary, 1956 (Ibid).  
 
There are several reasons why Arendt may have approved of the Hungarian Revolution. 
Sebestyen describes many events in this revolution as spontaneous, from the initial Bem 
Square protest (2007: 111) to the action of peasants bringing food for the freedom fighters 
(2007: ???????????????????????????????????????evolutionaries during the fire-fight on the 
24th ????????????????????? 127). The protest in Parliament Square on the 23rd October, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????rate??????????????
?????????????????? 197) would have been another aspect of this revolution of which Arendt 
approved. Other facets would also have pleased Arendt such as the involvement of workers 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????exam???????????????????????????????? 
                                                                                                                    
104 Almond supports this claim describing the American R???????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????7). 
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243). This example repeats many of the genuine political moments perceived by Arendt in 
the French Resistance.  
 
In her description of the compassion that arose in the French example, Arendt also passed 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????he needs of their 
?????????????: 59). This contaminated the political with issues of the social. Arendt says 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? American Revolution (1965: 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? her differentiation between the French 
?????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
inconsistent application of these concepts it is possible to resolve some of the issues in ?On 
Revolution? that lead critics of Are?????????????????????????????????????????????????
revo????????????????????????????????????? 219)  resulting in ?On Revolution? being a 
????????????????????????????????????????????225).  
 Pitkin can be forgiven for reaching this conclusion about ?On Revolution? because there 
are times when Arendt seemingly does contradict herself. For example, she states that 
abject poverty was missing from the American scene (1965: 44) only to seemingly later 
state that poverty actually was present in America (1965: 68). It is precisely at these points 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Arendt uses these terms in conjunction with poverty to demonstrate that at times something 
more than the issue of material inequality between people separated the two revolutions. 
What was present in the French Revolution, but absent from the American one, were the 
issues of misery and want.  
Arendt argues that although both revolutions experienced sufficient material inequalities 
between people that poverty did exist in both situations, what distinguished the American 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Americans were poor but not miserable and therefore ???????????????????????????????: 68), 
whereas throughout the French revolution liberation was enjoyed by only some. In America 
the issues which drove the revolution were always concerned with the form of government, 
and thus retained the political and ignored the order of society (1965: 68).  This ensured 
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that in America the political system was such that the poor were able to be participants in 
it105 thus ensuring they did not suffer the fate of the poor in France who were imprisoned in 
their abject predicament by the short sighted political system of representation. As 
explained earlier, for Arendt political representation only ensures negative freedoms which 
????????????????????????????????????-preservation, at the same time and by extension 
prevents them from participating in political life. T????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????: 69). This, argues Arendt, means that eventually 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????id).  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???? ????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????y for 
incoherence, a mistake made by commentators such as Pitkin and Marquez (2010a: 18). 106 
Indeed, Arendt does herself a disservice by stating, in what appears to be her own 
?????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????r and 
more simply call ??????????????????????????????: 60) before then moving on to eventually 
explain it in the greater detail outlined above.  
??????????????????????????????????????????occasionally throwaway use of the term 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????is the social question. This is 
because the relative aspects of poverty create different perspectives which in turn feed the 
plurality necessary for the public sphere. Nevertheless, what is crucial in the explanation of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e, but 
always highly idiosyncr????????????????????? ?social? does not equate to the mere existence 
                                                                                                                    
105 The poor in America could participate politically at the local level, through such public spaces as town 
council meetings in New England (Arendt 1965: 166). At other levels in America, political participation 
was/is given through the election by the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1968: 17), state governors and governments (Calleo 1968: 101), congressmen and senators (Calleo 1968: 18, 
Conway, 2000, 6-7) and also the election of the President as a head of state (Calleo 1968: 14, Conway 2000: 
6-7). The opportunity for political participation in the USA exists to the extent that despite his criticism of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
of democrac???????????????????? 
106 ??? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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of poverty but also to the attitudes of both sufferers and witnesses toward poverty and it is 
???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????S??????????????????????????
???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
considering the ways that she distinguishes herself from Marx.  
7.3: Marx and the Socialization of Poverty 
Arendt points out that the young Marx became convinced that the reason the French 
revolution failed to found freedom was because it had failed to sol?????????????????????????
(1965: 62). However for Arendt, Marx transformed this social question into a political one 
using ??????????????????????????, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
possession of the means of violence (Ibid). Arendt is critical of Marx on this point claiming 
that this relationship was only valid as a description for the early stages of capitalism (Ibid). 
Arendt challenges Marx with being more interested in history than politics107, leading him 
to forget that the original intention for the men of the revolutions was the foundation of 
freedom108 (1965: ???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????? ?rx did 
help the poor, it  
was not by telling them that they were living embodiments of some historical or other necessity, but 
by persuading them that poverty itself is a political, not natural phenomenon, the result of violence 
and violation rather than scarcity. (Arendt 1965: 63).  
 Arendt sees that poverty is natural between people because scarcity is natural, in the same 
ways that inequalities of physical strength or intellect are. All of these differences between 
people contribute to a natural inequality between people. That is not to say that Arendt felt 
that nothing should be done about poverty, indeed, as this thesis as has shown, her oeuvre is 
strewn with claims and exhortations against a multitude of repressions, and this chapter has 
shown that she included poverty within this. The vital importance that Arendt placed on 
recognising relative poverty as an ontologically occurring phenomenon was because doing 
                                                                                                                    
107  ????????????????? ????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
specifically the Kritik der Hegelschen Dialectik (1998: 86 n14) and also cites a deleted phrase from the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
unterscheiden, ist nicht dass die denken, sondern dass sie anfangen ihre Lebensmittel zu produ???????????8: 
???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
Arendt also stands by this assessment of Marx in her 1970 interview with Adelbert Reif  (1972: 211) and her 
lectures 1953-4 and 1973 German writings that became the Promise of Politics (2005b: 153).  
108 Arendt states this view of Marx explicitly in a letter to Karl Jaspers (in Kohler 1992: 216, l142) 
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so meant that it would have a priori acceptance to the genuinely political space, rather than 
becoming an unsolvable and therefore omnipresent issue for the political space. The 
translation of poverty into a non-issue, in that it has no precedence over any other, acts as 
yet another way that equality, one of the cornerstones of genuine politics, can be ensured. 
This politically equalizing measure offers both rich and poor freedom, rather than 
attempting to mitigate or solve poverty by a social revolution that iniquitously prioritizes 
the poor over the rich, in the case of Marx, or through over sentimentalized social attitudes 
that lead to representative politics as in the French revolution. These latter approaches may 
lessen poverty to different degrees but they will never end it. They will however limit 
??????????????????????????????????????????????nction between the social and pseudo-
political in contrast to the genuinely political can not be underestimated109. For this reason 
the genuinely political is returned to later in the chapter.  
??????????onclusion to this criticism of Marx is that he was mistaken in seeing poverty and 
freedom as incompatible (1965: 62)110. This, however, was not the only moment in which 
he contributed to the rise of the social in the history and the course of political thought, in 
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????xplain another important issue for 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????nother angle from which she is distinct 
from ????????????????????????????????????????e social in the Human Condition which is 
considered.  
7.31: The Public/Private Distinction 
?The rise of society brought about the simultaneous decline of the public as well as 
??????????????????? (Arendt 1998: 257) 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????the above, is her public/private 
distinction. This is important because maintaining a divide between the public and private 
realms keeps questions of necessity out of the public, i.e. the political, realm. In the private 
sphere, each individual has the benefit of a space where necessity is dealt with, but where 
they can exercise solitude and develop their own perspective(s). These are practices which 
are vital for full engagement in public life as equals beside but distinct from their peers. For 
                                                                                                                    
109 An oversight that Kingston (2009: 116) makes when he claims that Arendt exclusively focuses on the 
political. 
110 The other side of this interpretation is that there is no necessary compatibility between wealth and freedom.  
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Arendt, the separation of the private and the public realms simultaneously guarantees the 
purity of genuine politics and at the same time allows a space which safeguards the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????e distinction can be 
understood ???????????????????????????????? ??????? ????????????e to distinguish work from 
labour, his association of property with the bodies of men and the implications of his 
maxim for the revolutionary re-appropriation of private property, further ideas that led his 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????? 
 
Arendt claims that Marx bases his whole oeuvre on the nature and role of labor (1998: 84 
n14) and th?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????98: 
88).  What Marx fails to do she argues, is to distinguish between ?animal laborans???????
?homo faber??????????????????????tion between work and labor (1998: 85). Instead, other 
distinctions are conceived, such as skilled and unskilled work, manual and intellectual 
??????????????????? ??????????????????????????? productive and unproductive labour (1998: 
85). This for Arendt translates all forms of work into labour in the arguments of Marx 
(1998: 87)111.  
??????????????????????????????Marx all labour possesses a productivity of its own on the 
basis of the surplus that is not exhausted once labou?????????????????????????d (1998: 88). 
For Arendt, this is because in ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
su????????????????????????????????8: 88)112. The labouring of some meets the demand of 
necessities of ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
that individuals own need which allows the reproduction of more than one life process 
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????
social angle, in the sense that the life processes of all can be sustained from the labour of a 
few. This is equivalent to a vision of ???????????? ???????????????????8: 89). So on the 
basis of the labour power of every individual where labour solely and primarily reproduces 
                                                                                                                    
111 Arendt claims this hope accompanied Marx from beginning to end. She quotes Marx in the Deutsche 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Arbeite????????????????????????8: 87 n17). Other 
sources used by Arendt are Die Klassenkampfe in Frankreich, 1840-185 (1965: 64 and 2005b: 191), 
Ökonomische ? ??????????????? ???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Arendt 1998: 86 n14). 
112 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????(Arendt 1998: 88 n20). 
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?????? ???????????the purely social viewpoint [??] its most coherent and greatest 
?????????????????). 
The conflation in Marxism between work and labour takes on further significance for 
????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????tes ???????????????????????????
(1998: 70). This source of property is located in Man himself, in his possession of a body 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????m 
is situated on the individual means that for Arendt the worldly character of property is lost 
(1998: ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
central to Marx. Arendt makes a vital distinction between the very familiar capitalist idea of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
unmanag????????????????????????????????8: 70) and private property in the sense of a 
???????????wor?????????????????????????????8: 70).  The importance of this worldly place of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
catastrophic to lose; that is, there are important positive aspects that the private realm gives 
to human beings, that cannot be achieved in any other way and which are sine qua non 
preconditions for a genuine political life. These are identified by Arendt in The Human 
Condition as the non-privative qualities of privacy (1998: 70-1), and she sees these qualities 
in two distinct ways. 
 The first non-privative quality of privacy is connected with a need in genuine political life 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????-riding urgency that necessity brings can 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????lic realm can be considered 
(1998: 70). Arendt goes on to qualify this contention further by pointing out that 
necessity and life are so intimately related and connected that life itself is threatened where necessity 
is altogether eliminated. For the elimination of necessity, far from resulting automatically in the 
establishment of freedom, only blurs the distinguishing line between freedom and necessity.  (Arendt 
1998: 71). 
?????????????????????????????????????????tricted to the household can be better understood 
through this statement. For her necessity and life are so fundamentally connected that to 
eliminate one is to eliminate the other. Furthermore, if necessity were to be eliminated it 
would not result in the creation or discovery of freedom, but would make freedom 
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indistinguishable as an ontological state. The elimination of necessity would actually render 
freedom a more remote possibility. Necessity in the private sphere is required to maximize 
freedom firstly by distinguishing life from political freedom and secondly by keeping the 
private space as a pre-requisite for the constitution of distinction. This gives deeper insight 
into why Arendt said that Marx was mistaken in seeing freedom and poverty as 
incompatible. In this way for Arendt, Marx did not only fail to solve the social question, his 
theoretical contributions exacerbated it. 
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-privative 
aspect of the private sphere that Arendt wished to retain. This relates to privacy as a hiding 
place from the common world. For Arendt, there are aspects of human lives that should 
remain hidden and which can only remain so if there is a private sphere in which to hide 
them, against those ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
guarantees the distinction of individuals and thus avoids a loss of depth of perspective 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 71). 
Alt????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-??????????????????????????
Thus, Arendt articulates the importance for her of a public/private distinction, to retain the 
important political quality of perspective, and gives very real reasons as to why Marx can 
be argued to destroy it. The elimination of the private realm becomes a real possibility 
(1958: ??????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
property during the process of revolution. The Marxist revolution requires the expropriation 
???????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
labour power under ?????????????????????????????????? ????????8: 72) leads to the 
sustenance of all life via communist labouring. The consequence for Arendt of each 
individual reclaiming his/her labour power during the revolution, and moving from this 
point into the socialised existence of communism, is the collapse of the private/public 
distinction, which is coeval for Arendt to complete domination by the social. She testifies 
that ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
unjustified glee ?????????????????????????????????????????????8: 117).  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????the shortening of time spent 
laboring are likely to result in the estab????????????????????????????????8: 117). Referring 
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t????????????????????????????????8: 117), distinct from the non-privative qualities of privacy 
that she exalts, Arendt argues ??????[?] the expropriated animal laborans becomes no less 
private because he has been deprived of ????????????????????????????????8: 117).  This is 
??????????? ??????????????????? ?? [?] spend their freedom from laboring in those 
strictly private (my emphasis) and essentially world-less activities that we now call 
??????????????8: 118)113.  Thus, not only does the public realm collapse as the result of the 
prolaterian revolution, but this loss is compounded yet further by the subsequent retreat of 
men into a world-less, private existence. By definition, this interferes with the genuine 
plurality of people. 
Although Arendt is critical of Marx in these ways she does not favour capitalism instead. 
For her capitalist as well as communist economies can be defined by the consequences of 
both socialized and isolated mankind. For A??????????????????????????????????? in earlier 
chapters occurs both in s?????????????????????????????????? 118). This worldlessness 
suggests why Arendt may have been more correct than Marx in claimi???????????????
alienation, and not self-alienation [??] has been the ???????????????? ????????????Villa 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
through the many limits of sovereign based politics, the various suppressions of plurality 
and the political isolation created by bureaucracy. Once again, almost prophetically, Arendt 
saw that: 
A hundred years after Marx, we know the spare time of the animal laborans is never spent in 
anything but consumption, and the more time left to him the greedier and more craving his appetites 
[?] so that consumption is no longer restricted to the necessities, but on the contrary, is mainly 
concerned with the superfluities of life (1998: 133).114 
The realities of this situation, points out Arendt, are disturbing for the private/public 
distinction because that which we are left with is only the depth-less visibility via 
consumption by animal laborans????????????????????????????????????????????????8: 134) but 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? 
                                                                                                                    
113 Deutsche Ideologie (Arendt, 1985: 118  n65) 
114 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(1998), Taylor and Tilford (2000), Bauman (2001), Daunton and Hilton (2001) and Hetherington (2009). 
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?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
overall concept of the social entails. Although the rise of the social in the modern age did 
not occur through a communist revolution, it bears many of the catastrophes Arendt thought 
communism promised. Firstly, the idea that poverty and freedom are incompatible implies 
that freedom must always be dependent on the resolution of this issue. This narrows the 
potential for freedom massively. Seen in this way, a belief is maintained that until the issue 
of poverty is resolved there can not be freedom for all. This maxim serves capitalist rhetoric 
as well as it does communist rhetoric. Moreover, it is a belief which may well not be true. 
What it does give the social is a basis in the idea of the labour of some sufficing for the life 
of all to eliminate the issue of poverty. This results in the view of all people as one huge 
family which equals one huge household (Arendt 1998: 28). The administration of this 
household constituently forms the social via bureaucracy and consequentially homogenises 
plurality. Arendt defends private property in the sense ?????????????????????????????
certainly does not defend the endless accumulation of property revered in capitalism. It is 
vital to recognize that an argument for one ????????????????????????????????????????????????
of many ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
social because it acts as a place for solitude giving a basis for distinction and perspective, 
which continually refreshes the plurality of perspective existent in the plurality of people. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ms. The 
private and public sphere contrast to one another and in doing so give support to each other.  
There is, however, a different ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
addressing and that is to answer how exactly poverty can be mitigated by the private sphere 
when that private sphere may lack resources and the public sphere has no concern with it? 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? [?] could be 
more obsolete than to attempt to liberate mankind from poverty by political means [?] 
nothing could be ???????????????????????????????: 114), is to how exactly, given that she 
has already asserted that poverty is inherent in nature, the differing affluences of every 
household could possibly deal with the questions of necessity privately? This omission by 
her makes this aspect of her separation of the two, easy to attack as an argument for the 
privatization of poverty, and in doing so an argument that speaks in the spirit of the worst 
kind of liberalism, that is to say the isolating individualism that Arendt is at such pains to 
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attack in other parts of her work outlined previously in the thesis.  This is a question that 
???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????tself 
w??????????????????????????????? 31).    Furthermore, sticking to her maxim for poverty to 
remain outside of the public, that is, the political sphere, would mean that only those 
households who have sufficiently satiated the most basic demands of necessity can fully 
participate in public life. This is tantamount to the privatization of politics as well as 
poverty, and is seemingly therefore a self-contradictory and self-undermining aspect of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? f?????????????????????
(Reinhardt 1997: 158). As will become apparent however, in the fullness of this thesis, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
arguments of Marx nor the overriding self-interest of liberalism. 
For Arendt, the private sphere is imperative only as the foundation upon which differing 
perspectives are formed and renewed so that a better politics can exist, and not at all in a 
??????????????????????????????????????-sovereignty provides the reminder that she argues 
against certain liberal axioms (1976: 454) such as the limiting nature of negative freedom, 
which she sees as a facilitator of the accumulation of wealth rather than a guarantor of 
freedom itself (1998: 69, 1969: 67-8) and the exacerbation of individual isolation (1983: 
89-90) leading to the destruction of the political world (1976: 454). In her opinion the 
modern rise of the social is concomitant to the collapse of both the public and private 
realms, and does not equate to either. The modern age has a false privacy when cast in 
liberal terms, individual activities which are visible but not politically meaningful. These 
have no real meaning on any level. The isolating nature of this modern form of privacy is 
?????????????????????????????harply opposed to the social realm as it ?????????????????????
(Arendt 1998: ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
be taken to mean the genuinely political as Arendt saw it. 
The destruction of the political space between people leads to a situation of representation 
which is not equal political participation by all people. All potential for the genuinely 
political is destroyed, whilst many are also excluded by the pseudo-politics of 
representation. To add to this, i??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
poverty themselves, enraged by their exclusion from the political sphere and the 
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perpetuation of the want and misery that it involves, constitute a force115 which greatly 
assists in the revolutionary ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
tour de force which they constitute increases the ease with which they can be used to 
overthrow power116. Where they are not part of a genuinely political sphere, as they were 
not in France in 1789 for example, their exclusion from whatever masquerades as the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for her it is also attitudes toward poverty and of the poor themselves that can lead to the 
problematic of the social question, rather than simply the mere existence of poverty alone. 
Arendt saw that this problem contained in the social question continues into modern 
western society. She wrote that ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to the lower classes of society have [?] a right to burst with re??????????????????????????
(1965: 73). Taken out of the context explained in this section, this bald statement appears 
overly harsh, but what Arendt meant was that more could be done to remedy the resentment 
that ensues from economic inequity through the chance for pro and inter-action in a public 
sphere which illuminates their perspectives and therefore gives them value, than the 
inactive condescension of pitying countenance that she believed kept them in darkness117. 
Arendt most certainly was not blind to the issue of poverty and want, as is implied by some 
critics (Reinhardt 1997: 145). She observed that it was no longer possible to av??????????
eyes from the misery and unhappiness of people in places such as some parts of Europe, 
and nearly all of Latin America and Africa as it was in eighteenth century Paris or 
nineteenth century London (1965: 73). What can be understood at this stage ???????????????
disparagement of such sentimentality is that is that she saw that it largely contributed to the 
socialization of human suffering rather than the genuine politicization of it.  
                                                                                                                    
115 Arendt quotes Saint-??????????????????????????????????Les Malheureux sont ????????????????????????? (1963: 
112) 
116 Schecter (2000: 84) reiterates the value of citizens in a public sphere rather than an easily manipulated mob 
in a faceless society.  
117 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the Founding Fathers however attracts criticism from some particularly regarding her reading of Jefferson and 
Hamilton (see Arato and Cohen 2009: 312-3). 
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7.4: The A rendtian Political 
 This chapter has added to previous explanations by showing how the modern political 
experience of individuals is inseparably enmeshed with the social118, facilitating a 
proclivity towards conformist behaviour. This equates to continuity of the destruction of 
plurality. Pitkin captures this i???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
are the power, yet they do not have it (1998: ????????????????????????o relates to a cultural 
attitude that overall is condescending toward poverty by its confusion of compassion, pity 
and solidarity. The thesis has shown that modern politics is disingenuous politics because it 
lacks a distinction ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
view of modern politics is that it is pseudo-politics, a machine, not simply enmeshed with 
complex issues that she terms social, but one that is dominated by them. 
The view of the domination of the social over the political is what has led thinkers such as 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? in 
On Revolution referred to earlier119. This seems to largely arise from a desire by Pitkin to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
biography is not irrelevant to her thought, it offers no more relevance or insight than would 
any other thinkers? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
has a decidedly anti-femi????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
further by Pit???????????????????????????????????????????????????????: 252 - it is Pitkin 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Pitkin also makes 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                                                                                    
118 ???????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????ly realm within which action can 
take place and have any real-world meaning.  
119 See footnote 114. 
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beginning with her recognition that Arendt was right to see the problems in politics that she 
did (1998: 6) and the later stages of her book help with the task of better separating 
?????????????????????????????????????????????? 
 
The best example for gaining insight into the alternative politics such as that envisioned by 
Arendt can be achieved through consideration of the Ancient Greeks. In her opinion, the 
Greek attitude toward politics held as its essence everything that politics could and should 
be, for this reason Arendt frequently used the Greek model as an explanation for her own 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ection of 
her claims on the basis that Greek life rested on a master-slave relationship and was 
patriarchal because women were second class citizens and therefore excluded from the 
political sphere. As these aspects of Ancient Greece are clearly retrograde in terms of 
twenty-???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Ancient Greece as at best fanciful and at worst irrational120. It is important to recognize that 
Arendt does not use Ancient Greece as a model society (women, slaves and foreigners were 
condemned to non-citizen status) but  uses it as a blueprint of the political space that can be 
created wh?????????????????????????????????????????l yet ?????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????121.  It is with this in mind that 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
employs it. 
 
For Arendt, the idea of isonomy constitutes the absence of a hierarchy. This guaranteed a 
space for citizens alongside their equals. The fact that isonomy allows this space for equals 
or peers to come together makes the space profoundly political ?????????????iew. What she 
shows, through this real world historical example, is that it entirely possible for full citizens 
to come together and share a space of perspectives. The fact that in Ancient Greece full 
                                                                                                                    
120 As represented by more literal interpretations of her argument about this such as that of Agamben (1998: 
188). 
121This aspect of Arendt is also recognized by Isaac (1994: 159), Reinhardt (1997: 148), Martel (2010: 160) 
and Kang (2005: ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????aution modern 
horses not to ??????????????????????????????? 2000: 127 n4). 
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citizens happened to be rich men does not negate the value of the political insight that 
Arendt offers here. It is not far-fetched to transpose onto the modern context, as Arendt did, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ta???????????????????????????????: 275) to enter therein and this has been glimpsed in the 
French Resistance, the Hungarian Revolution and most recently the Democracia Real Ya 
protest in the Plaza Del Sol, Madrid (Charnock et al 2012). 
The notion of the self-selection of political participants such as described by Arendt has 
attracted the commentary from writers such as Honig (1993), Wolin (1994), Connolly 
(1998), Medearis (2004) and ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
way means that it is a political model where politics is done b?????????-?????????????????????? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????ld engage in politics. It is hard to 
understand the basis upon which these theorists, particularly Reinhardt views Arendtian 
self-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????ter politics [?] ????????? ??????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
politics. That not everyone will is not an issue of democracy but of the perennial issue that 
some are more moved politically than others122. This makes the self-selected aspect of 
politics inevitable but in no way elitist. In any case, Arendt herself gives an answer to 
accusations of elitism in ?On Revolution?, when she points out that self-selection, by 
definition, means self-exclusion (1965: 280) ???????????????????????????????????hose involved 
??????????????????: ??????????????????????????????????????-one is excluded from politics in any 
other way than by their own design. Furthermore, given her emphasis on unpredictability 
and spontaneity no individual???????-exclusion need remain indefinite. 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? involves plurality as a 
constitutive aspect of the political sphere. Arendt used Ancient Greece once again as a 
                                                                                                                    
122 Most non-governmental political action today is done by self-selection anyway by participants who self-
motivate on the basis of common interest and includes people from all walks of life. Participants span the 
socio-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
such as Southall Black Sisters and the Muslim Council of Britain. Other groups span the whole spectrum of 
social diversity such as the Countryside Alliance. This is no different from the basis of politics that Arendt 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? as elite. In professional politics, however, it is 
very different in that many contemporary politicians and certainly those that form government, arguably self-
select on the basis of private, not public interest. Contemporary politics is therefore elitist. 
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template to demonstrate the importance of the public sphere. In drawing further on the 
Ancient Greek system and adding weight to the necessity of a private/public distinction for 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????hold 
?????????????????????????????, whereas the household was the centre of the strictest 
???????????????83: 32).   
This underscores the necessary contrast of the darkness of the private sphere against the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????we deny our very humanity by the absence 
of a public sphere (1998: 38). The public sphere is thus a luminous space. In creating this 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-conditions of 
plurality, that is to say our human ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????t 
equality of condition (Arendt 1965: 30) further underpinning her point about poverty and 
freedom being entirely compatible. The two are compatible because in a genuinely 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
necessary motivations for acting politically (in fact they need not be any motivation at all, a 
point fully made in the final chapter). Arendt saw that the isonomy achieved by the polis 
????????????????s ??????? ???????????????????????: 30-31) as political participants but 
distinct as individuals so that perspective retains meaning. In an extension of the comments 
in the last section in which it was shown that Arendt lamented the destruction of the 
public/private distinction by social questions, it becomes clearer still how and why the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
Another aspect of the genuinely political as Arendt viewed it was the importance of non-
instrumentality, or means-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
for its own sake, literally for the joy or art of political engagement, the sharing of 
perspectives between peers rather than have as its sole purpose the need to resolve social 
i????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(Reinhardt 1997: 145) or that her exclusion of the social fosters the effects that she resists 
(Connolly 1997: 17). To ask with regard to political ???????????????????????????????s] 
???????????????????dt 1997: 163) shows that a politics conceived of in this way 
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immediately sets up agendas, participants, methods, routes and prohibitions for all political 
experience. As soon as this question is asked politics immediately assumes limits and 
begins to be led by something other to and very different from the sharing of perspectives 
of the participants therein.  
For Arendt, genuine politics ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
mind.  In the Arendtian public sphere the speech that people engage in orbits around goals, 
something to be approximated toward rather than a final end to be achieved. When Arendt 
wrote of the lost treasure of the revolution (1963), and exemplified it with the French 
??????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
speak and act with no vision of the future rather than anything intrinsic to revolution or 
res???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????
into the very trap of instrumental thinking that Arendt was so keen to avoid.  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ty 
because it is mired in means-end rationality. The need to predict in advance where a 
decision or an action will arrive (this can not ever be known) and to strive to be efficient in 
that action or decision above all else, results in a dominated politics and a politics that 
dominates  to give the impression of predictability and control, as outlined in the first 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ires none of these things. Such a 
form of non-sovereign politics need not be disregarded because a solution to its 
unpredictability and irreversibility is found in the faculties of promises and forgiveness. 
7.41: Promises and Forgiveness 
  ??????????????????????????????????????? (Arendt 1998: 98) 
????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
sovereign model of politics, is because she sees that within a community of equals certain 
actions permit the issues of unpredictability and irreversibility to be minimized. These 
political actions which Arendt argues circumvent the risks contained in spontaneous debate 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
The remedy against the irreversibility and unpredictability of the process started by acting [....] is one 
of the potentialities of action itself [?] The possible redemption from the predicament of 
187 
Beyond the Social and Political 
irreversibility [??] is the faculty of forgiving. The remedy for unpredictability [??] is contained in 
the faculty to make and keep promises. (1998:  237) 
 
Forgiveness then is the answer to irreversibility and making promises is the antidote to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
known what [they] we?????????????????????8: 236). Forgiveness allows them the chance to 
?????????????????? ????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
forgiven, released from the consequences of what we have done, our capacity to act would 
be confined to one single deed from whic??????????????????????????????8: 237). 
Therefore, forgiveness allows us the space to move on from mistakes, and to reverse the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ings forth yet another form of 
natality; we are able to begin anew.  
Forgiveness is the exact opposite to vengeance. Vengeance needs to be avoided because  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ces of the first 
?????????????8: ??????????????????????????????????? [?] bound to the process, 
permitting the chain reaction contained in every action to take it??????????????????????
(Ibid). Arendt contrasts forgiveness to revenge and argues that forgiveness is far superior 
because whereas revenge ??????????????????????????(1998: 241) reaction to a wrongdoing, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
an unexpected way and [?] retains [?] something of the original ?????????????????????
(Ibid). Therefore, not only does forgiveness provide an answer to one of the difficult 
characteristics of Action, but for Arendt, it actually constitutes a political action in its own 
right. 
???????????????? ???????????????????????????8: 237) is the antidote to the unpredictable 
nature of Action. For Arendt, promises and the faith in the making and keeping of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ncertainty of 
????????????????8: ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
uncertainty [?] islands of security without which not even continuity, let alone durability 
[?] would be possible [?] ???????? ????????8: 237). Identity can be found and fortified 
for Arendt by the role of ????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????). The effect 
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of making promises counter-balances the uncertainty of human Action in two ways. It 
???????????????????????kness of the human h??????????8: 244) which is as much to say the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????hey will be tomor?????
(Ibid) and also the consequences of acts that will be numerous amongst people who all have 
an equal capacity to act (Ibid).  
Unlike forgiveness which is held with circumspection, due perhaps to its theological tone, 
the action of making promises already has a long history in our political tradition (1998: 
243). Because of this, the value of promises has long been known. Arendt exemplifies this 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
contract theories sin???????????????????8: 243-4) as situations that have used the making 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
how light can be shone over the darker side of Action. Unpredictability is remedied by 
promises and irreversibility by forgiveness. For her the two ????????????????????????????
(1998: 237) so that the negative aspects of Action can be banished from the public realm, 
yet the positive aspects of that unpredictability and irreversibility allowed to remain.  
In pointing to the value of forgiveness and promises Arendt offers another justification for 
her defence of plurality. In order that they take on meaning and effect for the political 
world, Arendt points out how both faculties can only be realised within the plurality of 
people: 
Both faculties [??] depend on plurality [...] for no-one can forgive himself and no one can feel 
bound by a promise made only to himself; forgiving and promising acted in solitude or 
isolation...can signify no more than a role played before oneself. (1998: 237) 
In this respect Arendt draws a distinction between the moral code offered in the Platonic 
notion of rule; a code established from a relationship between me and myself (Ibid) 
???????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
experiences which nobody could ever have with himself, and, which are entirely based on 
????????????????????????????8: 238). In addition, these faculties fulfil ????????????????????
non-????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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existence of a freedom which was given under the conditions of non-?????????????????????
1998: 244).  
???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
that can stem from the misuse of this faculty. Promises as political scaffolds and moral 
codes use the unpredictability of human Action as it is, rather than trying to compress or 
annihilate it into predictable behaviour as is the case with the domination by a sovereign. 
For Arendt ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ty in the ocean of 
?????????????????8: 244) they will keep their binding power and hence their neutralising 
power against the unpredictability of Action. Arendt states that if the faculty of promises is 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????map out a whole path secured in all 
????????????????8: 244) all positive qualities inherent in the faculty of making and keeping 
promises will be lost. 
Action then, for Arendt, is two-dimensional. Arising in its genuine form amongst plural 
people Action?? spontaneity and unpredictability is both that which Arendt exalts and 
recognises as calamitous. Those aspects of Action which Arendt terms calamitous are the 
same things which are sought to be negated by advocates of sovereignty. In the right 
condition, th????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
promises and the willingness to forgive that depend on plurality ???????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????a 
mutual promises, as s/he loses under sovereignty: 
The mutual contract by which people bind themselves together in order to form a community is 
based on reciprocity and presupposes equality [??] Such an alliance gathers together the isolated 
strength of the allied partners and binds them into a new power by virtu???????????????????????
promises. (1965:  170).  
???????? vision of genuine politics as non-sovereign politics that must involve a 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? is a vision based not 
upon surrender to a sovereign in a hierarchy but on reciprocal obligation between people. 
This can only be achieved in a situation of political equality. Forgiveness is the opposite 
action to vengeance, and as such underscores Arendt???????????????????????????????
rationality and violence firmly outside the realm of the political.  Promises exist as the 
counterbalance to uncertainty that sovereign politics is so often justified with. That both 
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faculties can only function alongside their sibling actions of speech and deed mean that 
they too underscore the importance of plurality and by definition the rejection of hierarchy, 
and thus a much less dominated political experience.  Alongside the previous explanations 
in this thesis, it is with this final understanding of Are??????????????? that it can truly be seen 
that she ?decapitates the king?. 
7.5: Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that t?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
question of whether society for Arendt is a mere mentalité or an objective reality? (Pitkin 
1998: 141).  For Arendt it is both, ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
members of western society and the realities of the tools and methods of what masquerades 
as politics therein. One might concur that it is perhaps spurious to compare the outcome of 
a revolution in a new world, where space and natural resources are plentiful relative to the 
population and political institutions immature enough to be flexible to change, with a 
revolution in an overcrowded, impoverished city with an aristocratic oligarchy which had 
???????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????usually challenged. Instead it is characterize??????????????????????????
1998: 219) and ??????????????????????????????: 225) in relation to its multifaceted 
examination of poverty and misery within the two revolutions. It is worth pointing out here 
that within the complex canvas that constitutes the history of any set of human relations, 
varying explanations will simultaneously be entirely possible and logically compatible. 
Indeed logic and compatibility are not really applicable to socio-political history at all. 
Nowhere in the past will there be two situations so alike in every respect as to render their 
comparison easy. Arendt saw something in the French revolution that foredoomed the 
modern political world as she knew it, that she saw as absent from the American 
experience. Furthermore, she saw more evidence of the solutions to those problems in the 
American experience than she did in the French, and for her this is what separated the two. 
??????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????ses 
of the French and American Revolutions need greater nuance in their accounts ????????????
argument. 
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There are aspects of contemporary politics, however, that pose some unanswered questions 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
necessity. It can be settled in accord with Arendt that inequality of resources is inherent to 
the human condition, and to recognize this is not to argue that nothing should be done about 
it. It is even possible to agree that pity and condescension towards this inequality ultimately 
does nothing toward removing it from the political agenda or social experience in any way. 
It is harder, however, to see how issues of necessity can be restricted solely to the private 
sphere. Given that economic inequality exists, not all households will have the means to 
deal with this. This makes scarcity and necessity economic issues, and in the context of the 
contemporary, western world where most states offer a minimal level of welfare to their 
citizens, a political issue by extension. When seen in this way, it is hard to agree with 
????????????????????????????????123. This objection also has merit on a global scale when 
comparing for example the ravages of biological necessity in the developing world. 
However, the issue of welfarism also throws up a paradox because generally speaking, 
within neo-liberal societies issues of necessity are already confined to the private sphere. 
Those people dependent upon state welfare (that is a resolution from the public purse for 
the issues of necessity) are a minority compared to those people who are financially self-
sufficient. This is one of the most basic demands that neo-liberalism makes (Kiely 2005: 
63). Furthermore, the majority of households who do rely upon state welfare to survive, in 
all but the rarest cases, satiate the most basic demands of biological necessity to the extent 
that scarcity is a misnomer. So there is somewhat of an irony in ??????????????????????
restricting biological necessity to the private sphere is arguably already ?solved? between 
the practices of neo- liberal self-sufficiency for the majority of people and social 
democratic welfarism for the rest.  
Given this, and in light of the evidence used in this thesis so far, the question then arises as 
to why modern societies are characterized so definitively by such impoverished political 
experiences for the majority of subjects? The answer to this must be that neo-liberalism 
fails to encourage the free and equal public sphere that Arendt envisaged and the reason 
why there still political apathy. The contemporary experience shows that even when issues 
                                                                                                                    
123 As Connolly rightly observes, nothing is more dangerous than to bracket the social question from politics 
(1997:  17).  
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of necessity are confined to the household through privatized prudentialism or welfarism, 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? by itself. There is 
something in the contemporary experience that is still fundamentally anti-political and 
independent of resolution of issues of necessity.  
Although many contemporary societies that follow liberal democratic principles weakly 
and unintentionally partially fulfil one aspect of Aren???????sion through the restriction of 
biological necessity to the household, the paradox is that every other aspect of her political 
vision is denied.  ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
in relation to this. It therefore makes more sense to view the Arendtian discussion of 
poverty and necessity as one better described as incomplete than incoherent. Arendt should 
have given greater clarification of the issues of necessity and poverty, particularly by 
distinguishing between the absolutely fundamental in relation to biological requirements 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
minimize the apparent incoherence of her analysis of the American and French revolutions.  
Other critics of Arendt extend these ideas into a wider perspective stating that her 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????Reinhardt 1997: 
155). Reinhardt extends this observation when he goes onto say that social order is crucial 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? such as Grumley (1998: 
65), Gordon (2001: 135), Marquez (2010a: 19, 31, 2010b: 10) is that there is a failure to 
admit that social order is also the limit of relationships, not least because, as Arendt saw, 
social order was not only the basis of the most repugnant inequalities but also the 
framework within which the chances to change them were circumvented. This, at least, is 
recognized by critics such as Connolly (1997: 16), Kang (2005: 170) Duarte (2007: 6) and 
Kingston (2009: 74) who echo ???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????1998: 
33).  In spite of certain inaccuracies therefore, aspects of criticisms are accurate about two 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and one that suffocates the political. The paradox of this however is that in contemporary 
life it is the social upon which the political acts, therefore rendering the two inextricable 
from each other. Aren?????????????????????????????? context at least, therefore has a serious 
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flaw. The need to find a resolution to this conflation is ?????????????????????????????????
cannot show the way to do this. 
 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
overcome. The claim here is that there is a way to combat the problem that Arendt sees in 
the conflation of the social and political which also retains the strengths of her political 
insights. The solution to this exists in the work of Michel Foucault124. Realistic about the 
problems of neo-liberal thought and contemporary social experience, Foucault recognizes 
the conflation of the social and political instead of attempting the impossible task of 
separating them. This results in his argument as the domination of the political over the 
social. The remainder of this thesis takes up this claim to argue that since it is the political 
that dominates the social, the movement beyond the separation of the social and political 
may be found in taking on this unhappy conflation of the two and renegotiating and 
reclaiming the political within its sphere of operation.  
                                                                                                                    
124  It is unclear why certain scholars never fully develop this.  Pitkin makes unacknowledged Foucauldian 
adjustments to her comments ????????????????????98: 178, 179, 180, 181) and also uses Foucauldian 
terminology (1998:  257). Reinhardt admits the relevance of Foucault to many of the criticisms that he makes 
of Arendt, yet for some reason consistently underplays them (1997: 149, 155, 156).  
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8.0: BEYOND THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL:  POLITICAL AGENTS IN 
THE SOCIAL REALM 
8.1: Introduction 
Michel Foucault makes no distinctions between the social and the political of the kind that 
Arendt does and it is this which characterizes the divergence between them. The social for 
Foucault, rather than being something needing to be separated from the political, as argued 
for by Arendt, is seen ???????????????????as the conduit of the political. For this reason 
examples of the social and political cannot be discussed separately as in the previous 
chapter on Arendt. Instead, they are considered simultaneous???????????????????????
biopolitics. This chapter is written with this major contrast between the two theorists in 
mind to inform the ultimate aim of moving beyond the conception ??????????????????? the 
???????????????????????????????????? 
The conflation of the two spheres in the work of Foucault, as opposed to the unrealistic and 
impractical separation of them in the work of Arendt, is such that he can be considered to 
address this major weakness in her work125. To show this the social and political are 
sometimes referred to here in the Arendtian sense that is as two separate and distinct 
spheres. As this thesis has already shown, ????????????????????????????????????????????????
political as it works on and through the social, and the ways in which this argument still has 
relevance today, points to the way that the social and political can be transcended in a 
modern day context. This is because it is the ultimate contention of this thesis that in line 
with Foucault, and contra Arendt, that as many repressions on people as possible should be 
challenged irrespective of where in the traditional social/political/economic divide they are 
situated. 
 8.2: The Foucauldian Importance of Economy 
?[?] the theory of ???????????????????????????????????????? (Foucault 1997: 205)  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
from Arendt can be encountered, is via the emphasis that he places on the economy as the 
inescapable link between the two. Rather than viewing the social as a colonizing entity 
                                                                                                                    
125  Kingston (2009) also sees strengths in Foucault rather than Arendt. Kang (2005) implies this. 
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which has subsumed and destroyed genuine politics through the concerns of economic 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
has and does allow the art of governmentality to become concerned with and influential 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????. In this sense 
Foucault can be argued to present the economic sphere as a link between the social and the 
extent to which people are (dis)empowered. Foucault presents this in more passive terms 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nse, debilitating 
the political, Foucault views it as an area of governmental concern that has evolved 
throughout the haphazard course of history to become a bridge between the two. Despite 
this more passive account of the economic as the link between the social and political, it 
nonetheless remains for Foucault, a link which assists in the most potent governmental 
intervention(s).  
In the recent English publication of his lecture series of 1977-78 and 1978-79 from the 
Collège De France (Foucault 2004), Foucault elaborates on this claim in the genealogy (ies) 
of the eighteenth century rise in the economic disciplinary techniques of European 
mercantilists and physiocrats126 through to the German ordoliberals of the Weimar republic 
and American liberalism127.  He includes in these lectures an examination of the economic 
issues of scarcity and the fluctuating price of grain, issues of production, imports and the 
behaviour of the consumer and producer to name a few128. Foucault points out that all of 
these early economic concerns, which are driven by concern over the wealth of the state, 
take place simultaneously with legal prohibitions. On these pivots therefore, the issues of 
economic security for the state begin to become entwined with the behaviour of individuals. 
This concern is furthered in the development of the concept of population and as a result 
the centralized concerns for the economic security of that population as an asset of the state. 
Economic security applies therefore in both a singular and a collective sense. 
F?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????? concerns, 
the behaviour and discipline of individuals and the concept of population, identifies how 
                                                                                                                    
126See for example the Bio-Politics lecture of the 18th January, 1978 (Foucault 2004) 
127 Foucault exemplifies this in the federal interventionism of the FDR administration as well as those of 
Truman, Kennedy and Johnson and saw these as connected via the influence of Keynes. See the lecture of the 
31st January, 1979 (Foucault 2004) 
128 See the Bio-Politics lecture series, particularly the lecture of the 1st February 1978 (Foucault 2004) 
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contemporary neo- liberalism is inextricably tied to modern, western life in three ways. In 
the first of these ways, modern liberalism continues to be occupied with issues of economic 
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? 
hand liberal ????????? (Foucault 2004: 130) such as those of Locke for example. 
Additionally, the connection with legal prohibition also continues into modern liberal 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
techniques are completely bou?????????????????????????????? 67). This observation has 
implications for the far reaching stretch of the disciplinary techniques of the art of 
governmentality that contemporary forms of liberalism give rise to and have already been 
exemplified in earlier chapters. 
 The genealogy of liberalism outlined in the 1977-79 lectures allows the identification of 
the exact m????????????????????????????????????? [?] simply indexed to the problem of the 
material invest???????????????????????????????: 232). In addition to the investment in 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? [?] precisely on one 
of the things that the West can modify most easily, and that is the form of investment in 
????????????????????? 
The above points foretell the second and third ways that neo-liberalism becomes tied to 
modern life through economic concerns. It is within the development of the concept of 
????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
one must place the rule for defining all governmental action???????? 121) which is the 
second way that Foucault sees liberal ideology as inextricably tied to modern, western life. 
This is something that Foucault identifies as the sociological aspect to neo-liberalism 
(2004: 130) which is seen through its concern to establish strictly market relations in 
society and which gives rise to the modern day phenomena that is identified by Foucault as 
???????????? ????????????????????? 144). This gives grounding to his conclusion that there 
is only one true and fundamental social policy; that of economic growth (2004: 144).  
The third and final field where Foucault sees the tie between neo-liberalism and western 
life taking place is in political terms (2004: ?????????????????????????? ???????????????????????
generalized administrative intervention by a state which is all the more profound for being 
ins??????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????comes 
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something more than the classical liberalism of Locke or Rousseau, and this something 
more makes it something new and worthy of different considerations; something where 
???????? ?????????. (Foucault 2004: 117). Foucault termed this something more which was at 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-79 series of lectures (2004).  
The Biopolitics lectures that trace the genealogy of the art of liberal governmentality into 
the modern, western world show how liberal doctrine becomes enmeshed as a set of 
practices which find a field of discipline affecting each of the economic, social and political 
aspects of everyday western life. Bio-politics in general and these lectures in particular 
mark a seminal moment in two ways given the focus of this chapter. Firstly they chart, with 
historical demonstrations such as seventeenth and eighteenth century mercantilism 
(Foucault 2004: 5) or the New Deal programme of FDR and subsequent Democrat 
presidents (2004: 79) the genealogy of the practices and techniques of the modern, western 
liberalism that can also be identified in the contemporary western world and secondly, and 
just as importantly for this thesis, it marks the point where concern for economic security 
spills out into the social and political elements of everyday life129. By the time Foucault 
completes his lectures on biopolitics, he has demonstrated how modern liberalism is 
inextricably tied together with the socio-political through the field of economics (2004: 
103-105)130?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
security and freedom (2007: 354). In this moment Foucault demonstrates in full distinction 
to the conclusions of Arendt, that it is not the social that dominates the political in modern 
life, but to borrow the Arendtian separation, it is the political that dominates the social.  
8.3: Biopolitics: Political Domination Throughout Society 
?Power is not a commodity, a position, a prize, or a plot: it is the operation of the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????(Foucault 1994: 185) 
In bringing forth the way(s) in which Foucault radically diverges from Arendt on the 
relationship between the political and the social it is necessary to briefly revisit some of the 
previous aspects of Foucault pointed out in this thesis. The difference in this chapter 
however is not to repeat these things under the guise of issues of sovereignty, or plurality or 
                                                                                                                    
129 Duarte, in an Agambenian vein, ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
combined with ????????????????????????????????7). 
130 See the lectures of the 31st January and the 7th February, 1979 (Foucault, 2004) 
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the instrumental reason bound up in all too familiar modern day experience of bureaucracy, 
but to see them now through the lenses of ???????????????????????????????politics?, ?society? 
and ?economics? so that their contribution to the differing levels of empowerment within 
everyday life through the art of governmentality can be fully understood and exemplified.  
 Issues of disempowerment are there from the very beginning of the practice identified by 
Foucault as governmentality. On the basis that it is people that are governed (Foucault 
2007: 122, my emphasis), political practice becomes an art of government that evolves to 
realise the social as its target. It has already been shown that Foucault identifies the earliest 
example where this crossover to the social happens is in the governance of the poor. 
Poverty then becomes a very specific application of politics in the social realm. The visitor 
of the poor provides aid to the pauper, and at the same time gathers information about the 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????t administer aid, comfort, cure; in short to 
??????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
encroachment of the political into the social, they also represent more specifically as the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
This coincides with the arrival into everyday consciousness of the political maxim that to 
govern effectively means to govern oneself and ??????family well. This practice eventually 
moves wider than but not away from poverty to take in more and more aspects of social life 
to the point that the people who must be governed fear being judged and adjust their 
behaviour to meet approved behavioural codes.  Everyday lives thus become the subject 
and object of concerns of government. Once again, the art of governmentality is concerned 
with life, but what really drives this political impetus forward is not the desire to eradicate 
poverty, or disease or to ensure that all families behave in a way befitting a king but a 
political impetus that is fully focused on maximizing the economy of those people who are 
governed.    
This thesis has already explained how economy is the field of intervention of governmental 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????y and the role of 
economics in this. This is because new principles introduce themselves into the attempt to 
establish continuity in legitimizing the position and the power of the sovereign. These 
principles are not ones of government however, but economic ones identified by Foucault 
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as beginning with the early practice of mercantilism and which evolve and expand to 
feature those economic questions of the kind outlined earlier in this chapter.  
Thus, Foucault claims that a form of political practice arises where every aspect of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????vernment and 
becomes biopolitical. Throughout his sociological genealogies of prisons, hospitals and 
sexuality, Foucault gave many real world examples of how the biopolitical practice of 
governmentality could be seen. This focus on the individual can be illustrated nowhere 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
biopolitical reality; medicine is a biopol???????????????? (1994: 137) and he offered examples 
of where the biopolitical focus on the body could be seen. He once described Swedish 
society as over-medicalized and protected and where subtle and clever mechanisms 
mitigated social dangers. He also saw Polish society as a society with different types of 
mechanisms of confinement (1994: 258). Foucault went on to add that both medicalizing 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????131. To link 
these examples to contemporary western society this observation holds merit given that 
issues of crime and punishment by confinement still occupy prominence on the liberal 
political agenda. In 2001 Tony Blair promised to b??????????????????????????????? 2004: 
245) which led to a rise ???????????????????????????????????????????????????? This claim is 
supported sociologically through prison overcrowding as an ever increasing UK 
phenomenon132. This is coupled with the consistent medicaliz???????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????ur, drug abuse, smoking addiction, teenage pregnancies 
and childbirth in general, under-age sex and euthanasia.  All of these perceived dangers not 
                                                                                                                    
131 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
interpretations of these countries. As such there is no reliable way to validate the accuracy of this claim. 
However the familiarity of the sociological prominence of both medicalization and confinement (see note 143 
of this thesis) as political issues to those of us in other European societies suggests something noteworthy in 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
132 Skellington (2011: 11) states that the 1993 UK prison population was 44,268 and by 2010 was 85,085. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a steady rise of 25,000 people in the UK prison population between 1990 and 2003. The rate of imprisonment 
in England and Wales is the highest in Western Europe (178 per 100,000 people), which is higher than 
Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Hungary (Skellington 2011: 14). HMP service supports this trend quoting 
the 2004 prison population at 74,777  rising to 85, 097 by 2010. Garside (2010) supports this claim whilst also 
stating a corresponding decline in crimes from 18.5 million in 1993 to 10.7 million in 2008/09.  This trend is 
also reflected in data from the Howard League for Penal Reform (July 2010). Denscombe (1998, 2002, 2003) 
adds that the Home Office predicts that the UK prison population may reach 100,000 by the end of the 
decade, a rise of over 50% (in Lawson et al 2010: 283). 
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only demonstrate the prevalence of this zeal in medicalizing and confining generally 
speaking, but also the contemporary ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
not only through consciousness or ideology but also in the body and with the body. For 
capitalist society, it was biopolitics, the biological, the somatic, the corporeal that mattered 
??????????????????????????????? 137) 133 
The art of governmentality is not just a form of politics that dominates the social through 
behaviours, choices and lifestyles but this rationality of government becomes one that 
crystallizes in a form of politics that is literally focused on the bodies of individuals 
themselves and targets such biological situations as gestation, childbirth and child 
development, death and bodily pleasures. Foucault expands therefore outside the specific 
??????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
institution that is ????the state (2007: ?????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
of biopolitics is both his macro-analysis of the art of the governmentality of the state and 
also the specific instances of micro-power where that biopolitics focuses. There is no 
?????????????????????????????????????? ???????? 
[?] there is not a sort of break between the level of micro-power and the level of macro-power and 
that talking about one does not exclude talking about the other. In actual fact, an analysis in terms of 
micro-powers comes back without any difficulty to the analysis of problems like those of 
government and the state. (Foucault 2007: 358) 
Thus, with the arrival of biopolitics also comes the recognition that power relations have 
come more and more under state control (Foucault 1994: 345), despite their dispersal across 
many social sites. T?????????????????????? ????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
is supplementary in relation to sovereignty, and it is something other than the pastorate 
(2007: ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
body, through extremely different channels???????????????????????????????? 283) and which 
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
species became the object ??????????????????????????????? 1) but also whereby the three 
spheres of political, social and economic cease to be distinguishable from one another in 
modern, western life. This interpretation sets up a very interesting and difficult question, in 
                                                                                                                    
133 ??????????????????????????????????????? of politics being different to that of self-government (1998: 65) 
one that is difficult to agree with in the contemporary western political context. 
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relation to the resolution that Arendt gave for the problems of modern, western society. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
view of civil society.  
Foucault described civil society as something that became ??????????????????????????????? 
296) and later became unde??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
philosophical idea but a concept and correlate of a technology of government, the rational 
measure of which must be juridically pegged to an economy (2004: 296). This was 
important for Foucault because he saw ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and yet which are inscribed in reality and fall under a regime of truth dividing the true and 
????????????????? 20).  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????the state concern itself? (2007: 
350).  Foucault posited that in addition to the concern with economics the principle concern 
for governmentality is the theory of civil society (2004: 286, 295). He further supported 
this idea by concluding that the answer to this question was not that the state concerns itself 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
sovereign will and submissive to it?????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
responsibility for a society, a civil society, and the state must see to the management of this 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????s 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????(1994b: 
75). In this moment Foucault asserts the complete opposite to Arendt, in that he sees the 
political art of governmentality dominating the social. However in addition to this 
contrasting conclusion with Arendt, he diverges not only descriptively from her, but also by 
stating the opposite in terms of where resolution might be found.  
Arendt recommended that the social and the political be separated for genuine politics to 
flourish under the conditions of plurality. Foucault explicitly rejects this notion, firstly 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
opposition between state and civil society , on which political theory has been laboring for 
hundred and fifty years, is not very produ?????????????????????? 290) and also for the 
disempowerment of society that this implies. On this basis therefore, Foucault indirectly 
202 
Beyond the Social and Political 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? separation of the social and the 
political, and also gives an unwitting suggestion as to how this major weakness might be 
addressed. In seeing the separation of the state and civil society as necessarily 
disempowering for society, there is the concomitant recognition that pervades all of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
rather than separating the ?social? from ?politics? in order to rescue genuine politics, as is 
argued by Arendt, Foucault suggests that political power can be found, fought and 
reclaimed in the sphere in which disempowerment operates which is the Arendtian ????????. 
This idea is elaborated in the remainder of this chapter and the remainder of the thesis. 
Firstly, however, it is necessary to make some comments explaining the paradoxes that 
Foucault identifies in neo-liberalism and the current climate that characterizes 
contemporary politics. This is so that the remainder of the chapter and the conclusion of the 
thesis can be justified through the context of the western political experience of today. 
8.4: The Paradoxes of Neo-L iberalism 
In examining Fouc??????????????????- liberalism several paradoxes can be identified. The 
first paradox of neo-liberalism that is outlined is in the different but simultaneous forms 
that it occupies. Foucault has identified liberalism as both a regulative scheme of 
government practice and as the theme of a sometimes radical opposition134 (1994b: 75). 
Both of these aspects are the reason for liberalism??????????????????????????????????????
(Foucault 1994b: 75). Foucault firstly shows us that neo-liberalism has been a tool for 
criticizing the reality of a previous governmentality that one tries to shed, and also 
secondly, a current governmentality that one attempts to reform and rationalize by stripping 
it down (Ibid). There is a tension in neo-liberalism, therefore, that it has been different 
things at different times. Foucault encapsulates these paradoxes in defining liberalism as [a] 
??????????????????????????hat consists in saying and telling government: I accept, wish, plan 
and calculate that all t???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????what 
                                                                                                                    
134 Examples of the radical opposition of liberalism in addition to those already presented in this thesis are the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to be ??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????he 
twentieth century (see Unwin 2008: 437, Purvis 2011: ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Communist China, the 1968 student protests seen in Mexico City, Bangkok, Paris and Chicago (in Harvey, 
2007: 1-5) and most recently elements of the Arab Spring have ?????????????????????????????Guardian, 22nd 
March, 2011). Liberalism as opposition is also recognised by Hobhouse (1964: 14). 
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??????????????????????????? 63). With these comments Foucault hints at the most modern 
and familiar liberalism of today being a particular type of governmentality, one which is 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 175). 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????tion starts 
from the assumption that government cannot be its own end?. (1994b: ?????????????????????
doing things ? a practice - oriented toward objectives and regulating itself by means of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????re located firmly in the 
social realm due to economic motivations. The genealogy of this shows up the second 
paradox of modern liberalism in that it is both the continuation of old forms of concern to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? being also about something else; it 
is yet at one and the same time something that needs to be grasped in its singularity (2004: 
130). The singularity of modern neo-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
political power being modelled on the principles ????? ?????????????????????????????? 
131); notions such as the body as a unit of human capital, production and consumption, and 
the social discipline(s) that constitute biopolitics are now a familiar discourse within 
modern governmental rhetoric, example phrases of which include economic security, 
efficiency and risk. Therefore modern liberalism is seen by Foucault not only as evolving 
from the assumptions, techniques and practices of various liberal moments throughout  
history but also as being characterised by a concern with human capital that means it also 
encroaches into numerous aspects of everyday life. The second paradox in modern 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????? it 
????????????????on that obeys ? this is its specificity ? the internal rule of maximum 
???????????????? 74). This specific concern with maximum economy means a maximum 
economy in and from politics, economics and society. This means that the new art of liberal 
governmentality firmly and inextricably ties the social, political and economic spheres 
together. 
The firm connection that is achieved between politics, economics and society by the 
modern neo-liberal art of governmentality often leads, as shown by examples in this thesis, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 28). This gives 
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rise to another paradox within neo-?????????????????????????????????????????????lity of 
government is indeed th???????????????????????????????? 29). This relates back to the 
domination of the political over society, through the pastoralising techniques of 
normalization and the political management of life that is biopolitics.  The art of 
governmentality is an art whereby the population governs itself, through the bio-policies of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
government of themselves and omnipresent in the need to renew biopolitical mandates. 
This leads Foucault to conclude that the third paradox of neo-?????????????????????????????????
at once that which exists, but which d???????????????????????????????? 4). 
???????????????????????????-liberalism as a historically singular art of governmentality does 
more than just point out its incoherence. In tracing this genealogy, he points out many 
problems that still need to be solved, and the relevance that his work holds for today. He 
observes that a continuing interest in this form of governing ??????????????????????????
problem of liberalism arises for us in our immediat???????????????????????????????? 22). 
Moreover, what is required to be thought about now 
is the way in which the specific problems of life and population were raised within a technology of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
eighteenth ce???????????????????????????????? (1994b: 79)  
The remainder of this chapter looks at the way that the specific technology of contemporary 
western government problematizes, regulates and disciplines everyday lives and how this 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
this idea, it will be shown that politics as an ethics recognizes the more accurate 
contemporary situation of the domination of everyday lives by the disempowering practices 
of liberal governmentality. In this respect politics as an ethics can be considered to 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????that impractically and 
therefore unrealistically calls for the separation of the social and the political.  However, 
discussing politics as an ethics has even greater merit for this thesis in that by looking 
toward this as a way in which contemporary forms of disempowerment can be challenged, 
it also fulfils the demand to transcend the Arendtian social and political division. This move 
must begin with an understanding of the problems that Foucault saw as inherent in modern 
political thinking.  
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8.5: The Problems with Politics Today  
?[?] we are suffering from inadequate means for thinking about everything that is 
????????????Foucault 1994b: 325) 
For Foucault the general mechanisms of power in our society affect societal relations at 
several levels. They infec?????????????????????? [?] verbal communication [?] amorous, 
institutional or economic relationships (1994b: ????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
operations of power that exist in western societies can be exemplified in the several ways 
outlined elsewhere ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
homogenous whole. Foucault labels ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
indi??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????hat they take into 
?????????????????????????????????? (1998: 233). However, this notion is flawed ?????????????
whole of society is precisely that which should not be considered except as something to be 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
specific way, the claims of Foucault momentarily resonate again with the observations of 
Arendt.   
The limits that a fatalistic understanding of existing forms of power places on the 
possibilities of empowerment allows governmental techniques and practices to rapidly 
????????????????????????????????????????????. This is something that Foucault not only argued 
should not be accepted, but also something that should be actively resisted. The practices 
and techniques of modern, western political rationality played out over and within society 
emerge as truths that belie ????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????
modified, they are not ??????????????????????????????? 292). Foucault condemns the history 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the grand discourses that have been pronounced on the subject of society are convincing 
enough for us to rely on? (1994: 285). He goes on to qualify this by stating that: 
Centuries have convinced us that between our personal ethics, everyday life and the social, political 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? [???] 
without ruining our economy and democracy and so on. (in Rabinow 1991: 350)  
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Thus, some of the possible answers for the political and social stagnation of western 
societies reside in the realization that the dominations of everyday lives are reversible. On 
these bases, a very real new approach is needed.  
Foucault qualifies that it is not a question of seeking the removal of all power relations 
from society, pointing out that this is impossible (1994: 343), but that it is vitally important 
to recognize that the dominations that do exist are not necessary, or inevitable or that they 
cannot be subverted (Ibid). What the new social, economic and political obligation requires 
is not the removal of power relations but their resistance (1994: 344). Where political 
maxims such ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is no hop???????????????????????????????? 355) are still accepted there needs to be a much 
more widespread and much more multi-faceted subjection of such maxims to a consistently 
renewed political obligation of agonistic resistance.  Foucault describes the result of such a 
re-conceptualisation of what is politi????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
to itself? (2007: 357).  
?????????? work in this area enlightens further the call that he makes to understand the 
oppressive aspects of power, but more importantly the creative aspects of it. He shows us 
??????????????????????????????????????????? [?] bad [?]that w?????????????????????????
(1994b: 298) but that what is needed is a re-conception of the political played out in a 
radically different obligation amongst, between and from people within their everyday 
lives. W??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? same time a creation 
(1994: ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????the political task 
that is inherent ??????????????????????????????? 343) 
The remainder of this chapter explains the possibilities that Foucault highlighted for the 
empowerment of everyday lives created by this problem and applies it to those 
contemporary dominations such as constrictive interactions with the bureaucracy 
surrounding social benefits, the corporeal subjection of health advice or the over 
proliferation of privatized prudentialism???????????????????????????????????????????????
removal of power from society but its reconfiguration via a celebration of the mobility and 
changeability of power relationships through the non-acceptance and active resistance of 
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the domination of everyday lives. Foucault gave this proposal the specific label o????????????
???????????????in Rabinow 1991: 375). What will be shown is that rather than bringing forth 
????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
only permits a re-thinking of the relationship between the social and political by 
recognizing that in the daily lives of most people the two are almost inseparable, and in 
doing so fulfil the proscription that Arendt set out for modern politics but also sketches out 
a starting point for many potential reversals of the domination of social issues by political 
means.  
Kingston claims that a turn toward Foucault is not political (2009: 117). This thesis 
however distinguishes itself from this by arguing that a turn towards Foucault is political 
and correctly so given contemporary western life.  Moreover, by promoting the resistance of 
such d?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, this thesis fulfils its 
overarching aim to attempt the transcendence of the traditional separation of the social and 
political spheres via an abandonment of those categories that misleadingly imply that 
society and politics can be conceived of and dealt with in distinction to one another. To 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????, that is as something 
that preserves what is valuable in Arendt, ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????? 
8.6: Foucault and E thics 
?[?] ????????????????????????????????????????????????? (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 
377) 
In a 1984 interview135 Foucault alluded to the problem with the history of political thinking. 
When asked to clarify whether a previous answer of his referred to a process of liberation, 
he replied that he was suspicious of the idea of a process of liberation because it implied 
that there is an underlying base or nature to humans which remains hidden until conditions 
coincide to release it (1994b: 282). The problem with this understanding, Foucault 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? [?] repressive deadlocks 
???? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
                                                                                                                    
135 With H.Becker, R.Fernant-Betancourt and A Gomez-Müller. The original was published in Concordia: 
Revista Internacional de F ilosophia. Translation in Rabinow (1994b, 282).  
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shown the situation of liberation in the strictest sense exemplified by him as the liberation 
of colonized peoples but, he reasoned, such moments of liberation from immediate and 
overt repressions do not translate into liberation in the widest sense by allowing, in his 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 283). What 
these points show is that Foucault took a very definite and radical turn away from seeing 
freedom ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????
of liberation humans become complete because they are reconciled with a previously 
enslaved self (Ibid).   
Instead, Foucault argued, freed?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
individual appears and acts as subject conscious of himself and others? (in Rabinow 1991: 
335). The importance of this could not be understated for him. In applying thought to 
internalized habits of behaviou?????????????????????????????????????????????????pting or 
??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
social and ???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
idea of processes of liberation allowing the human individual reconciliation with the true 
self. In a semi-Arendtian vein, Foucault intimates that the relation with the self is created in 
the same moment as the relation with others. The relation of the self with the self, and the 
relation of the self with others is very specific according to Foucault. The application of 
thought and thinking to the resistance of internalized norms, behaviours and ideas means 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????hed (in Rabinow 1991: 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
creates the human being as an ethical subject (in Rabinow 1991: 334, 1994b: 200). 
Foucault asked ?????????????????f not a practice of freedom, the conscious practice of 
freedom????????? 284) answering ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????not meant in a proscriptive or moralizing sense. In both an interview with 
Stephen Riggins (1994b: 131) and with F. Ringelheim (1983) he declared that he had 
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???????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
what they ought to do [?] and prescribes a conce???????????????????????????????? 384). 
However, somewhat at odds with this declaration, he also said, in relation to the modern, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????-political choice 
[??] every day [?] to determine which is the main danger? (in Rabinow 1991: 343) from 
the multitude of threats to empowerment which this thesis has highlighted such as the 
repressions by sovereign politics, the domination of the plural condition and the 
instrumentality to which social and economic life is continually subjected. However, 
further dangers exist such as ????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????vernmental 
domination of many lives but also stifle the resistance to it.  
8.61: Epimeleia Heautou136: The Inversion of Power137 via Care of the Self 
??????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
care for thyself, care of the self has become abs?????????????????????????????????????? 234, 
226). For Foucault, the disappearance of the ethic of caring for the self contributed to the 
techniques of the art of governmentality because the rise of the maxim to know oneself has 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? [?] oneself becomes the object of actions, 
the domain in which [self-government is] brought to bear? ?????????????????????????????????
individuals to effect by their own means, a certain number of operations on their own 
bodies, their own souls, their own thoughts, their own conduct, and this is in a manner so as 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
happiness, purity, supernatural power called the technologies of the self? (1994b: 177).  
 Because this involves a simultaneous loss of the ethic to care for the self, the field of 
experience for the individual is narrowed and so too are the ways in which governmentality 
might be resisted.  Taken together, the increase of technologies of the self at the expense of 
caring for the self further compounds the disempowerment of individuals. For these 
reasons, Foucault makes the renaissance of the ethic to care for oneself pivotal in his 
argument for the creation of freedom through thought. By care of the self Foucault means a 
                                                                                                                    
136 Foucault, (in Rabinow 1991: 359) 
137 Foucault (1994b: 288) 
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?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????in 
Rabinow 1991: 365). The return towards care by the self by the self can form, Foucault 
argues, a starting point for change in each of the habits of speaking, doing and behaving 
and in which the individual appears and acts as subject conscious of the self. In this way 
new power relations begin to be created and old ones left behind, which can be seen as the 
beginning of resistance. Foucault states that an ethic to care for the self is not the same 
thing as what he terms the ???????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
sel???????????????????????????in Rabinow 1991: 362). For Foucault, the Californian cult of 
???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????? 128). In other words, the Californian cult of 
the self is an exercise in knowing. This makes it an extension of the political tools that 
dominate social lives and as such should not be confused with caring for the self.  
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????-????????????????????-c??????????????????????????
(2007: 20)138. However, Foucault answers charges resembling this by stating that care 
???????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
attachment or self-???????????? (in Rabinow 1991: 359). Most importantly, he has also 
?????????????????????????? ???????????????????-love [?] selfishness in contradiction to care 
?????????????????? 285)139.  
Inaccurate interpretations of care of the self as selfish and ignorant of others such as is 
represented by writers like Braun are simply reflective of Christian morality in the criticism 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-??????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????anity that says that care of the self is 
immoral and which requires a moral renunciation? (1994b: 228, 282, 285). For Foucault, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????
(1994b: 287). On this understanding, it appears as if Foucault may be in complete 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????er, it is worth considering 
                                                                                                                    
138 A charge also levelled in varying guises by McNay (1992 in Bell 1996: 93) and Grumley (1998: 65).  
139  ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ised by others such as Gordon 
(2001), Kang (2005), Gros (2005), Duarte (2007) Kingston (2009) and Hardt (2010). 
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????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
parallel between these two thinkers on this point.  
Foucault frequently and clearly rejects outright any interpretations of care for the self as 
negligent towards others. He shows in his work how thought exercised through care for the 
self creates a subject conscious of others and therefore how a relationship with them can be 
established. This is because the ethos of freedom that is contained in the care for the self 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
counsellors, friends??????????? 1994b: 287). It therefore carries with it a pluralist dimension 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ever present in the  care for the self (Ibid); there exists within this ethic the postulate that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
properly in relation to ??????????????????????????????? 287).  
As has been shown Arendt sees plurality as the ontological condition of humankind 
because plurality offers the space for the sharing and understanding of viewpoints between 
distinct yet equal peopl??????????????????????? do our distinct viewpoints have meaning, the 
condition par quam for all political life. The consequence of exile from this world is the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????without the company of 
trusting and trustworthy distinct equals. Thus, for Arendt the self depends on the existence 
of others and for others to have meaning to and for us plurality is needed. The two are 
symbiotic.  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????idea rather than diverge from it. In 
his recognition of the importance of caring for oneself as opposed to knowing oneself, 
Foucault underlines the importance of the self for meaningful relationships with others, or 
to make the point Arendtian, the sine qua non to plurality of the distinct identity of the self 
which does not exclude plurality but has it immanent to it. He too describes a symbiotic 
relationship between the two where lack of care for the self degrades the ability to form 
relationships with others that in turn ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
not only permits care for others, it also implies it. The parallel between Arendt and 
Foucault in their observations of the self and others is that there is political and social 
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sufficiency, profit and enjoyment from this symbiosis. There is therefore an undeniable 
pluralistic ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
epimeleia tonallon140 within the epimeleia heautou141 (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 359) that 
preserves something valuable about Arendt. 
Braun also ???????????????????????????ent for the care of the self because she also doubts 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
analyse, ???????????????????????????????? 20). Braun never fully establishes quite why she 
sees it as the case that politics needs to be overcome. It is far more accurate to argue that it 
is the political oppressions conducted upon everyday lives that need to be overcome, rather 
than politics itself, which is an unrealistic aim ?????????????????????????????????????ect in 
any case????????????????????????????????????????????in parallel with the claims of this thesis, 
writers such as Dolan recognize and point out the need for ????????????????????????????????
373). Connolly (1997) and Kingston (2009) recognise the value of Care of the Self, 
something which is missed in the work of scholars such as Marquez (2010: 21, 2010a: 11) 
in the haste to rescue Arendt. Hardt (2010: 160) explains that Foucault did not have time to 
fully develop his ideas about this.  
 
Care of the self ????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 288) and this 
inversion of power occurs in more than one way. Firstly care for the self stands in 
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
resists the self-government immanent to this. Thus, contemporary power begins to be 
inverted through resistance of knowing oneself. The beginning of resistance that this action 
marks out by definition constitutes an exercise of freedom. This exercise of freedom is 
extended through care of the self through changing habits of speech, action and thought. 
Secondly, care of the self considers others in the same moment that the self is considered 
and in doing so subverts the isolating technique of the art of governmentality outlined 
elsewhere in this thesis. Care of the self is also the raising of awareness of the self and 
through this strengthens the potential for the relationships with others and also strengthens 
the connections in those relationships themselves. This further constitutes an exercise of 
                                                                                                                    
140 Care of others 
141 Care of the self 
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freedom in an Arendtian sense through i) the plural dimension that exists within care of the 
self and (ii) the necessity for effective Arendtian pluralism that care of the self constitutes.  
Because of these things care of the self can be argued to have an immanent Arendtian 
political dimension due to its recognition of plurality which translates into an inherent 
sociability, and Foucault identified a political dimension for the ethic of care for the self 
which addresses both epimeleia heautou and epimeleia tonallon. Foucault stated that what 
really interested him i???????????????????????????????? 375) which incorporates the ethic of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????1994b: 131)  and which in that 
moment of action demonstrates a further reflective and conscious practice of freedom. It is 
to an explanation ???????????????????????????as a way to further transcend the social and 
political that this chapter now turns.  
8.7: Politics as An E thics 
?I emphasize practices ???????????????????????????????????????? (Foucault 1994b: 
283) 
Foucault refers to other ways that freedom can be created and care for the self further 
exercised, through the adoption of politics as an ethics.  As will be shown in the following 
section this understanding fulfils the observation that Foucault made for the need of a new 
economy of power relations (1994: 329). The contention here is that politics as an ethics 
has political merit on several bases. In addition to this, the chapter will show why 
o????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
conditions that make individual resistance [?????????????????????????? 143)142 actually 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????constituted 
by the very conditions that not only make resistance possible, but more often than not 
actually demands it.  
In a somewhat prophetic sense, Foucault seemed to anticipate criticisms of his work such as 
the one above when he stated that he reject?????????????????????????????????-wielding state 
that exercises its supremacy over a civil society deprived of ?????????????????????????
(1994: 290). In this statement, Foucault rejects a model of the western world which sees the 
                                                                                                                    
142 Kingston (2009: 93) also rejects similar claims. 
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zero-sum situation of the state as an omnipotent political entity existing at the expense of an 
impotent society. This is in line with his rejection of the mystification of power and his 
absolute refusal to see any power arrangement as necessary, inevitable or intractable. On 
this basis he argued that it was possible and indeed desirable to resist dominating power 
arrangements in any way possible. The importance of this recognition is that although it 
may be the case that some people are unable, through time or lack of resources, to ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
practice of non-acceptance (in Rabinow 1991: 377). Although, he likened this idea to a type 
of dissidence, Foucault ultimately rejected dissidence as a description of his political vision 
(2007: 201). Instead he argued for a resistance of power arrangements that he reluctantly 
???????????????-????????????????????????-conduct won out as the favoured description of 
his vision of political resistance because it contained some important elements necessary 
for the successful forms of political challenge required in the western world today and also 
offered possibilities that are not limited to any one western country (Foucault 1994: 329). It 
??????????????????????????????????counter- ????????????????????????????????????????????
reference to the active se???????????????????????????????? 201). It can be seen therefore, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????done or 
not done with a d????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????litics 
?????????????????????????? 202).  
Foucault identifies three main moments of counter-conduct.  The first counter-conduct is 
the affirmation of an eschatology that civil society will prevail over the state (2007: 356), 
the disappearance of governmental strategies and techniques from the lives of individuals. 
For Foucault ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????[?] when civil society 
frees itself of the constraints and con?????????????????????????? 356). In this explanation 
Foucault makes his d???????????????????????????????????????????????????????he challenge 
to the politics of the contemporary, western world will come from the ???????????????????????
?????????????????????social??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? an 
imperative role in political resistance because as has been shown elsewhere in the thesis, 
???????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????? 343).  The active 
????????? ??????????????????????????- conduct constitutes makes the inescapable recognition 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? [??] whose radical 
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????elations 
???????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????
in his recognition that the social and political can not be separated and this thesis argues 
that because of this he strengthens this major weakness in her oeuvre. One of the major 
strengths of politics as an ethics therefore is that it recognizes as potential sites of 
empowerment those aspects of everyday lives that Arendt would term ?social? and therefore 
outside genuine political action.  
For Foucault it is through non-acceptance that ethics takes on a political dimension, in his 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????: 377). This realization brings 
????????????????????????? form of counter-??????????????? 356) in this argument which is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????ght to revolution 
?????????????? 357). At this point it is worth exemplifying the wide and varied forms that this 
insurrection can resist. Far beyond, but certainly not excluding, the most historically and 
globally familiar form of strident subversion that is coordinated or spontaneous collective 
insurrection (Foucault 2007: 357), Foucault?????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????k the bonds of 
????????????????? 356). Out of the many possibilities that this suggests, this might include 
the refusal to judge [??] the list of those so subjected [?] the indigent, the degenerate, the 
feeble-minded, the aboriginal, the homosexual, the delinquent, the dangerous or even, and 
much m??????????????????? ????????????????? 134) and/or the active turn away via a 
celebration of plurality from all and any attempts to homogenise society. The economic-in-
the-social that is rampant consumerism can be resisted by ticking the boxes that deny 
companies the permission to call you at any time, selecting mail preferences to avoid junk 
mail, not stopping for commercial surveys in the street, using a credit union instead of 
borrowing from banks143.  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
possibilities for engagement with politics as an ethics of resistance might include 
demanding that what should be expected of social security is that it is to be freed from 
                                                                                                                    
143 Martel and Klausen (2008: 18) make suggestions for counter-conduct as does Troyer (2003: 273) who 
????????????????????????????-????????? 
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dangers and from situations that tend to de????????????????????????????????????? 336), or by 
asking questions and by making it a maxim that if the qu?????????????????????????????????
asking the question again (Foucault in Rabinow 1991: 377). Indeed any resistance within 
everyday life helps in the cessation of submission to pastoralising forces and therefore will 
at one and the same time facilitate the resistance of the techniques of governmentality, or 
bio-politics to call them by their modern name. In terms of this thesis this also results in 
resisting the traditional division between what is political and what is social such as 
identified by Arendt and taking action that transcends this division.  
These forms of resistance ???????????????????????????????????????????????????bring forward 
the third and final form of counter-conduct, which is the resistance to the biopolitics of the 
modern age. Via episodes of micro-resistance as exemplified above, the foundations of 
whole network of the biopolitical become less rigid and therefore so too do all of the arts of 
governmentality. To engage in counter-?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the pos???????????????????????????????? 357) and applies regardless of the ideological basis 
of a government. This applies not only to each individual within the population, but also the 
population as a whole. Via these counter-conducts the idea that at a given moment the 
nation itself must be able to possess the truth of wh???????????????????????????????? 357).  
These examples, however, are only part ????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????? mere negation. 
It is productive, creative ? to be an active member of a process. No is decisive but is also 
the minimum form of resistance? (1994b: 168). In this sentiment, Foucault refers to yet 
more potential for counter-conduct. Referring to his recognition that power is creative as 
well as destructive, productive as well as repressive and rarely immutable or intractable, he 
also pointed out that counter-conduct can likewise take a productive form, which can also 
result in innovation within peoples everyday lives.  Such examples of creative counter-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? art, 
?????????????????????????? 164). The potential here is also as infinite as in the previous 
examples of counter-conduct and amongst many others will include becoming involved in 
your community to create a new, or revive an old community, to make demands on public 
servants that they fulfil the roles they have been elected to fulfil, to foster relationships of 
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the family(ies) of our own choosing144, to cultivate and celebrate our plural identities 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
ethical and political choices, [we] not only affirm ourselves as an identity but as a creative 
?????????????? 164). Once again, such action145 would resist the traditional division of 
social and political by remarking the boundaries upon which action takes place. This 
redrawing of the boundaries would arise because action takes place in the form of a pro-
action in addition to a reaction.   
At this point it would be prudent to return to the critique of Foucault referred to at the 
beginning of this section that queries what the conditions might be that make such counter-
conduct possible. Foucault acknowledges that some of these forms of counter-conduct will 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
(1994: ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nd practical 
?????????????????4: ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
succeed perhaps in changing a situation that with the terms in which it is currently laid out 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????oes not excuse 
those in society less directly oppressed by governmentality, but who are affected by it 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? the 
governed means t?????????????????????????????????? situation there will be at least one, yet 
probably more than one, reason to resist, and in every relationship of power there is the 
opportunity to do so no matter whether at the level of people in the plural or an individual 
level.  
This reading of Foucault leads the argument of this thesis to contrast with Arendt/Foucault 
scholars such as Marquez (2010), Gordon (2001) and Kingston (2009). Marquez for 
example claims that power is at all times collective (2010: 9). This assertion underplays the 
point that  source(s) of oppression can come through the real or perceived subjectivizing 
??????????????????????? that is it fails to recognize (2010: 4) that a horizontal as well as 
                                                                                                                    
144 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
see Kingston (2009).  
145 ?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????tly been revived by Hardt (2010: 
160) 
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vertical oppression can exist. Gordon makes the same error (2001: 35). By viewing 
??????????????????????????????????????in much too literal terms (2001: 27) he ignores the 
power relationships that exists between students themselves (Ibid). In this joint error both 
Marquez and Gordon fail to recognize that the horizontal forms of power relationship that 
exist in these moments therefore also provide spaces for resistance, not only at a collective 
level, but also at an individual one too.  
This error is repeated by Kingston (2009). Despite some parallel observations to those 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
The error that Kingston makes, which is seemingly a common one in the body of 
comparative work between Arendt and Foucault, is to cast the individual approach to action 
as necessarily exclusive of action undertaken by individuals in the plural (2009: 5, 31). As 
this thesis has already shown there is a value for empowering people in the claims of 
Arendt, but the weakness in the false dichotomization of individual or collective 
exemplified by writers such as Kingston, is that the initiation of resistance fails to be 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????ularly 
in the case of the contemporary ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
both the plural and individual levels. These writers? failure to take adequate account of this 
results in an avoidance of the Foucauldian project through an Arendtian appeal to 
collectives such as small communities at the expense of the potential of the individual146. It 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????from each person as the 
locus for cultivating counter-conduct still permits a space for collective resistance147. 
Furthermore, in contradiction to  critics such as Allen (2002) one of the major strengths of 
????????????????????????????????-??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
fit the space and resources of their situation, for example by the choice between counter-
conduct as outright resistance such as the G20 protests or the recent reactions or the 
???????????????????????????in Stokes Croft, Bristol (Kingsley 2011) to counter-conduct as a 
creative form such as finding and following ways to care for the self (and others by 
implication) through such things as meditation, growing your own produce or cultivating 
new relationships and plural connections. This idea is exemplified, although by no means 
                                                                                                                    
146 Bell (1996: 92) and Grumley (1998: 60) also recognise this.  
147This is recognised in different ways by Grumley (1998), Gordon (2001) Marquez (2010).  
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exhaustively, ?????????????????????????????148, an alternative to the four main UK mega 
supermarkets that sells produce local to it at affordable prices and is owned by the 
community and staffed by volunteers. It is also not the case that these two versions of 
counter-conduct are mutually exclusive, both outright individual and collective resistance 
and creative individual and collective resistance can be engaged in.  What is very evident 
?????????????????????????????? and which this thesis seeks to retain, is the point that there 
???????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
things that can be done, invented, contrived by those who recognizing the relations of 
power in which they are involved have decided to resist them or escape ???????Foucault, 
1994, 294). In a pre-emptive strike against criticisms such as those of Allen, Foucault 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? [...] to become. That is something without 
??????????????? 163). In an extension of this, this thesis argues that there is no reason why 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????political? agents in the ?social? 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????[?] of a suspension or completion of 
historical and political time when, if you like, the indefinite governmentality of the state 
will be brought to an e????????????????????? 356). This is possible because the apparently 
monolithic ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
episod????????????????????????????????????? 248). 
8.8: Conclusion???????????????????????????????????  
Foucault recognized that certain elements of neo-liberal governmentality such as security, 
utilitarianism, maximising efficiency, human capital and privatized prudentialism rests at 
the present time as a form of governmental techniques that focus upon individuals through 
bio-politics, which equates to those aspects of their lives that theorists such as Arendt 
would see as completely outside the political realm. The genealogy that Foucault traces has 
thus bequeathed a legacy whereby any thinking pertaining to the political, economic or 
social spheres necessarily has to take all three into account at the same time. This thesis has 
exemplified how this still applies in many contemporary situations. The implication of this 
is that a new direction for thinking about and acting upon the domination of everyday life is 
required. This is one where the impractical and traditional endeavour to separate the 
                                                                                                                    
148 ??????????????????????????, Channel 4,  27th February 2011. 
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spheres is abandoned and a much more realistic approach is adopted. This should recognise 
and reflect the basis upon which these spheres are actually experienced in contemporary 
western societies and use them as the basis for challenge and resistance.  
In looking toward this new direction, the dominating art of governmentality is challenged 
and resisted on the individualizing and collective oppressions and dominations of 
governmentality over and within the ?social? world. This thesis argues that it is imperative 
that the social ??????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????? becomes the site of 
both political and economic resistance which equals new forms of empowerment. 
????????????olitics as an ethics empowers people by fully politicizing all aspects of their 
lives????????????????????????????????????????????????olitics. In politicizing the ?social? in this 
way, the scope exists for both individual and collective resistance. No-one is excluded by 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
more attentive reading of Foucault shows the answers to criticisms such as those raised by 
McNay (1991), Gordon (2001), Allen (2002), Braun (2007). The conditions for resistance 
already exist; contemporary bio-politics is both defined by the conditions that allow 
resistance and also by those that demand it.  As the conclusion to the thesis will show, the 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the impractical proscription to separate the social and political as seen in arguments like 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????he potential to galvanize 
contemporary (bio)political resistance149 in a way that is achievable for and sensible to 
most people and which also speaks to them in the sense of their everyday life experiences 
because it is on this basis that it is challenged.
                                                                                                                    
149  Recently Hardt (2010: 159) made a similar observation. 
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CONCLUSION: EMPOWERING  EVERYDAY  LIVES 
This argument grew out of an article that looked at how Arendt demonstrates a strength that 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????. The research undertaken for 
this showed that there were many parallels between the two theorists which have relevance 
to societies within Western Europe and North America and for these reasons an important 
argument about contemporary experiences could be made via a synthesis of these strengths 
in their work. This synthesis of their work however has also allowed ??????????????????????
work to correct major weaknesses in the arguments of Arendt. 
This thesis is original in three main ways. Firstly, it is one of very few book length 
comparative studies of these two thinkers. Secondly, it has also looked at the majority of 
existing comparative secondary literature on Arendt and Foucault which means that it goes 
beyond the limit of these two other comparative pieces. The third point of originality 
derives from the parallels between the two that have been considered.   
The first parallel considered here was the critique of sovereignty between Arendt and 
Foucault. This made the argument that contemporary sovereignty is iniquitous, dominating 
and therefore a limiting form of politics. It also made the point that this form of politics, 
although existing in different places in slightly varying forms, is a common organisation of 
power generally in terms of the nation-state and universally in terms of liberal democratic 
countries in particular. It also showed how some societies of the contemporary developed 
world had equivalent forms of fear and insecurities to the ones written about by advocates 
of sovereignty.  
The importance of Foucault and Arendt??????????????????????? critique of contemporary 
sovereignty was shown to reside in their parallel distinction from advocates of sovereignty. 
Their respective arguments make it clear that advocates of sovereignty make two mistakes. 
The first is in putting an assumed human nature as a priori to politics. This assumes that 
humanity has an inevitable and unalterable nature that creates problems to be addressed or 
managed retrospectively rather than as a situation in which the human plural condition and 
political issues co-exist in symbiosis. The second mistake is in treating assumed human 
nature in a negative sense only, in terms such as fearful, greedy, brutal and violent which 
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leads theorists of sovereignty to view political solutions to this human nature as 
necessitating an arbitrator of friend or enemy. This rhetoric of hostility was shown to be 
repeated in contemporary politics.  
This parallel has further value because of the refusal to view people in such negative terms. 
This means that the perception of the inevitability of hostility between people is resisted as 
is fear of the other. The parallel brought out in this thesis showed that politics informed by 
sovereignty dis-empowers people in their capacity to act. Arendt blames this 
disempowerment on the contract between people and sovereign and rejects the contract on 
this basis. Foucault rejects the contention that war ends due to the sovereign. This thesis 
claims that this parallel rejection of sovereign politics opens up alternative possibilities for 
politics within societies.  
A critique of sovereignty is therefore relevant to the contemporary context and this can take 
place on several levels. These include the parallel recognition that all people are not equal 
but that inequality is in fact immanent to sovereignty which furthered Foucault and 
?????????distinctions from Schmitt and also marked out their distinction from Weber. The 
inequality immanent to viewing the sovereign as an inevitable and inescapable ?power on 
high? leads to a misanalysis of the way that power really operates and neglects the societal 
dominations and political isolations that it creates. These creations include the manufacture 
of an individual, the presentation of difference in negative terms and exaggeration of the 
threats that this embodies. ????? ??????????????????????????????? normalising judgements 
between and amongst people at societal level which prevents important connections 
between people. This thesis showed that this joint recognition of such separations within 
society could be demonstrated through contemporary cultural and political examples.  
?????????contemporary relevance was shown through her claims that state sovereignty in a 
global context is flawed. The recognition by Arendt of the modern marriage of politics and 
violence distinguishes her further from Schmitt and in a further paradox, shows the 
Hobbesian problem of the state of nature as one that is unresolved in an international 
context. This thesis has also used contemporary examples of these issues to question the 
necessity of the ?????????????? ???????????????????????????? rather than empowerment 
through greater pluralism.   
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The claims made here have ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????he ????????????????????????????? 95) to show that both offer a much more 
forceful critique than this. Both use liberal concepts to form a specific attack on the notion 
of sovereignty of the individual, a particularly neo-liberal focus which is defined in this 
thesis as the focus on individual security and efficiency to the exclusion of all other socio-
political considerations. On this basis, this thesis demonstrated these criticisms to be 
relevant to contemporary politics. Equally as relevant is their parallel recognition that these 
concerns only ensure negative freedoms which are also limited freedoms because when 
measured in these ways individual sovereignty compounds the perception of insecurity 
??????????????????????????????????.  
A weakness was identified ??????????????????????????relates to her failure to account for the 
loss of individual autonomy that could occur when individual sovereignty is lessened. This 
issue was mitigated by pointing out that the amount of autonomy individuals actually have 
given their existence as plural beings is not something that can easily be decided, but this 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nty is one that is only invoked 
when it is to the exclusion of all else, namely other people. Furthermore, any loss of 
autonomy that occurs as a result of a reduction in individual sovereignty would take place 
from equitable rather than hierarchical circumstances if other aspects of Arendtian politics 
were also in place.  
The greater wea?????????????????????????? was related to the ???????????????????? 
renaissance of the city-citizen, a weakness that is repeated in secondary literature which 
attempts an Arendtian corrective of Foucault. This thesis pointed out that social revolution 
will not be a possibility in initiating this ??????????????????????ocal rejection of violence,. 
It suggests the possibility that the resolution to this weakness can be sought in the argument 
of Foucault because of his strength in locating his argument within, and not apart from 
society, and the circumvention of the limits of a politics based entirely on collectives such 
as nations or class that this pluralism allows??????????????????????????????????????ment were 
attested to here through his more precise socio-historical sensitivity than Arendt which as 
well as being more relevant to contemporary societies also gives his arguments a form of 
flexibility because disempowerment can take many forms both within and across time.  
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Using a see-saw analogy this thesis situated ???????????????????????shepherd-flock as a 
modern and contemporary phenomena that is ?????????????????? decline of the city-citizen. 
As a response to these two phenomena this thesis retained the see-saw analogy by 
suggesting that the rise of the city-citizen, that is a more politically interested, motivated 
and empowered individual might be the consequence of the decline of the shepherd-flock 
constituted by a socially and politically dominated population. This suggestion was argued 
to have two advantages. Firstly, in not being as abstract an idea as attempting the stand 
alone rejuvenation of republican sentiments amongst people in the Arendtian sense and 
secondly that sending the shepherd-flock into decline does not require co-ordinated action 
or violence. In this moment, Foucault???argument was shown to preserve ?????????principle 
of anti-violence whilst strengthening this weakness in her work.  
In parallel distinction to contract theorists like Rousseau, Foucault and Arendt also 
recognise that a multitude of opinions and wills cannot be adequately represented by a 
single entity. A further common strength therefore exists through ??????????????? celebration 
of plurality. Plurality is important to the argument in this thesis because it is vital for the 
alternative forms of empowerment offered through connections with other people. On this 
basis, the argument was made that another strength in the work of both theorists is the 
politicisation of plurality rather than fear.  
This was shown to reduce fear of the other by celebrating rather than disparaging the 
differences between people. In this recognition both theorists were shown to distinguish 
themselves further from advocates of sovereignty who disparage these differences on the 
basis of the unpredictability and uncertainty that such differences pose. This thesis 
demonstrated that it is evident that some contemporary political systems try to suppress 
these aspects of plurality giving further relevance to this parallel.  
This argument also explained that assujetissement remains relevant to contemporary 
western societies and examples of where this can be identified in everyday lives were 
given. ????????????????????????????????????????????poor and limited relationships, 
disconnections and ultimate disempowerment between people that are connected to 
assujetissement is used in this thesis to further support the argument for a greater 
appreciation of plurality. This, it has been argued here, ??????????????????????????????
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axiom to be neither for nor against which equals a rejection of preconceived boundaries 
limited by binary opposition. Once again, in line with a central concern of this argument a 
space is opened out for a variety of relationships between people which can foster a greater 
appreciation of distinction and opportunities to challenge disempowerment.  
This argument emphasised the importance of equality in the work of both theorists. For 
Foucault this as an ontological condition whereas Arendt sees it as one that must be 
guaranteed by others, however both agree that it is imperative to recognise others as peers 
or members of the community of the governed rather than as a hostile ?other?. In addition to 
further reducing the bellicose model that informs modern and contemporary sovereign 
politics, equality also acts as a bulwark against the anti-political state of hierarchy. This 
thesis reiterates the importance of these things for alternative approaches to empowering 
individuals within their everyday lives.  
This thesis claimed that a positive view of distinction is necessary for reasons besides those 
above. Agonism is permitted when the sharing of viewpoints takes place within a space of 
equals which creates politically proactive spaces. These are politically proactive because 
people are more visible both in their individuality, in their solidarity with other people and 
via an immediacy to the results of their actions. This space also opens up the potential for 
spontaneity whilst also being at one and the same time a flexible and portable space. In 
support of this contention, this thesis has offered contemporary examples of where this too 
infrequent approach to politics has successfully taken place. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????for a higher reflective ability amongst those 
who enter the public space of the world because it implies elitism. However, this argument 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? shows a non-elitist approach to politics 
because anyone can engage in it. His argument for this hyper activism recognises that 
plurality is diminished via the assujetissement of the societal sphere and this gives his work 
more contemporary relevance than Arendt as well as avoiding elitism.  
Arendt and Foucault also recognise in parallel that it is quite possible to escape the current 
limits of politics and this is also something that has been emphasised here. Their belief that 
an alternative politics can be created through the politicisation and celebration of the 
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differences that are found within the plurality of humans marks their parallel distinction 
from theorists of sovereignty such as Schmitt who argue that the state and politics are 
inseparable. This thesis has used this to show that a significant distinction exists between 
the perception of difference as something to be feared and judged as opposed to a 
celebration of difference without the limits of enmity.  It is for this reason that this thesis 
makes the defence of plurality a central part of the synthesis of their work in the argument 
for new approaches to empowerment.   
The synthesis between Arendt and Foucault was furthered by their parallel critique of 
instrumental rationality. Both recognize a post-enlightenment form of rationality conceived 
in means-ends terms. This is a scientific rationality, measured only in terms of optimization 
or utility that has now become a ubiquitous form of rationality in all aspects of human 
affairs and these joint arguments allowed this thesis to show that in the realm of human 
affairs this rationality is one intrinsically linked to various forms of domination.   
The application of instrumental rationality toward people shows that such a form of 
rationality cannot stand up to the irrationality of the world. Both Arendt and Foucault 
extend this point further however to distinguish themselves from theorists such as Weber 
by showing in more detail where this type of rationality leads for example to forms of 
social domination such as bureaucracy or anti-political strategies such as violence. Both 
define violence as physical harm, directed towards bodies not conduct, and both theorists 
distinguish themselves from Schmitt through a more sophisticated account of politics 
whereby they separate violence from power. Their parallel demystification of power is 
important to this thesis because of the conviction that there is always space to renegotiate 
power. This can be through other people in their plurality in the case of Arendt and by 
individual resistance in the case of Foucault.  
??????????????????????????????????was shown here to have a weakness in comparison to 
Arendt in two ways. Firstly, he makes the implicit criticism of her consensual view of 
power only to return to its more positive aspects at a later date thus demonstrating too 
simplistic a representation of her thought. Secondly, without consideration of Arendt, as 
???????????????????????????????????????????????, he identified the need to understand the 
rationality behind the use of violence which was something that she had already fulfilled. 
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This oversight of the already existing Arendtian analysis of violence implies at best a lack 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? by Foucault.  
Foucault and A????????????????????????????????????????????????????? to contemporary 
politics and thus this thesis in two ways, beginning with violence as the superlative 
expression of modern political instrumental rationality. Further to this, it is the superlative 
expression of contemporary political rationality as this thesis exemplified both in Chapter 
One and the chapters on instrumental rationality. Foucault and A?????????????????definition 
of politics that use violence is that of a limited politics. This thesis also recognises this. 
Drawing on these arguments this thesis made the claim that the real task for empowering 
people is in challenging and resisting the ossifications of such instrumental rationalities 
such as those that suggest that forms of power are a possession or necessary or final or a 
fatality?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????moments when the 
circulation of power becomes blocked and so power can and should be challenged to ensure 
its constant circulation.  This maxim is also a central part of the synthesis of their work in 
this argument for new approaches to empowerment that move beyond the social and 
political.  
Bureaucracy is a political rationality that administers everyday lives beyond the point of 
either absolute or relative subsistence by creating both dependency and marginalisation. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????nstrumental rationality was 
shown as relevant to contemporary society was through contemporary forms of reasons of 
state such as criminology, risk and cultural judgement; in short the judgements of 
normality. The value to this thesis of the parallel analysis of bureaucracy lies in the 
recognition of it as the rule by nobody which uses a ridiculous form of authority whereby 
the power that it uses appears to emanate from nowhere and no-one. This means that no-
one can be held to account and is therefore a rationally organized socio-political form of 
absence of speech. Besides the contemporary examples of this that were given this analysis 
included ?????????discussion of Eichmann, who demonstrates what the consequences are 
when a desire for security beyond all else, a willingness to conform and a refusal to 
exercise judgement crystallizes at a single point. This example showed what becomes 
possible when the instrumental rationality of bureaucracy meets the arbitrary efficiency of 
228 
Beyond the Social and Political 
the instrumental rationality that is violence. The point was made in this thesis that despite 
the case that the contemporary bureaucracy of the western world does not result in the 
extreme consequences characteristic of Eichmann the unreflective, inflexible instrumental 
rationality behind them both belong to the same continuum.   
Two weaknesses in Arendt??????????????????????????????????????? were demonstrated in this 
thesis. Despite locating bureaucracy as constitutive of an absence of power, Arendt neglects 
a full exploration of it as a surfeit of societal authority and domination. This thesis showed 
that ??????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????over people 
corrects this weakness in Arendt further suggesting why a synthesis of their work helps to 
conceive of alternative ways to empower people. This thesis also identified however that 
for all of the problems that Arendt identifies with instrumental rationality, she gives very 
little explanation for how this can be reversed. This thesis argued that this is the ultimate 
strength that Foucault demonstrates in comparison to Arendt. Bureaucracy therefore formed 
???????????? final point of comparison between the two theorists as it is was shown to be the 
area where the questions that they might ask each other become more tangible and where 
the ultimate divergence between them begins.  
The early part of this thesis reflected the recognition that for some of us politics is closer to 
worldliness than to government, law or administration (Dolan 2001: 441) which 
encapsulates the main basis for the synthesis between Arendt and Foucault regarding their 
respective strengths. However, this thesis showed the main divergence between Arendt and 
Foucault to be found in their respective and differing views of the social and political. This 
thesis therefore used the differing strengths of each regarding this issue to correct the 
weaknesses in the other which further informed the synthesis between them given here. 
 
The explanation of their divergence in this way began with an exploration of Aren?????
?????????to show her strengths in this that other writers sometimes miss, thus distinguishing 
the argument here from other secondary writers because it is more sympathetic to her 
claims in The Human Condition. It rejected the characterisation of ????????????????either as 
??????????a simplistic concept or as confused and incoherent, although it did recognize that 
Arendt contradicted herself at times in her explanation of this. The argument here asserted 
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that the majority of secondary work looking Are????? ??????????????? ????????????This 
thesis distinguished itself from these interpretations by offering this greater nuance through 
comprehensive consideration of ?????????????????????revolution. This led this thesis to 
clarify that her discussion of the social allows Arendt to make a case for the empowering 
potential of solidarity, an important aspect of her work retained in the synthesis with 
Foucault. Further strengths shown here was Arendt?? distinction from Marx in terms of her 
criticism that he destroys plurality through the socialization of both poverty and mankind. 
This recognition was important to this synthesis for the following reasons???????????????????
recognition, contra Marx, that poverty and freedom are not incompatible extends the 
empowerment of everyday lives to anyone regardless of their position in or experience of 
society. ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
support the contention of this thesis that challenging the pastoralisation and isolation of 
individuals has to be attempted by more than simply challenging the economic context in 
which they exist. 
 
To highlight a further strength in Arendt this thesis explained how an alternative form of 
empowerment amongst plural individuals can work in praxis. B???????????????????????????
world example of Ancient Greece and also by identifying rare contemporary examples of 
the sharing of perspectives it was suggested that it is possible for a politics amongst equal, 
self-selected and motivated individuals to be undertaken for its own sake rather than 
efficiency, use value or ends. The importance of plurality was also underscored here 
through the examination of promises and forgiveness. This thesis uses these Arendtian 
ideas to suggest that the existence of other people can help to resist domination because 
promises between equal participants counteract the hierarchy of non-plural politics. In 
addition, they act as political actions in themselves because they constitute beginnings. As,  
promises are already used in contemporary politics this thesis pointed out that ?????????
claims regarding this, just as with her explanation of Ancient Greece, are not as far fetched 
as she is sometimes made to sound and was another way that this thesis distinguished itself 
from other secondary works. 
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The difficulties with ???????? view of the social and political were shown to arise from her 
claims that poverty must be solved by the private sphere and was shown to be easy to attack 
as an argument for the privatization of both poverty and politics.  This argument made the 
point that it is impossible for poverty to be resolved in private spheres which have differing 
levels of resources. This issue was shown to be complicated further by the contemporary 
situation that economic necessity is a political issue by extension yet one which is already a 
privatised concern between liberal demands for self-sufficiency and welfare policy which is 
directed at households.  
If Arendt was correct in the solution to the domination of politics by the social in this way 
this thesis posed the question as to why, contemporary societies are still characterized so 
definitively by such impoverished political experiences as exemplified herein? The 
argument here claims that this question leads to the inevitable conclusion that privatizing 
necessity as Arendt proscribed is not enough to instigate more fulfilling political 
experiences because there are additional anti-political experiences such as those 
exemplified in earlier chapters that this proposal from Arendt ignores. This issue therefore 
represents a much bigger issue in her work which is that her theory alone cannot provide 
the solution to the oppressions and limits on modern life that she outlines in her theories 
nor the wider problem of her analysis that the social dominates the political. With the 
recognition of this contradiction in Arendt it has been claimed that a different direction for 
politics is required than that of the separation of the social and political spheres set out by 
Arendt. 
The new direction for politics must reject the Arendtian attempt to separate these spheres 
because in the contemporary western world ??????????????????? inextricable from each 
other. Her solution is therefore both impractical and unachievable. This thesis claimed that 
this weakness ???????????????k can be transcended via an appeal to strengths in the work of 
Foucault. This thesis showed that as well having merits in its own right, such as offering 
the solution to some of the problems identified by them both without recourse to Marx or 
liberalism, Foucault also provides an alternative to criticisms that pluralists ???????????????
self ?????????????????????? ?????????????? 280).  Furthermore, in relation to the Arendtian 
problem of the social dominating the political, a synthesis of their work that looks at this 
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issue from a Foucauldian point of view has the advantages not of abandoning Arendt 
wholesale but of preserving all of the strengths of Arendtian politics hitherto celebrated in 
this thesis whilst also fortifying the weaknesses in it.   
This thesis has contended that the work of Foucault gives a much more realistic approach to 
solutions for contemporary political problems because his work is grounded in the ways 
that ??????????????????????politics?, ?society? and ?economics? are actually experienced. This 
strength has been shown to arise through his analysis of the modern version of liberalism 
that he identifies as neo-liberalism which he ties to modern life in three main ways.  
????????????????hand for these three ways are shown to be encapsulated in his concept of 
bio-politics, shown here through examples to be the contemporary form of government 
omnes et singulatum, a form of government beyond sovereignty. This explanation 
demonstrates his greater contemporary relevance than Arendt.  
This thesis ???????????????????????-politics to support the claim that there is an inescapable 
and link in contemporary life between the art of governmentality and the disempowerment 
that individuals experience within their everyday lives. To state this in Arendtian terms this 
thesis has asserted that there is an inextricable connection between the ?political?, 
?economic? and ?social? spheres. The argument made here therefore is that attempts at 
reversing the limited political experiences of contemporary western societies such as those 
outlined by the parallel strengths of these theorists have to take this into account when 
considering how to alter this disempowerment.  
Given the bio-political focus on individuals in contemporary, western societies it is clear 
that it is inaccurate to continue to view aspects of western life as either economic or 
political or social and treat them as belonging only to these three distinct spheres. It is more 
accurate to approach and conceive of the levels of (dis)empowerment that individuals 
experience in their everyday lives irrespective of what these problems may involve. This 
thesis proposes therefore that these inaccurate and unhelpful short hands are abandoned and 
the levels of empowerment in everyday lives are negotiated from within everyday lives. To 
put this in Arendtian terms this means the argument here is one for challenging political 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
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thesis asserts that this approach redresses this main weakness in Arendt and also provides 
the answer to contemporary forms of disempowerment.   
The strength of this claim of the need to transcend this Arendtian separation has been 
??????????????????????????????????????????????? concept of civil society as a technique of 
government, and politics and economics as regimes of truth inscribed in reality. ???????????
distinction from Arendt has been shown here to reside in his recognition that the opposition 
of civil society against the state is unproductive. This has shown that his assertions about 
this poses important questions to Arendt in that this aspect of his work clearly identifies a 
domination of the political over the social, to borrow Arendtian terms, as opposed to the 
opposite as viewed by Arendt. 
This thesis extends the above claim to show therefore that this opposition is both 
unproductive and disempowering within the contemporary western context. The limited 
empowerment of individuals has been shown to take place from the false opposition of 
society and state because it leads to the acceptance of fatalistic truths about society, 
examples of which are that societies are homogenous entities or that challenges to 
sovereignty will damage the economy or democracy. This thesis has shown that the 
importance of F???????????????????????????????????????????????????????s from his assertion 
that forms of power are never fixed, irreversible or immobile but can be challenged, 
resisted and renegotiated in several ways. These have been shown in this argument to 
include th??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
discussing political problems and the resistance of the maxim to know oneself in favour of 
a maxim to care for the self. In distinction to other secondary theorists this thesis rejected 
care of the self as a notion that is self-centred instead explaining it as something that 
immanently considers other people. This more plural aspect was shown to often be missed 
by other writers in their haste to rescue Arendt. Making a synthesis with Arendt on this 
basis ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
bringing it out more. Furthermore, through reiterating these forms of resistance, this 
synthesis also points out how new, different and better relationships with others can be 
undertaken thus marking points for the possible reversal of dominating practices.  
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These points illustrate that this ??????????? ???????????????????????????? the fatalism of 
power arrangements a central aspect of its argument. What has been claimed as both 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reconceived and renegotiated through agonistic forms of resistance. A destruction of the old 
can occur simultaneously with creation of the new and this point brings the thesis to its 
most important point and ultimate conclusion, which is that the transcendence of the 
problematic Arendtian separation of the social and political can be further informed using 
the specific principles of Foucaul??????????????????????????  
???????????????????????????????? corrects the main weaknesses in Arendt regarding the 
separation of the social and political because its principles are based on the constant 
renegotiation of power directed towards the dominations of everyday lives and therefore 
sited within everyday lives. It is these principles that form the final aspect of the synthesis 
of their theories given here and is therefore ??????????????????????????????????????????
power150 . This thesis is therefore distinct from the neutral comparison between them made 
by other secondary theorists. 
The principles of politics as an ethics ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
call for resistance to become an ethic of practice in the everyday lives of individuals. By 
resistance, Foucault was shown to mean the identification, refusal and challenge toward the 
bio-political dominations of everyday life that arise within western societies and which 
could be achieved both through resistance as outright refusal but also more creative forms 
of resistance. This argument has also highlighted that these forms of resistance should not 
be limited to resisting vertical, formal conceptions of power but also to horizontal, informal 
ones that can also dominate everyday life such as that from one person to another. This 
showed freedom to be based upon a practice of everyday life rather than something hidden 
needing to be revealed.  
The dynamic principles of counter-conduct were used as a way of resisting the 
disempowerment of everyday life and examples were given for how this could be done in a 
                                                                                                                    
150Interestingly both other book length comparisons of them favour Foucault over Arendt.  
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contemporary context. Not only does this argument view the contemporary experiences of 
everyday lives as making resistance to disempowerment possible because of the 
multifarious ways in which it occurs, it also claimed that contemporary experience 
demands such resistance.  In distinction to other secondary theorists therefore the emphasis 
here was that this turn toward Foucault for empowerment within everyday lives through 
resistance is an unashamedly ?political? one because its central concerns are ones of 
empowerment. 
 A synthesis between Arendt and Foucault using these principles honours the strengths of 
both theorists because the success or failure of the act of resistance is not as important as 
the act of resistance itself. What is important is that the moment of resistance forms a 
challenge and therefore a re-negotiation of the relationship of power. Applying this to 
everyday life in the ways that this thesis suggests subverts the principles of instrumental 
rationality that only sees value through means and ends. 
The importance of plurality is another strength honoured in this synthesis because politics 
as an ethics permits the space for both individual and collective resistance. Individuals can 
resist on the basis of their own everyday disempowerment but where people have everyday 
dominations in common, more than one individual can counter conduct. This opens up 
therefore a form of conscious resistance against all social oppressions singulatum in the 
first instance, but always with the promise to challenge and change oppression omnes. On 
this basis this form of resistance is also inclusive. As it is arises from and is directed within 
the everyday lives of individuals, the basis upon which it is undertaken does not derive 
from pre-existing social divisions nor act, recruit or propose solutions on such a basis. 
There are therefore no prior qualities or lack of qualities that distinguish, select and 
discri?????????????????????????????; all individuals irrespective of their situation can engage 
in this.   
This synthesis is therefore distinct from other secondary work on the two theorists that try 
to conserve Arendt?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? erroneously 
dichotomising individuals against collectives. To proscribe political action solely on the 
basis of collectives or communities not only limits social action in a way that it is rarely 
experienced, but it also misses something vitally important regard???????????????work that 
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this thesis recognises, which is that politics as an ethics does conserve something 
importantly Arendtian both in terms of plurality and natality.   
This thesis has recognised therefore that the individual is the starting point of all social and 
political resistance but not the limit of it. This shows the further strength of demonstrating 
how a politically engaging and proactive individual, who practices forms of resistance 
informed by the principles of politics as an ethics, initiates a point of reversal to the 
shepherd-flock and problems that it brings. The claim here has been that the pro-action 
involved in this could reinvent ???????? city-citizen in a sense more relevant to the 
contemporary context because of the alternative forms of empowerment created. 
The principles of politics as an ethics also recognize and ???????????????????????????????
everyday lives are dominated in many ways that range from the most formal vertical 
operation of power such as that of the sovereign to the subtle informal horizontal cultural 
judgements made by other people and these operations of power can be demonstrated in the 
contemporary western context. Therefore, in both a Foucauldian and contemporary western 
?????????????????impossible separation of the social and political has been demonstrated as 
inaccurate. Politics as an ethics views everyday lives as the site of bio-political domination 
and therefore the only meaningful site that resistance can take place. In this way it is used 
in this synthesis to transcend the Arendtian separation of the social and political.  
The everyday lives of contemporary western individuals are disempowered in many ways 
which include limited political systems, the domination and government of new forms of 
relationships and the narrow form of rationality informing these two other things. The art of 
government to which many individuals are subject knows nothing and does nothing outside 
of the space of everyday life. Recognizing the relevance of this to contemporary 
experiences means also to recognise that the division between the social and political is 
false and therefore is something that has to be transcended. The only way to transcend this 
inaccurate division is for people in either their singularity or their plurality to react to and 
resist these disempowerments from within their everyday lives because it is only in this 
way that disempowerment or new empowerment becomes comprehensible for most people 
because it speaks, relates, motivates and acts in the direct sense of their everyday lives. On 
this basis infinite possibilities are opened up for ways to ensure that power settles unequally 
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less often, greater connections between people are made and forms of rationality become 
constantly challenged. 
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